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Principles adopted by the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment call for the development of international law to con¬
trol marine pollution, for addressing marine pollution in international
organisations, and for coordinated work by these organisations. These are
the subjects studied in the thesis, that is, the legal and organisational
response to marine pollution and the issue of coordination among inter¬
national organisations concerned with marine pollution.
In evaluating the adequacy of the legal response, emphasis is
given marine pollution control conventions. These agreements are assessed
by studying how effectively they have been developed. Examination of the
organisational response is directed at the marine pollution activities of
eight global and six European international organisations. Considering
the many organisations involved with marine pollution and the numerous
administering institutions created by most of the conventions, questions
arise about effective coordination within this complex network. The
formal mechanisms to facilitate coordination -- as well as an array of
informal coordinating mechanisms -- are described and evaluated.
The thesis concludes that the organisations concerned with marine
pollution cooperate better than is thought, that coordination is not the
key to protecting marine resources, and that the concern for adequate
coordination has numerous tenets, many of which may be legitimately
questioned. It is also concluded that the international community is
responding commendably to marine pollution and that the response takes
place in international organisations and in the direct development of law.
The organisational and legal responses are not, however, independent.
Organisations stimulate law and are stimulated by it. The marine pollution
control conventions have laid the foundation for a sound legal regime
protective of the oceans. The necessary institutional arrangements have
been established to study marine pollution, disseminate information about
this problem, and continue the development of international environmental
law. In sum, the international community has established a legal and
organisational framework for control of marine pollution, a framework
that only awaits broader acceptance and fuller implementation for it to
adequately protect the oceans.
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INTRODUCTION
While the roots of modern environmentalism can be traced
to the budding nature conservation movement of the late 1800s and early
1900s,''' it has been only within the last two decades that environmental¬
ism has risen to the forefront of public concern. The awakening was
spawned by the combination of the development of nuclear power, the pub¬
lication of Silent Spring, and a series of oil tanker accidents. The
advent of nuclear capability and its uses produced emotional demands for
strict control. Atmospheric hydrogen bomb tests over the Pacific Ocean
and the consequent immediate and genetic harm to Japanese fishermen
alarmed the international community about the danger accompanying the
revolutionary development of nuclear power. These fears gradually
intensified with the recognition that the production of energy from
nuclear processes brought risks of radiation contamination from accidental
and operational discharges. The second event that spurred man's environ¬
mental conscious occurred in 1962 with the publication of Rachel Carson's
2
Silent Spring. Carson persuasively argued man was misusing chemicals and
that nature's inability to adapt to the input of wastes augured rapid
deterioration of man's natural heritage. Carson succeeded in her goal
to frighten. Last, oil tanker collisions and groundings in the 1960s
provided graphic evidence that advances in technology imposed costs to
be paid for by loss of flora and fauna.
By the time the 1960s ended, it was recognised that the envi¬
ronment was endangered. But much of the initial legal response to the
3
situation took place within the realm of national law. International
efforts before 1967 can "be regarded as belonging to a 'prehistoric era'
4
of marine pollution control." Yet some problems were -- and remain --
international that no state, no matter how vigorous its environmental
laws, can alleviate. Such is often perceived to be the case with marine
pollution. For example, ships flying the flag of one state may trade
in a number of foreign ports, traverse the territorial sea and exclusive
economic zone of many countries, and cross the high seas of many oceans.
This activity can result in a damaged environment. Oil and chemical
tankers are sometimes involved in collisions or pushed onto rocks by
foul weather or mechanical failure, resulting in the release of their
cargo. Such ships also discharge cargo residue as part of their opera-
1
tions. The international character of marine pollution is also repre¬
sented by land-based pollution. All states allow contaminants to be
discharged from land into the sea and these can be carried by currents
to the high seas or waters of neighbouring states.
The uniqueness of marine pollution was recognised early re¬
garding oil pollution from ships and conventions were adopted to control
5
this contamination. Treaties were also agreed to for several subjects
6
arising from the development of nuclear power. But this fragmentary,
uncomprehensive approach was believed inadequate. Thus, in 1969 the
United Nations General Assembly asked states to gather in Stockholm for
a conference on the environment to "serve as a practical means to encourage,
and to provide guidelines for, actions by governments and international
organisations designed to protect and improve the human environment and
to remedy and prevent its impairment, by means of international coopera-
7
tion..." The Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment was held in
1972. The Declaration it adopted is a formulation of international envi-
8
ronmental policy and marks the beginning of a concerted international
effort to respond comprehensively to environmental problems.
The Declaration comprises a number of principles and over a
hundred recommendations. Some of the principles call upon states to
9
develop international law and to ensure "that international organisa¬
tions play a co-ordinated, efficient and dynamic role for the protection
10
and improvement of the environment." While most of the recommenda¬
tions are applicable to environmental problems generally, a number
specifically deal with marine pollution."'""'" Here appear calls for inter¬
national cooperative action within and apart from international organi¬
sations, scientific study of marine pollution, and development of
international controls over activities that pollute the seas.
The Stockholm Declaration, with its call for more international
law, for addressing problems of marine pollution within international
organisations, and for coordinated work by organisations, raises the
three subjects studied in this thesis: the organisational and legal
response to marine pollution and coordination among intergovernmental
organisations (IGOs) concerned with marine pollution. These subjects
are not distinct. The legal response is heavily dependent upon IGOs
and the coordination issue is entwined with the legal and organisa¬
tional responses.
The thesis' examination of the international legal response
2
concentrates less on description than on evaluation. The discussion is
divided into convention and nonconvention-based rules for the environ¬
mental law of the sea. Regarding nonconvention-based rules, a short
review of customary law is offered. Primarily because customary law
usually takes a number of years to develop and since environmental
problems only recently have been recognised, the usefulness of customary
law is found to be severely limited. Next, a summary evaluation of
judicial decisions is presented with the conclusion that these explana¬
tions of international law are distinctly unhelpful for fashioning a
regime for the preservation of the marine environment. The decisions
examined are the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) Corfu Channel
Case and Nuclear Tests Cases as well as the international arbitrations
of Trail Smelter, Lake Lanoux, and Gut Dam. A few summary points are
made on national case law. Last, several broad observations are made
about seme general principles of law, primarily the abuse of rights
doctrine, and their value for international law.
Following this evaluation of nonconventional international
law, the thesis examines conventions with the hope of finding a sounder
regime. The review of conventions is not, however, comprehensive.
Beyond the scope of the thesis are treaties dealing with liability and
compensation as well as intervention conventions. Included are the 1958
Geneva Conventions and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC). A
number of specifically marine pollution control treaties are also studied.
These are divided into global and regional. The former include the
London Dumping Convention (LDC) and the Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). The regional treaties studied include
the Paris Convention on Land-Based Sources, the Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (ECE Convention), the Oslo Dumping Convention
(ODC), the Helsinki Convention for the Protection of the Baltic Sea,
and the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean
Sea. The methodology used in scrutinizing the specifically marine
pollution control treaties is not by an examination of their terms alone,
something that has been done extensively in other studies. Rather,
their value is assessed by studying how effectively they have been
implemented, interpreted, and developed by the institutions set up
to administer them.
12
Adopting a convention is a complex task. "No problem of
international law...can be viewed realistically [outside] its context
3
of underlying political, economic, sociological, scientific, techno¬
logical, and other factors, and no solution to an international law
13
problem can be achieved which does not accomodate these... realities."
14
Marine pollution is a complex problem involving all these factors.
Scientists disagree about the effects of marine pollution and
some about its very existence. Economic ramifications of pollution
control can be severe. Consequently, less developed countries (LDCs)
are concerned that their industrialization not be impeded by international
15
regulations. Despite the fact that different levels of economic
development are irrelevant to the consequences of pollution, the position
of LDCs has often led to double standards in international agreements,
with stricter controls placed on developed countries than undeveloped
ones. It has also led to the inclusion in treaties of provisions on
development aid and transfer of technology. The economic controls of
pollution control also influence developed countries where environmental
problems are typically viewed as minor consequences of more important
economic activities. Most developed states believe the costs of complete
protection too high, particularly during a time of economic recession.
Even marginal protection is not easily agreed upon by this group of states,
for their commercial interests may be damaged by agreeing to pollution
controls, particularly when some of their competitors for international
business are not parties to an agreement. The inevitable compromises
16
more likely favour commerce. Furthermore, because of "pride of
sovereignity," states are reluctant to allow any international control
over activities conducted on their land territory, where the most serious
17
marine environmental problems originate. Thus, only ship pollution,
which presents less sensitive political problems, is governed by a
reasonably well-developed international law. All of these, and other,
"complicating factors," significantly affect the ability and willingness
of states to agree upon strong measures.
Nonetheless, important advances have been made in preserving
the marine environment through the adoption and implementation of treaties,
but the system cannot be considered satisfactory. As IGOs, global and
regional, together possess considerable capabilities to address marine
pollution and strengthen law, the thesis goes on to examine the organi¬
sational response to marine pollution. Protection of the oceans depends
in part upon the ability of IGOs to develop prospective international
legal norms and push along their gradual acceptance, develop acceptable
codes of conduct, facilitate the progressive development of conventions
4
for which they act as Secretariats, assist states in expanding their
marine science capabilities, provide forums where states may meet to
discuss pollution control mechanisms, and study polluting activities and
the marine environment in order to provide states with sound, timely
information with which they may protect their coastal areas and develop
the international environmental law of the sea.
There are 250 international organisations with ocean activi-
19
ties, while about 150 of these are nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)
composed of individuals linked by a common, usually scientific, interest,
20
100 or so are intergovernmental. Tables in a recent issue of Marine
Policy set forth 41 regional organisations and 37 global organisations
21
involved with marine pollution. A 1983 United Nations study lists 17
United Nations bodies and 11 specialized agencies active in marine
22
pollution. The primary global bodies for marine pollution activities
are the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO), the International Sea-Bed Authority (ISBA),
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations Educa¬
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and its Intergov¬
ernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC), the Food and Agricultural
Organisation (FAO) , the World Health Organisation (WHO), and the World
23
Meteorological Organisation (WMO).
UNEP has a mandate to address all environmental problems and
has developed a Regional Seas Programme that now includes ten regions.
In these regions UNEP promotes national environmental management programmes
for the protection of coastal areas and international agreements to control
marine pollution. IMO has significant activities involving control of
ship pollution. The ISBA is concerned with the environmental consequences
24
of commercial exploration and exploitation of thecteep seabed. The IAEA
is responsible for problems arising from radioactive waste disposal into
the sea. UNESCO and its IOC endeavour to develop marine science capa¬
bilities of states and organise cooperative scientific investigations of
marine pollution. FAO is interested in marine pollution where it harms
living resources and interferes with fishing operations. WHO has
activities relating to human health aspects of marine pollution and WMO
studies transfer processes of air pollutants frem land to sea. Each of
these global IGOs is discussed in the thesis with an emphasis on their
marine pollution activities and how they are able to contribute to the
development of international law.
As mentioned, there are also a number of regional IGOs con-
5
cerned with the health of the oceans. The thesis, however, is directed
only at regional activities in Europe, and primarily Western Europe.
The reasons for this concentration are several. One, regional organisa¬
tions proliferate in Europe. Two, European bodies generally entered the
environmental field before those in other areas and have developed beyond
others in the scope of their functions and legislative powers. Three,
most of the legal response to marine pollution through conventions is
concentrated in Europe and the emphasis on European IGOs provides a link
between the thesis' discussions of the legal and organisational response
to marine polluiton.
As with the global organisations, it is the marine pollution
activities of the regional IGOs and how they contribute to international
law that are the emphasis of their discussion. The European bodies
examined are the European Economic Community (EEC), the Council of
Europe, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the bodies of Nordic Coopera¬
tion, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's Committee on the
Challenges of Modern Society (NATO's CCMS). These organisations were
chosen because of the breadth of their memberships and overall prominence
in European affairs. Their marine pollution activities cannot easily
be delineated, as were those of the global bodies, because the interests
of regional IGOs are generally wide-ranging, leading to programmes on a
number of aspects of marine pollution.
Besides the many global and regional IGOs with marine pollu¬
tion activities, the marine pollution control conventions mentioned
above have themselves created IGOs. These treaties are not self-executory.
Rather, an institution, usually termed a commission, is established to
administer and oversee implementation. Success or failure of a treaty
is more likely dependent upon the actions of the commission after the
treaty is in force than upon convention terms. A treaty without vigorous
provisions may nonetheless prove effectve, while one with stronger pro¬
visions may fail to meet expectations because of its commission's inability
to implement and develop it. Therefore, the commissions, which are a
form of IGO, play a significant role and exemplify the meshing of the
legal and organisational, response.
This interdependence and the role of IGOs in furthering the
legal response are highlighted by the LOSC. This treaty, which may well
enter into force, contains a long section on environmental protection.
The environmental articles, however, are generally devoid of specific
environmental duties. What the provisions do is direct states to the
6
"competent international organisation" and there to set specific obliga¬
tions for each of the sources of marine pollution. Which IGO is the
"competent" one to address which source of pollution is not clarified.
What is known, however, is that the development of the treaty and, hence,
international environmental law is likely to be carried out under the
auspices of IGOs. These bodies, therefore, take on added importance
further warranting a survey of their activities. Such a survey, it is
hoped, will aid in ascertaining which IGOs are to handle which of the
sources of marine pollution.
The global and regional IGOs, along with the commissions,
25
thus make up a complex network of organisations. There are a welter
of global, regional, and functional bodies addressing marine pollution,
and it is likely their number will grow. Yet none alone has the consti¬
tutional powers, technical ability, appropriate membership, or suffi¬
cient resources to preserve the marine environment. None operate at
all the levels where a forceful legal regime needs to exist. It has,
therefore, been hypothesized that there is a need for the organisations
to cooperate, to draw upon the various capabilities of the entire net¬
work through joint planning and execution to obtain the common goal of
cleaner seas. Of course, there are other problems that beset IGOs, such
as questions of mismanagement as plague UNESCO and debilitating political
bickering by member states. The causes and consequences of such prob¬
lems, as well as others, for building an effective legal regime deserve
attention. Yet regarding marine pollution, one issue, coordination, has
received considerable attention by the organisational network. Further¬
more, many writers have argued that present coordination of marine pollu¬
tion activities by organisations is unsatisfactory. Boczek, for example,
states: "The international legal and organisational environmental pro¬
tection network must be tightened, better coordinated and harmonized by
establishing links between the global and regional arrangements and pro-
26
grammes within the one region..." Such an argument is founded on the
idea that close coordination is needed if all available resources within
the network are to be brought fully to bear to effectively handle marine
pollution, particularly since these resources are limited.
While the issue of coordination is relevant to the legal
response -- for, as mentioned, organisations are initimately involved in
developing environmental law and administering conventions -- the dis¬
cussion of coordination will take place primarily along with the survey
7
of the organisational response. Coordination is more clearly involved,
and its lack of more often asserted, in the context of the overall
functioning ofIGOs than in those organisations' specific role in the
legal response to marine pollution.
Analysis of the coordination issue includes several areas.
After surveying the numerous complaints about poor coordination of
marine pollution control activities, the thesis examines several reasons
why coordinating IGOs is not simple. These reasons include the decentral¬
ized United Nations system, the trend to regionalism, the unique complexity
of environmental problems, and the effect upon IGO coordination of the
lack of coordination within national governments. The legal framework
for interorganisational cooperation is also examined. This includes
coordination provisions in the United Nations Charter, the relationship
agreements between the United Nations and the specialized agencies,
inter-agency cooperation agreements, and coordination provisions in
marine pollution control conventions and in constituting instruments of
the regional conventions.
The organisational network has long been concerned with coordi¬
nation and numerous mechanisms for improving collaboration have been
established. These include the Administrative Committee on Coordina¬
tion (ACC) and its subsidiary bodies on marine affairs and environmental
matters,the Inter-Secretariat Committee on Scientific Programmes Relating
to Oceanography (ICSPRO), the Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific
Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP), and UNEP's Regional Seas Programme
as well as its efforts to develop a System-Wide Medium-Term Environmental
Plan (SWMTEP). There are also general coordinating responsibilities for
the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and General
Assembly. Each of these coordinating mechanisms is described and assessed.
While most of the institutionalized coordinating machinery is found to
be ineffective, a broad range of noninstitutionalized machinery, such as
joint sessions, harmonized reporting, and liaisons, are also examined
and evaluated as having performed reasonably well. The final section on
the coordination issue submits that there is a good deal of coordination
among global and regional IGOs and questions the continued avid pursuit
of coordinating marine pollution activities.
To summarize, the themes of the thesis are two. The first is
an effort to determine the adequacy of the international community's
response to marine pollution. This study begins by examining nonconvention-
based rules of the international environmental law of the sea and, upon
8
finding these woefully insufficient, critically reviews conventions.
Although marine pollution control treaties provide encouragement that
the vitality of the seas will be retained and offer potential for further
securing that goal, they alone are insufficient. Consequently, one must
look to IGOs in the hope of finding activities or possibilities for
advancing the common goal of healthy seas. A number of conventions
themselves rely upon IGOs for administration. Finding a plethora of
organisations, global and regional, involved in this endeavour, a survey
is made of their activities and of a potential problem that may inhibit
their work, lack of coordination.
The second theme of the thesis, interlaced with the first, is
the idea that the international community's response to the problem of
marine pollution is one that proceeds at various levels, globally,
regionally, bilaterally, and that the fruits of this effort are variously
manifested by declarations, recommednations, codes of conduct, draft
conventions, scientific research, information dissemination, and adopted
and ratified conventions. It is a complex response with interdependent
components. What is pervasive within this response is the presence of
IGOs. There is considerable interplay between organisations and law
and, in fact, the implementation and development of the only significant
part of the legal regime, the conventions, is largely dependent upon the
work of organisations. Because the presence of IGOs permeates the res¬
ponse to marine pollution and because their role is significant, and
seemingly bound to become more so, it is best they operate smoothly, or,
as the Stockholm Declaration says, "that international organisations
play a co-ordinated, efficient and dynamic role for the protection and
27
and improvement of the environment. Thus enters the coordination issue.
It is not only an important one, considering the great number of organi¬
sations involved, but also timely considering both the often heard com¬
plaint thatIGOs do not sufficiently collaborate and the renewed emphasis
placed on organisations by the LOSC.
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PART I: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF MARINE POLLUTION AND
INTERORGANISATIONAL COORDINATION
CHAPTER ONE
AN OVERVIEW OF MARINE POLLUTION
A. Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of marine pollution. It
begins with defining "marine pollution," a necessary exercise because
the concept is the focal point of the thesis and there is a need to deter¬
mine what the international community considers significant pollution
giving rise to legal responsibilities.
The various sources of marine pollution are set forth along
with a sampling of the kinds of wastes and amounts each source brings
to the seas. Such information provides not only background to the prob¬
lem but is necessary for two reasons. First, to assess the effective¬
ness of the legal and organisational response to marine pollution one
must know if the sources causing the most environmental harm are being
addressed. Second, some parts of the legal regime, such as the LOSC,
impose different obligations and grant varying rights depending upon
the pollution source. Thus, a basic knowledge of the sources is helpful
in understanding the regime itself. The chapter concludes with a survey
of literature on the health of the oceans. Determining the well-being
of the seas and which areas of it are suffering is also necessary in
deciding whether the response of the world community is being directed
where it should.
B. Defining "Marine Pollution"
1. Approaches to Defining "Pollution"
Different approaches can be taken to defining "pollution,"
each of which is founded upon a philosophical view of the problem and
28
its underlying economic, ethical, social, and political circumstances.
Hence, "pollution" can have many definitions.
There are two extreme approaches. One is referred to as the
"purity" approach and defines "pollution" "as any alteration of the
29
existing environment." The other is more a policy than definition,
proclaiming state sovereignity gives the right to pollute without the
10
need to consider the interests of other states. In other contexts,
particularly involving international rivers, these two approaches are
known as the doctrines of absolute territorial sovereignity and absolute
31
territorial integrity. Under absolute territorial integrity, natural
resources and interests of a state may not suffer outside interference,
even minimally. On the other hand, absolute territorial sovereignity
gives a state the unfettered right to do what it wishes with its natural
resources even if doing so causes damage to another state.
Falling between these extremes are three other approaches.
The first is pollution considered as damage and is made up of two prongs.
One focuses on what damage is done to man and his property, and the
other, rejecting the narrowness of a concept restricted to damage to
human interests, considers damage to the environment itself as legally
32
significant. The second middle approach focuses on man's uses of the
33
environment and how pollution interfers with these uses. This formu¬
lation has the drawback of disregarding harm to the environment itself,
concentrating, as it does, solely on the environment as it is useful to
man. The third middle position views pollution as a waste that exceeds
34
the environment's assimilative capacity.
2. "Marine Pollution"
a. A Politically and Scientifically Acceptable Definition
The three basic approaches may properly be integrated in
developing a definition of "marine pollution," and should to give compre¬
hensiveness to the definition as, individually, each has weaknesses.
Indeed, it has been the practice of states in defining the term in recent
international agreements to combine two or more of the approaches, thus,
all three reflect existing opinion.
The essence of "marine pollution" is well established in
international law. Article 1(4) of the LOSC contains the most recent
formulation:
"Pollution of the marine environment" means the introduction
by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into
the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or
is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to
living resources and marine life, hazards to human health,
hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of
sea water and reduction of amenities.
For the purposes of the thesis, this definition is accepted for
two reasons. It has won political acceptance and has a sound scientific
basis.
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The definition's political acceptance has a long pedigree.
"Marine pollution," and similar terms, have been defined in a number of
conventions and most of the definitions bear close resemblance to the
35
LOSC's. Also, Principle 7 of the Stockholm Declaration follows the
36
tenor of the definition as do the formulations of national and inter-
37
national bodies. The definition's scientific validity rests on its
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close similarity to the definition accepted by GESAMP. The GESAMP
definition was itself based on one devised by the Scientific Committee
on Oceanic Research/Advisory Committee on Marine Resource Working Group
39
and accepted by IOC.
b. Analysis of the Definition
Since the LOSC definition represents a general consensus in
defining "marine pollution," it will be helpful to take a closer look
at it.
The definition begins with the phrase "the introduction by man."
Man is thus the only polluting agent. Nature, although it puts contami¬
nants into the oceans by, for example, oil seepage from underground
deposits, is not recognised as a polluter. Although some definitions
40
of pollution include natural processes, these are inherently ambiguous
for they conclude that nature can pollute itself. As all processes of
nature are part of a complex system that determines the natural state of
the oceans, it is difficult to follow the argument that one part of
41
nature can cause damage to another. The focus on human activity is
appropriate. Furthermore, a legal definition must necessarily be anthro-
procentric.
The use of the word "introduction," however, gives rise to a
problem. Not all environmental harm to the oceans is caused by man's
introduction of substances. Deepsea mining, for example, will be done
by either sucking or scraping nodules from the ocean floor. This process
will disrupt benthic life and destroy some of it. It may be argued that
during this process man will not be "introducing substances," only
disturbing the marine environment. Likewise, nuclear waste may be im¬
planted under the ocean floor and if holes need to be drilled for this
disposal whatever harm done might not constitute marine pollution. The
requirement of "introduction," therefore, gives cause for concern about
the adequacy of the definition and is an example of law outpaced by
technology. The definition of "marine polluiton" must, therefore, never
42
be definitive. Because of the problems "introduction" causes, arguments
12
have been made that the definition should exclude reference to "intro¬
duction" and focus instead on "change" of the marine environment. The
environmental consequences of deepsea mining and nuclear waste implace-
ment would thus fall within the definition.
After beginning with "pollution...means the introduction by
man," the LOSC definition goes on to state that polluting activity is
the introduction "directly or indirectly, of substances or energy."
The wide breadth of this phrase is helpful. Direct polluting activity,
such as dumping, falls within the definition as does indirect pollution,
as that reaching the oceans through the atmosphere. "Substances" covers
all man's waste products.
Next, a caveat appears in the definition. Only the introduc¬
tion of those substances "which results or is likely to result in such
deleterious effects" are included. Pollution is not just the presence
of an alien substance in the seas; there needs to be a negative conse¬
quence or its probability. Adding the likelihood of harm has the advan¬
tage of caution. Little is known about many wastes and it may be wiser
to regulate those that probably will be harmful than to wait until the
43
harm appears. The inclusion of likelihood has been seen, on the
other hand, as too broad. Some scientists argue that the oceans ought
to be viewed as a valuable resource for waste disposal and that it is
foolish not to use it fully or to wait for proof that a disposal activity
44
is harmless. Yet, the LOSC definition does require at least the prob¬
ability of harm before labelling something as pollution. This allows
considerable room for the oceans to be used as a disposal resource.
The definition concludes with a list of six undesirable
effects by which marine pollution is manifested: harm to living resources,
harm to marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance of legitimate
uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water, and reduc¬
tion of amenities. It is clear that the definition combines several of
the approaches described above. Taken into consideration is damage to
marine life as well as man's interests. Of the six effects, harm to
marine life is the one added to the GESAMP definition by the statesmen
at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).
Inclusion of "marine life" represents broader appreciation of nature.
Recognising that marine life, whether or not man makes use of it, needs
protection is a more enlightened, ecological view.
Yet the definition has been viewed as insufficiently ecologi¬
cal in that it requires harm before responsibility attaches. It has been
13
contended that "change" should be substituted for "harm." This senti¬
ment is an example of the "purity" approach mentioned above. Were this
the standard, recognition of the oceans as a waste disposal medium would
be lost. All forms of disposal into the marine environment produce
changes, but these may be harmless and, if not, will often pass quickly.
Even the passage of a single large trawler will cause incidental destruc¬
tion of small fish on a vastly greater scale than most waste disposal
46
activities. The "purity" approach would thus deem the mere passage of
a ship as marine pollution. It is better to include the element of harm.
The six deleterious effects of the LOSC definition are un-
quantified and not subject to objective determination. Yet, it is
probably better that "harm," "hazard," etc. remain unquantified so that
the definition retains flexibility. Were the deleterious effects
qualified by a high standard, such as "serious"or "grave," most pollu¬
ting activity would remain unchallenged because rarely does a single
act of disposal result in damage. It is the cumulative effect of many
kinds of waste from many sources that typically harms the marine environ¬
ment. Requiring "serious" harm may result in overlooking the gradual
47
changes that have even greater long-term impact. At the other extreme,
requiring low levels of acceptable damage would unwisely "demand a costly
48
and relatively unrewarded 'cleaning up' operation." By leaving the
harm unquantified and unelaborated, the definition creates problems of
application, but by requiring a particular kind of harm it would be largely
useless for marine pollution control purposes.
Springer states that a general concept of pollution must
include a means for determining the threshold of "what is and what is
not legally significant pollution, what demands regulation and what does
49
not." The definition accepted here does not fully accomplish this.
It requires supplementation with ideas of how best to manage the marine
environment and with criteria to determine what activities are environ¬
mentally acceptable. But the construction does satisfy the need for a
working definition for the purposes of international law, providing a
sound framework that allows international lawyers and statesmen to enhance
with ecostandards.
C. The Sources of Marine Pollution
The sources of marine pollution are generally classified
50
into five or six categories. The six are ship pollution, dumping,
land-based, atmospheric, offshore exploration and exploitation, and
14
deepsea exploration and exploitation. Although discussions of marine
pollution sources are commonly found in legal literature, it is necessary
to include a short review of the subject to provide a framework for the
subsequent discussion and evaluation of the international legal and organ¬
isational response to marine pollution.
1. Ship Pollution
Ships pollute the marine environment in several ways. Con¬
tamination often results when cargo is lost overboard in foul weather and
when cargo and fuel is lost in a maritime casualty. Neither losing a
51
hazardous cargo in rough seas nor shipping accidents are uncommon. In
a January 1984 storm sixteen tonnes of herbicide were swept off a Danish
52
freighter into the North Sea. A five week search for the eighty drums
53
of poison was unsuccessful. That same year the North Sea was also the
54
site of a collision between a French cargo ship and a West German ferry.
The French vessel sank and took to the seabed its cargo of thirty
55
barrels of highly radioactive gas, uranium hexafluoride.
Ships also cause oceanic pollution by operational discharge
56
of cargo. This involves such procedures as deballasting, tank washing,
and bilge pumping. Although it is incidents as those described above
that capture headlines, operational discharges are a greater cause for
concern. Based on statistics from the 1970s, of the 3.3 million metric
tons of oil estimated to enter the oceans each year, 1.5 million come
57
from ships, most of which, 80%, results from operational discharges.
2. Dumping
Dumping accounts for about 10% of the pollutants entering
58
the marine environment and is defined as "the seaward transport of
land-generated wastes by ships, barges, platforms or aircraft and their
disposal in the marine environment. Such wastes may be 'dumped' in
59
bulk, in containers, or incinerated..." The kinds of wastes dumped
are extremely varied, covering the range of man's activities. Until
recently, dumping has been unregulated by international agreement and
insufficiently overseen by national regulation. Consequently, the
quantity and kind of wastes that have been dumped are largely unknown
60
and thus their potential for harm is undetermined. Data has only
recently been assembled and it indicates the sea has been and continues
to be used as the receptacle for an extraordinary amount of man's refuse.
By volume, dredged materials are the main class of wastes
61
dumped. "The weight in dry matter of dredging muds dumped in the North
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Sea in 1979 is estimated at 20,000,000 tons." Dredged spoils can be
dangerous; tnose from highly urbanized areas often contain cadmium,
63
mercury, and heavy metals. As populations tend to live near coasts,
the ocean is often used to dispose of municipal sewage sludge. In
64
1983 7.3 million tons of this waste were dumped by the United States and
65
these also often contain harmful substances. In 1979 the EEC countries
6 6
put 9,347,832 tons of industrial waste into the sea. Such wastes hold
67
"traces" of cyanide, arsenic, cadmium, and mercury compounds. That
68
same year the United States dumped 2,577,000 tons of industrial waste.
Floating on or just below the ocean surface is a surprisingly large
amount of debris such as plastic and polystyrene items, wood, fishing
69
gear, and glass and metal containers. The amount of solid wastes
70
entering the marine environment "can be in the million of tons."
The remaining class of substances dumped is radioactive wastes.
Although quantitatively little is dumped into the oceans, it is quali¬
tatively the most dangerous. Not only must the soundness of containers
be assured for hundreds of thousands of years but placement must be
secure so that there is not a reoccurence of incidents wherein fishermen
71
have found in their nets barrels of radioactive wastes. The United
72
States stopped dumping radioactive wastes in 1970, but between 1947
73
and 1969 allowed 86,000 containers of the waste to be dumped. The
condition of the containers, their exact location, as well as the amount
74
disposed have been questioned. In Europe ocean disposal of low level
radioactive wastes goes on. Between 1967 and 1979 65,085 tons of the
75
waste were dumped by several nations under OECD supervision. During
1982 Britain disposed of 2697 tons of packaged solid and liquified
76
nuclear wastes and it has recently discussed plans to dump high level
77
plutonium. In 1983 Japan decided to continue its disposal programme
with an initial drop into international waters of 5,000 to 10,000 drums
78
of low level waste.
An activity that does not neatly fit into the categorization
made here of wastes dumped involves military wastes. "These... have con¬
sisted of organic materials, biological and chemical warfare agents, heavy
metals, petrochemicals, outdated explosives, defoliating agents, pesti¬
cides, solid objects, dredging spoils, and other inorganic materials
79
peculiar to military establishments." Because of the classified
nature of military operations it is troubling that details about
dumping locations and the exact chemical and toxicological nature of the
16
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wastes is frequently unknown.
It needs to be noted that not all wastes dumped harm the marine
environment. In fact, such activity can be benificial. Dumping certain
nontoxic wastes in poor sea areas may enhance the development of the
81
living resources there. Sewage sludge may benefit the marine environ-
82
ment if its main toxic substances are removed prior to disposal. Auto-
83
mobiles and auotmobile tires may be useful in creating artificial reefs.
3. Land-Based
Although ocean dumping puts vast amounts of different wastes
into the seas, it is land-based pollution that is by far the greatest
source of marine pollution. "By most scientific accounts 75% - 85% of
the detectable pollutants in the ocean are traceable to land-based
84 85
sources." Other estimates put the range at 80 to 90%. Wastes from
land enter maritime waters by two routes, point source, such as a
factory drainpipe, and nonpoint, such as natural runoff.
Land-based wastes come from an extraordinary diversity of
human activities and the amounts from this source are enormous. A
survey of the Baltic Sea, even though unable to obtain full information,
concluded the Baltic has put into it yearly 1.3 million tons of organic
86
matter, 308,890 tons of nitrogen, and 25,825 tons of phosphorus.
87
Fifty percent of these wastes came to the Baltic via rivers, illus¬
trating that rivers are the primary avenue by which land-based pollutants
88
reach the oceans.
Untreated sewage, released directly from land, is one of the
89
foremost problems in less developed areas such as the Caribbean and
of serious concern in the Mediterranean Sea that has pumped into it the
90
municipal sewage of 120 coastal cities, over 90% of which is dis-
91
charged in its raw state. To this waste is added discharges the
92
Mediterranean receives from 140,000 coastal factories.
Modern agricultural practices contribute to oceanic pollu¬
tion. The use of fertilizers has burgeoned from two million metric tons
93
per year at the start of the century to 100 million metric tons. Be¬
cause plants rarely use more than 60% of the nitrogen from fertilizers,
much of it will pollute ground and surface water and some will reach the
94
seas. A similar problem exists with herbicides and pesticides, the
95
use of which has also increased dramatically.
Although it is estimated that eleven million cubic meters
96
of urban waste are released into the North Sea each day and that
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60,000 tons of "toxic metal wastes" enter it annually, it is British
nuclear waste discharges that receive considerable publicity. The
British nuclear operation at Sellafield regularly releases radioactive
substances into the Irish Sea; currents carry the pollutants around the
98
coast of Scotland to the North Sea.
4. Atmospheric
Pollution reaching the sea through the atmosphere can be
considered a land-based source because the two sources have a common
place of origination, land. Although this is generally true, some atmos¬
pheric pollutants do not originate on land. The marine environment may
be harmed by air pollution caused by ships that burn fuel oil and by
incineration of wastes at sea. Thus, a separation of atmospheric and
land-based pollution can be made by recognizing their place of origni-
nation is not always the same and their pathways diverge; one reaches
the marine environment through the air and the other via rivers or
directly from runoff and outfalls. Furthermore, it is helpful to dis¬
tinguish the two where, as here, a general explanation of the sources
of marine pollution is undertaken.
Atmospheric transport of pollutants is not "an insignificant
99
part" of the movement of contaminants from land to sea. "Crude" esti¬
mates of the pollutant transfer frccnair to sea reveal the global trans¬
fer of "DDT,PCB, carbon tetrachloride, Freon II...and sulphur dioxide
[amounts] to 200; 2000; 14,000; 5,400; and 10,000,000 tonnes per year."^"^
101
Other atmospheric pollutants include such substances as phosphate,
• 102 . . 103 104 „
pesticides, radioactivity, and lead. As for incineration at
105
sea, a practice that began in 1969, 99.9% of the wastes are destroyed
106
during the burning and less than .1% of residue is ash. This ash,
107
however, is toxic and some it will reach and harm the marine envi-
108
ronment.
5. Offshore Exploration and Exploitation
While the mining of sand, gravel, diamonds, tin, and heavy
109
metals from the ocean proceeds, it is the search for and extraction
of oil and gas that are the primary goals of offshore mining. The produc¬
tion of oil and gas account for approximately 90% of the value of
mineral resources recovered from seabed operations and, by 1977, for about
110
20% of the world petroleum and gas extraction.
The causes of pollution from offshore gas and oil operations
can be divided into operational and accidental. Operational discharges
include oil and gas as well as mud mixtures that contain sodium hydrc
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ide, iron, chromium, and sulphur. Though offshore petroleum produc-
112
tion accounts for only about 1.3% of all oceanic oil pollution, a
blowout can cause severe, short term environmental damage in localized
areas. Despite this industry's fairly good record, there have been
serious blowouts, such as at Santa Barbara, California, where the envi¬
ronmental damage has been estimated at between ten to forty million
113
dollars. Iranian wells were recently spewing about 5,000 barrels of
114
oil a day into the Persian Gulf. The causes were two; one well was
115
struck by a ship and two others were set on fire by Iraqi warplanes.
Although it is not certain how much oil entered the Gulf or what damage
was done, signigicant losses of marine life have been attributed to the
., H6oil.
6. Deepsea Exploration and Exploitation
A United States agency anticipates that exploratory mining
of the deep ocean for phosphorite and manganese nodules that lie on or
just below the ocean floor will have little or no significant adverse
117
environmental effect. Since commercial exploitation has not begun,
the extent and type of harm that will be caused are prospective, nonethe¬
less, preliminary assessments have been made. Removal will be accom¬
plished by sucking or scraping the nodules from the seabed. Either
method will have adverse environmental effects for the ocean surface,
water column, and ocean bottom.
Collecting the nodules will probably destroy benthic flora
118
and fauna. The mining will lift sediment that will be released
throughout the water colurrn, from the place of removal to the ocean sur-
119
face. The resettling sediment could limit light penetration thereby
reducing phytoplankton and impair photosynthesis and the early stages of
120
the food chain. This plume may also smother benthic life and thus
121
dilute the food supply of bottom feeders. A second plume will be created
122
by discharges from ships of seafloor sediment and water. This may
significantly harm the larvae of those fish, such as tuna, that spawn in
123
the open ocean.
Deepsea nodules contain as many as twenty minerals but only
the more valuable minerals will be extracted. The extraction process
will produce a great deal of waste that will require disposal. If pro¬
cessing is done at sea the pollutive chemicals used will likely be dumped
at the mining site, and if done on land wastes may still end up in the




D. An Overview of Marine Pollution
Having noted the multitude of marine pollutants, some signi¬
ficant polluting incidents, and the various sources of marine pollution,
it is appropriate to make a general assessment of their effect.
1. The Marine Pollution Problem
a. Coastal versus Open Ocean Areas. In studying the well-
being of the marine environment, it is necessary to distinguish the coastal
from the open ocean areas, for they differ dramatically in several res¬
pects. The marine resources man values are gathered almost solely in
the coastal zone, the amenities provided by the seas are concentrated
near shore, and man's polluting activities occur mostly in coastal
126
waters.
Marine life is not uniformly distributed. Vital life producing
and supporting systems for marine life are near coasts and it is here the
127
vast majority of ocean fora and fauna originate and live. Though
coastal zones comprise a relatively small part of the ocean area, it
128
is here man takes more than 90% of his seafood. Thus, in terms of
protecting the marine environment, it is obvious one must give primary
attention to the coastal region. But the open ocean cannot be ignored.
Despite the fact that it has been referred to as essentially a biological
desert, recent discoveries suggest that the number of species living on
129
the deep ocean floor may be far greater than had been thought.
Recreation is a major use of the marine environment and it
is concentrated near shore. Pleasure boats can be hindered by ocean
litter. The enjoyment of swimming is interfered with by debris and even
more so by microbial pollution from sewage. The negative effects of un¬
sightly wastes upon the aesthetic pleasures of a shoreline and rolling
sea are obvious.
It is in coastal zones where man does most of his polluting
and where the damage is more apparent and pronounced. It has been men¬
tioned that most marine pollution is land-based; all of it passes
130
through and 90% ends up in coastal waters. Ninety percent of shipping
131
is near shore. Hence, this area receives a good deal of the pollu¬
tion generated by ships. Dumping takes place near coasts, it being un-
econmoical to situate dump sites far from land. Lastly, offshore explor¬
ation and exploitation is primarily undertaken in shallow, coastal waters.
b. The Health of the Oceans. Clearly then, conclusions about
20
oceanic health ought to address coastal and open areas separately.
GESAMP adopted this approach and concluded in its study of the marine
environment: "In the open sea we have not detected significant effects
on the ecosystem. Trends have indeed been observed of the concentration
of several contaminants, some up, some down, but these are not reflected
132
in environmental deterioration. "On the other hand," GESAMP goes on
to say, "effects can be seen in semi-enclosed seas, shelf areas and coastal
133
zones." A review of the literature on the effects of marine pollution
134
proves the correctness of GESAMP's opinion as well as this conclusion:
[A]lthough effects of pollution have not so far been de¬
tected on a global scale, general trends of increasing
contamination can be recognized in some areas, and these
trends are warning signals. The signals are noticeable
mainly in the marine areas most intensively used by man,
viz. coastal waters. The oceans are capable of absorbing
limited and controlled quantities of wastes and, as such,
represent an important resource. But careful control of
waste disposal is necessary.
Thus, the oceans are not faring badly. The great part of
them, the open ocean, is healthy. Semi-enclosed seas are in varying
degrees of difficulty. Coastal areas, other than those in semi-enclosed
seas, are generally healthy although there are localized areas of
136
pollution and occasional incidents of severe damage. Yet, statements
137
that "life in the oceans has hardly been touched by pollution" are
unduly optimistic and perhaps even dangerous as they tend to create a
false belief that "all's well." Furthermore, any conclusion that marine
pollution and the damage it causes is mild can only be accepted with
caution> for two reasons that will now be discussed.
2. Considerations in Assessing Ocean Health
a. The Future
Any study of marine pollution that limits itself to present
conditions is shortsighted. Consideration of what stresses are likely
to be placed on this important resource in the future are necessary. And
the future of the oceans is not bright; the marine environment will come
138
under ever-increasing strain from all sources of pollution.
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World energy demand is to increase by 58% by 1990. Some
of this demand will be satisfied with coal produced energy. One opinion
140
is that coal use will rise by 13% by 1990. The consequence is greater
sulphur dioxide emissions, the prime element of acid rain. Nuclear
sources of energy are likely to increase as will the problem of what to
141
do with the waste and a number of countries are pushing ahead with
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their civil nuclear programmes or developing nuclear capability.
By the end of the century offshore oil, which now accounts for 30% of
143
world production, will likely exceed the 50% mark.
The world's population will grow by more than 501 by the year
144
2000 and population problems are "fundamental and critical to inter-
145
national environmental policy-making." Urbanization will soar and
more and more sewage and other wastes will enter the sea untreated, par¬
ticularly as the population increase will occur in countries least able
to provide sanitation systems. To feed the world's populace, use of
146
fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides will grow. Pesticide use in
147
LDCs is expected to at least quadruple from 1975 to 2000.
New uses will be found for the sea. Building nuclear
148
facilities on platforms in coastal waters is being discussed. It is
also proposed that liquified natural gas terminals and methanol plants
149
be located on the sea. Storing high level radioactive wastes in the
marine environment is deemed feasible and is being considered by
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Britain, the United States, and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency.
The United States is studying the feasibility of scuttling approximately
153
100 decommissioned nuclear submarines over the next three decades.
Some toxic wastes can be destroyed by combustion and the sea is being
looked to as the locale where this incineration might take place. Mari-
culture is expanding and its wastes could threaten the environment of
154
coastal zones. Heightened industrialization boosts the kinds and
amounts of wastes that will enter the sea. There is a serious problem
of what to do with toxic wastes, a conumdrum that will grow. In a year,
EEC states produce twenty to thirty million tons of toxic wastes and the
155
United States about sixty million tons. Disposal on land is dangerous
since sites can leach and contaminate ground water, and in the United
States the Environmental Protection Agency estimates that up to 75% of
156
all active and inactive disposal sites do leak. The Agency also con-
157
eludes that "land disposal needs to be drastically reduced." A
Congressional Research Service Brief entitled "Ocean Dumping: A Time to
Reappraise?" discusses the possible change in United States policy
158
to allow more hazardous substances to be disposed of in the ocean.
Thus, no comfort or sense of relief should be felt by con¬
clusions that the open seas are uneffected by wastes; nor should satis¬
faction be derived from the fact that coastal areas, considered globally,
are in reasonably good health. To say "that research has shown the ocean
159
to be a much more resilient system than was at first thought" fails to
22
recognize that "the resiliency of the oceanic system is not will under-
160
stood" and fails to account for the prospects of a gloomy future.
b. The Problems of Marine Science. Conclusions about the
health of the marine environment must be tempered with recognition of
problems confronting marine science. Of needed environmental data as
161
a whole, UNEP says there exists "startling gaps." With specific
regard to the oceans, GESAMP states: "The existing data base for an
162
assessment of global marine pollution is extremely limited." Little
is known about the behavior of oil in cold water and under ice and of
163
arctic marine ecosystems. Congress is reevaluating United States
dumping policy but the data gap in knowledge about the effects of dumping
leaves Congress "without clearly interpretable data upon which to direct
164
or assess current ocean dumping policy." In an IOC sponsored study
of oceanic health, the author, speaking about assessing the danger to
marine resources from chemicals and energy, said "there are obstacles
to such undertakings, for the production, use and disposal data are often
maintained as privileged information by manufacturers or by sovereign
165
nations." Not only may industry be faulted, for sometimes governments
hinder acquisition of knowlwedge. In his study of the Mediterannean
Action Plan, Boxer writes: "It is questionable whether most Mediterannean
coastal states really want to know the state of pollution in their coastal
waters. Scientists ...are interested, but governments are cautious in
166
encouraging investigations that may be too revealing."
Many articles about marine pollution contain comments bemoaning
the paucity of information, factual and scientific. Of the Caribbean,
for example, it is said:
There is a lack of data on the major sources of
marine pollution... on the amounts of pollution entering the
marine environment, on the present levels of pollutants in
the various components of this environment and on the effects
of pollutants and coastal development activities on marine
ecosystems, human health and coastal amenities.
In his study of marine pollution. Dr. Waldichuk states: "If one examines
closely the state of environmental knowledge concerning the world oceans,
168
one can soon identify many cpps." He then names nineteen areas in marine
169
pollution research where basic knowledge is lacking.
A problem of marine scientists is the basic one of deter¬
mining cause and effect. Oceanic waste input is heterogeneous, making
it difficult to discover which substance actually causes a specific
harm. There is the additional predicament of differentiating between
anthropogenic and natural inputs of the same substance. When, for example,
23
a fish species population declines, it is a complex task, perhaps beyond
attainment, discerning whether the decrease is due to natural changes in
ocean ecology or to pollution, and if caused by pollution, which pollu-
170
tant is the culprit. In addition, there is the burden of not knowing
what happens to pollutants when they interact with physical and chemical
properties of the sea as well as with other contaminants. Whether a
particular waste becomes more or less dangerous upon such interactions
171
is generally unknown. Yet, according toWaldichuk, the scientific
community is losing interest in environmental research even though "'we
are not much further ahead today in understanding many of the problems
172
of marine pollution than we were in 1970.'"
Beyond the doubt this state of marine science must cause
about conclusions of marine health, there is the danger of chronic low
level pollution and the long term effects which are as yet unpredictable
for nearly all contaminants. The Global 2000 Report says the main threat
to the oceans will not come from spectacular incidents but slowly from
chronic low level pollution. "The point is made that 'demonstrable
effects to marine resources are seldom available within time spans that
173
could effectively stop the pollution prior to adverse contamination.'"
Amidst such scientific uncertainty the dilemna is deciding
how to act. Concerned persons who contend, "[i]f governments wait for
scientific near-certainty it will often be too late for them to act at
174
all, may be wise, not environmental extremists. Action seems re¬
quired as little comfort can be had from the conclusion that the oceans
are in reasonably good health. "[W]e can say that the oceans as a whole
are healthy, so far. But the sickness we see in the estuaries and
coastal zones is circulating and spreading throughout the whole system,
175
and could eventually threaten all its parts." Nor must sight be lost
of the fundamental role the seas play in maintaining conditions for life
176
on earth.
There are those who argue that harm to the marine environment
will come gradually and that once damage is clearly discernible remedial
action can be taken. Yet, "[i]t should not be assumed... that environ¬
mental death is necessarily a gradual process... The sudden collapse of
some environmental systems, such as Lake Erie in North America, should be
177
sufficient warning of the dangers of the 'gradualist fallacy.'
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CHAPTER TWO
AN OVERVIEW OF THE COORDINATION PROBLEM
A. Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the coordination prob¬
lem that is said to exist within the network of international organi¬
sations dealing with marine pollution. Prior to reviewing this opinion,
"coordination" is defined. This exercise will pinpoint the type of coord¬
ination that is of concern in the thesis and thus define the thesis' scope.
Also defined is "international organisation." These bodies can be either
governmental or non-governmental and may also be distinguished as global
or regional. Since the regional organisations have significantly con¬
tributed to the environmental law of the sea, an examination of the term
"region" is in order, particularly because this study divides the inter¬
national community's response to marine pollution into global and
regional.
B. Defining "Coordination," "International Organisation," and "Region"
1. Defining "Coordination"
The meaning of "coordination" involves the ideas of negative
and positive cooperation. Negative cooperation seeks to avoid duplic-
tion of activities and its purpose is to limit the work of one or more
178
organisations. If duplication is understood as two organisations en¬
gaged in the same kind of projects with identical objectives then there
is little, if any, duplication of marine pollution activities and of
179
programmes in other areas as well. What does occur, however, is
overlap, that is, two organisations carrying out somewhat similar pro-
180
jects that cover some or much of the same ground. Positive coordi¬
nation, the second strand of "coordination," involves joint planning and
action. Joint planning seeks to identify gaps, harmonize policies,
establish priorities, divide work, and determine the most efficacious
. . 18
way to perform activities, all in an effort to achieve maximum results.
Joint action is the united execution of a programme by two or more organ¬
isations .
Obtaining the ends of negative coordination is easier to
accomplish than positive coordination since it is easier to locate
overlapping activities than it is to harmonize policies, set priorities.
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and divide work. It is also politically difficult for organisations to
argue that duplicative or overlapping projects are needed. In addition,
the limited resources given organisations makes it more likely there are
182
gaps in organisational activities than overlap.
Another approach to defining "coordination" proceeds by
dividing it into three categories: rationalization, standardization,
183
and prlorization. Rationalization is the process whereby duplication is
removed. Standardization refers to coordinating such administrative
matters as personnel conditions and financial practices. Priorization
has as its primary objective the same goals as positive coordination,
though duplication and overlap may be removed during this process.
"Coordination" in this study is understood to include rational¬
ization and priorization, that is, positive and negative coordination.
Not of concern are the numerous financial, administrative, and budgetary
matters of coordination. The focus is on coordinating the substantive
marine pollution control programmes.
2. Defining "International Organisation"
Dr. Archer has reviewed the many definitions given "inter¬
national organisation" and from these finds three outstanding features
184
of the term: membership, aim, and structure. An international organ¬
isation should draw its membership from at least two or more states,
185
although membership is not restricted to states. An international
organisation should have as its aim the pursuance of common interests
of its members. An international organisation should have a permanent,
formal structure established by a formal instrument and not under the
continual control of one member.
Based on these elements Archer defines "international organi¬
sation" as "a formal, continuous structure established by agreement be¬
tween members (governmental and/or non-governmental) from two or more
sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the
.,186
membership.
International organisations may be distinguished as those
that are intergovernmental (IGOs) and those that membership is nongovern¬
mental (NGOs). IGOs are based on a formal instrument of agreement between
187
states, while any international organisation not so established is
188
an NGO.
IGOs need to be furthered categorized because the thesis
examines the legal and organisational respnse to marine pollution on
two levels, the global and regional, and on each level IGOs are active.
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A global IGO is, in principle, open to all states and operates world-
189
wide. Examples include IMO and WHO. An organisation "with a
limited number of members most of which are seen to be geographically
proximate and/or culturally, economically and politically similar has
190
traditionally attracted the [label] 'regional,'" such as NATO and the
ECE. There is a unique kind of regional IGO that has appeared in the
last decade. During this period a number of regional marine pollution
control conventions have come into force that establish an implementing
and administering body. These are typically known as commissions and
though they are not as elaborate as regional IGOs that readily come to
mind, such as the EEC, they are nonetheless IGOs. The conventions
establish permanent secretariats to serve the commission. Although
the scretariats are small this does not deprive the commissions of IGO
status, for the IGO "framework may be very simple and consist of nothing
191
more than a lightly staffed scretariat... Along with the secretar¬
iat there is the commission proper, composed of the member states,
meeting annually, and directing the implementation and development of
the convention. Although looking unlike the more well-known regional
IGOs, "[o]ne m^ recognize sophisticated institutional arrangements in
,192
regional conventions for marine pollution control.
3. Defining "Region"
193
Defining "region" raises "major problems" and before dis¬
cussing the definition it will be helpful to begin by identifying the
194
main types of marine regions: physical, management, and operational.
Physical regions, delimited by geographic features, are finite in number
195
and include ocean basins and semi-enclosed seas. Nine ocean basins
196
have been identified. Considered sufficiently extensive and dis¬
tinguishable from ocean areas are semi-enclosed seas, a long list that
197
includes the North, Mediterranean, and Baltic Seas. Within the
198
semi-enclosed seas are innumerable subregions, such as the Gulfs of
Bothnia and Finland, the Oresund, and the Aegean and Adriatic Seas. It
does not follow from the existence of physical regions that joint manage¬
ment activities by littoral states occur, even if the area suffers from
a defined problem, such as pollution. But when problems justifying
199
treatment as a separate marine region emerge, a management region exists,
even though it is not necessary a management region conform to physical
200
regions or subregions. If the states of a management region jointly
address the problem by formal arrangements then the third type of marine
201
region, the operational region, is realized. The arrangements can
vary widely from cooperative monitoring activities to supranational
27
institutions with legislative powers.
While physical regions have always existed and while many
management regions were identified two decades ago, operational regions
have arisen only within the last decade or so. This is known as the
phenomenon of regionalization, "the trend toward a more or less localized
pattern of cooperative action within the international political system,
explainable in terms of an apparent perception by two or more states of
202
links resulting from geographical proximity. Operational regions
sometimes arise because of cultural affinity among the area states, as
is the case with the area covered by the Nordic Convention for the Protec¬
tion of the Environment. Sometimes operational regions find their identi¬
fication in terms of natural features, such as the Cartegena Convention
for the Protection of the Caribbean. Other operational regions are de¬
fined by a particular threat, such as a significant risk of tanker colli-
203
sions in narrow channels. In other instances, politics characterizes
a region, as is the case with the Convention for the Protection of the
West and Central African Region that does not include South Africa and
Morocco. On the other hand, some operational regions include states of
antagonistic political and economic systems, as represented by the Hel¬
sinki Convention which includes Western and Eastern Bloc powers. Cul¬
tural, political, and economic homogeneity is thus not always a requisite
for an operational region.
Such disparate characteristics of areas where formal arrange¬
ments exist to protect the seas proves the complexity of defining what
"region" means. Perhaps the term is best understood as an idea, an
organising technique for the efficacious resolution of, or at least a
structured and formal response to, a marine pollution problem. It is
better understood this way than by attempting to list criteria that define
204 205
"region," for the meaning depends on the interest involved and if
no common interest exists in an area it may be said that there is no
"region." The only two broad factors useable in defining an operational
region are the geographic proximity of the states involved and the recog¬
nition by those states of a mutual interest in protecting the marine
environment and their belief that this interest is furthered by joint
action.
C. The Asserted Failure of Intergovernmental Organisations to Cooperate
There is widespread concern about insufficient coordination
28
among IGOs. This collaboration has been disparaged by individuals
206
who have headed organisations, by those who have conducted studies
207 208
on behalf of the network, and by observers. Of course there is
209
a contrary opinion, but the number of critics and their adamant tone
cannot be ignored. Such criticism is often specifically directed at
IGOs dealing with marine pollution. The General Assembly expressed
210
such concern in a 1969 resolution. Since then there has been "a
noticeable trend" toward increased cooperation among global, regional,
211
and functional bodies. The author of this statement, however, doubts
212
that the progress has been sufficient. More than a few commentators
agree. For example, de Klemm states:
Present institutional arrangements relating to the
study, exploitation and preservation of the marine environment
...are clearly unsatisfactory.
[W]ithin the United Nations system, marine matters,
often closely related to each other, are dealt with by several
different agencies. There is little coordination and no real
possibility of identifying gaps in subjects covered or assigning
new tasks to a particular organisation.
UNEP's Governing Council recently adopted a resolution calling
for the "need for closer coordination" in solving problems of marine
214
pollution and the United Nation's Administrative Committee on Coordina-
215
tion has stated "there is scope for improvement in this field.
Miles says that in the area of preservation of the marine environment
"[t]here seems to be substantial overlapping of functions with some dup¬
lication of effort and a high degree of interorganisational competition
216
and conflict over programs and resources."
Broader studies of IGOs and ocean uses have drawn conclusions
217
such as the "overall lack of coordination," and the "ever-present rivalry
218
and clash of interests among members of the U.N. family of organisations."
These comments refer to the United Nations and specialized agencies and
not necessarily to regional IGOs concerned with marine affairs, but critics
219
of coordination at this level also exist.
Complaints are also prevalent that the overall environmental
work of the United Nations network, and not just that concerned with
marine pollution, is incoherent. "[F]or the sake of efficiency a
better coordination of the activities of various international organisa-
,220
t ions concerned with the protection of the environment seems necessary.
Such arguments persist despite the existence of UNEP. One writer comments
upon "UNEP's inability to assert much influence over the policies and
programmes of the large and well-entrenched specialized agencies...This
29
fact...has produced a great deal of criticism about the effectiveness
221
of UNEP. A review of the minutes of UNEP ' s Governing Council re-
222
veals a steady stream of complaints about insufficient cooperation.
UNEP's present Executive Director has recognized that UNEP has not
223
succeeded in coordinating environmental programmes, as has UNEP1s
224
, . . 225
Governing Council, the Administrative Coordinating Committee,
226
and the General Assembly has implicitly done so.
Thus, there are numerous complaints about coordination of
ocean and environmental activities in general and marine pollution
activities in particular. It is appropriate to point out that this
thesis has reservations about the validity of these charges, at least
those directed at marine pollution projects. But the belief is wide¬
spread and apparently firmly held that there is a serious problem that
inhibits the efficacy of IGOs to develop international law protective
of the marine environment. The subject, therefore, merits considera¬
tion, particularly since IGOs play a prominent role in the international
community's response to the environmental threats confronting the
oceans.
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PART II: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO
MARINE POLLUTION
CHAPTER THREE
LIMITATIONS OF NONCONVENTION-BASED RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE SEA
A. Introduction
This chapter assesses the significance of some nonconventional
international rules for the environmental law of the sea. The norms
examined are often put forward by publicists as evidence of law regu¬
lating the use of the oceans as a waste disposal resource. It is the
thesis of the chapter that the rules are of little usefulness for pro¬
tecting the marine environment. As the nonconventional rules addressed
are derived from custom, judicial decisons, and general principles, a
basic understanding of these three concepts as sources of international
law is offered.
B. The Sources of International Law
Ascertaining international law is frequently difficult.
Aid in doing so is often sought from Article 38(1) of the Statute of
the ICJ which sets forth the sources of international law; these being
conventions, custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions, and
227
teachings of publicists.
To better understand the function of these sources, it is
beneficial to distinguish them as either law-creating or law-determining.
Conventions, custom, and principles are law-creating sources for they are
processes by which international law is made. Law-determining agencies
include judicial decisions and publicists. While incapable of creating
international law, these assist in determining what norms have come into
existence and their content.
1. International Custom
Traditionally, international law of the sea has evolved
outside of treaties, its rules having been more often derived from
international custom. International custom is "evidence of a general
31
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practice accepted as law." Two requirements are generally posited
for a finding that governmental actions represent international custom
or lead to its creation: a sufficiently uniform state practice and an
intellectual conviction by the acting state that its action is required
230
by international law. State practice is the overt element of custom
and requires a quantitative analysis involving four, not entirely dis¬
tinct, parts: a general, though not universal practice; some degree of
. . 231
repetition; consistency; and duration. Custom's second element is
known as opinio juris and requires a qualitative, or subjective, analysis
of a state's reasons for acting as it did. Although it has been contended
232
that opinio j uris may not be a requirement, this is probably not true
for opinio j uris is necessary to distinguish legal custom from state
2 33
practices founded upon habit, courtesy, and morality.
2. Judicial Decisions
Judicial decisions include the work of the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ) and the ICJ, as well as decisions by
arbitration tribunals and national courts. The usefulness of each
is limited in the search for an obligation to control marine pollution,
a. International Judicial Decisions
Two reasons exist for the limited value of international
judicial decisions. First, there has been no case concerning environ-
234
mental damage to the oceans other than the aborted Nuclear Tests Cases.
Consequently, cases to be examined propound precepts applicable to marine
pollution only by analogy and sometimes that analogy becomes stretched
to and beyond the breaking point. Second, international law does not
recognize stare decisis. Article 59 of the ICJ Statute precludes the
235
Court's decisions in contentious cases from having binding authority.
236
The Statute of the PCIJ contained a similar limitation. The ICJ may
237
give advisory opinions to certain IGOs, (as could the PCIJ) but these
also lack binding force, even for the organisations requesting them.
Yet, it is true that states respect judicial decisions, parti¬
cularly those of the ICJ. The pleadings of the Court's litigants are
replete with reference to PCIJ and ICJ decisions that are cited as
2 3 8
authoritative. The ICJ itself cites its past opinions and those of
the PCIJ. Without ever stating it is bound by stare decisis, the Court
habitually seeks guidance from its jurisprudence and individual judges
239
have come close to proclaiming the binding force of precedent.
Lauterpacht has said that the decisons of the two World Courts are "as
a matter both of legal principle and of actual experience, one of the
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enduring factors which influence its future decisons." Further¬
more, judicial decisions as a law-determining process are evidence of
international law. This factor, coupled with the respect states give
Court opinions, opens somewhat the precedential door closed by Article 59.
b. International Arbitration Awards
The authoritativeness of arbitral awards is weaker than World
Court decisions. This is illustrated by the failure of the ICJ to refer
241
to arbitration decisions except in rare instances. When it does so
242
it is typically in sweeping generalities. The value of arbitral
awards can also be weakened by the varying competence of the arbitrators
243
as well as their reasonsing. Three further factors contribute to
the lesser significance of arbitral awards. First, an arbitration
244
panel is often of regional composition, lacking the ICJ's universality.
This can lead to the tribunal applying law it erroneously believes is
accepted by the international community. Second, some publicists refuse
to acknowledge the contribution of arbitration tribunals because of an
245
alleged fundamental distinction between arbitral and judicial decisions.
"According to these writers, arbitrators have...[generally] tended to
act as negotiators or diplomatic agents rather than as trained judges...
They insist that arbitrators have been influenced to an unreasonable
246
extent by the necessity of reaching a compromise." Third, as states
establishing an arbitration panel are free to name its members, there
is no requirement the tribunal be composed of individuals learned in
international law. For instance, in the Argentine-Chile Frontier Case,
while the President of the Court of Arbitration was a lawyer, the other
247
two members were geographers.
c. National Decisions
Nearly all of the national decisions presented below address
river disputes and none marine pollution, so any relevance they have
to marine pollution is by analogy. Analogies between these two problems
do exist. Each concerns a natural resource and one that moves, mixes,
and carries contaminants. The policies and factual problems of the two
are similar. If it is accepted that rivers flowing through several
federated states are akin to the flowing commons of the oceans, is it
still valid to apply municipal decisions regarding rivers to marine
pollution?
Because national courts are state organs their rulings, when
endowed with sufficient uniformity and authority, can evidence state
practice. As such, they are international custom. Although the propo-
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sition municipal decisions can represent state practice has been questioned,
249
the weight of authority supports it. A consistent, widespread national
court practice might also provide evidence of a general principle of law
250
under Article 38(l)(c) of the ICJ Statute.
Apart from these considerations, it is clear national decisions
fall within Article 38(1)(d). This provision allows recourse to judicial
decisions to determine international law and municipal courts are able to
provide evidence of this law. National courts have referred to inter¬
national law to solve their interstate disputes and, thus, their opinions
251
aid in determining and elucidating this law. The United States
Supreme Court, for example, "leans heavily on international law sources
252
for its materials of decision." This court has itself stated:
"Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as domestic tribunal,
we apply Federal law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies
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of the...case may demand." Two recent English decisions exemplify the
254
usefulness of municipal decisions in understanding international law.
It ought, however, to be kept in mind that municipal decisions
have only a quasi-international quality and must be used cautiously.
Professors Schwarzenberger and Brown point out a number of factors that
„ . . . 255
handicap national courts as compared with international tribunals.
Among these are the act of state doctrine that restricts judicial free¬
dom; the rule that international law may not be applied if it contravenes
statutory or constitutional law; and the tendency, or duty, of municipal
courts to accept the word of the executive as conclusive on matters of
policy.
3. General Principles of Law
There is disagreement about the meaning and function of Article
38(l)(c)'s reference to "general principles of law recognized by civil-
256
ized nations" as a source of international law. Regarding the func¬
tion of general principles, there are those who argue general principles
257
serves no purpose, that they are superfluous because any interna¬
tional dispute can be settled by either conventional or customary law.
Most Soviet writers do not believe general principles provide an independ-
258
ent source of international law. Such opinions are misguided for
they conflict with Article 38 which does not indicate a subsidiary, let
259
alone superfluous role for general principles.
The controversy over the meaning of general principles is
less easily settled. The concept has been interpreted as general prin¬
ciples of justice, natural law, analogies derived from private law,
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general principles of comparative law, general principles of inter-
260
national law, general theories of law, and general legal concepts.
The debate, however, seems concentrated on understanding the phrase to
mean general principles of international law or general principles of
261
municipal law.
Most Soviet writers believe Article 38(1)(c) refers to general
principles of international law, which are principles derived from
treaties and custom. They deny general principles of municipal law
can become a part of international law except to the extent they have
262
been adopted in custom or treaties. This position is weak. Article
38 lists three kinds of sources the ICJ is to give primary consideration:
conventions, custom, and general principles of law. Since treaty and
custom are mentioned separately the presumption arises that the special
reference to "general principles of law" does not encompass those
263
principles already incorporated in conventional or customary law.
Instead, the only question should be determining what principles are
264
recognised by civilized nations. The majority of publicists accept
265
this position, a view recently affirmed by the Supreme Court of
266
Canada and substantiated by studies of the travaux preparatories of
267
the corresponding provision in the Statute of the PCIJ.
Although it is acceptable to use the term general principles
of international law, it is necessary to keep a clear distinction be¬
tween it and general priniples of law recognized by civilized nations.
The former refers to well-settled and fundamental rules with their
source in customary or treaty law. On the other hand, the legal basis
of a general principles of law recognized by civilized nations is not
founded upon custom or treaty but upon its recognition in the law of a
representative number of nations.
C. Nonconvention-Based Rules for the International Environmental Law
of the Sea
1. Customary International Law
As mentioned, a state practice must be widespread, though not
universal, and of some duration before it can ripen into customary law.
As man's environmental conscience has only recently awakened, satisfying
these two elements to find customary rules to deal with international
environmental issues will be difficult.
Granted, there may be a customary rule that a state may not
268
conduct an activity regardless of transnational consequences, but this
35
rule is shackled because the prolonged state practice of using the sea
for waste disposal is a customary right and some amount of transfrontier
269
pollution is acceptable under international law. Stated otherwise,
270
only serious transnational pollution is prohibited. Furthermore,
the broad principle forbidding transboundary effects does not protect
the high seas where no state has sovereignity and thus cannot have
its sovereignity infringed by a polluting activity occurring or having
its effect there. In addition, the general rule is not working. If
it were, the diplomats of UNCLOS III would not have been as concerned as
they were to protect the marine environment.
That there has been little time for customary environmental
rules to develop is recognised by Professors Brownlie and Teclaff.
Writing in the early 1970s, each viewed customary law with little, if
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any, relevance. Schneider, writing in 1979, reaffirmed this opinion.
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Brownlie, however, saw that this situation might change and, as states
continue their marine environmental protection work, customary rules may
indeed develop. Presently, however, there is little customary law.
Even with radioactive waste, a substance of concern to the international
community for several decades, "little or no customary international law
274
has crystallized...
As a number of states have adopted comprehensive marine
pollution control laws, one might hope to find customary rules generated
from such legislation. But national law has "hardly sufficient uni¬
formity to effectively contribute to the process of international custom
275
creation. Nor have ad hoc state practices brought to fruition
customary norms.
Yet, there is a burgeoning body of treaty law on marine pollu¬
tion and from this a scholar has located two areas where customary in¬
ternational law rules may exist. Dr. Hakapaa, while believing "past
,276
experience does not give much proof of the emergence of customary rules,
nonetheless says oil pollution conventions stretching back to 1954 have
277
produced "a fairly strict customary regime" regarding oil discharges
from ships. The convention rules prohibiting oil discharges for nearly
all tankers within 50 miles of land "could be considered to have acquired
278
the status of customary law." Hakapaa adds that the load-on-top
method of limiting oil releases "may represent a minimum requirement
279
of pollution protection stating a rule of customary law.
Dumping is the second area where Hakapaa finds customary
280
norms. He bases this position on the number of dumping conventions
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that came into force in the 1970s, including the LDC, ODC, Helsinki
Convention, and the Dumping Protocol to the Barcelona Convention.
The terms of each agreement are similar and from this Hakapaa concludes
that "where dumping of a particular substance is prohibited by all the
agreements... the prohibition appears to be so widely accepted that its
281
application as a norm of customary law is justified. As for other
substances, the treaty network may allow the conclusion that these
may only be dumped with national or international approval.
Hakapaa's methodology has merit, for conventions may generate
283
customary rules. His conclusion, however, may be unwarranted. As the
regional dumping conventions only apply to waters surrounding Europe and
since the global dumping treaty, the LDC, has not been widely ratified and
as its active members are largely European states, any customary inter¬
national law on dumping may be of a regional nature for Europe rather
284
than a global customary rule.
Another scholar has sought to find a customary rule regulating
land-based pollution. The result was the discovery that marine pollution
control agreements have merely reaffirmed the broad principle that one
state may not seriously harm the territory of another and that this
285
principle only applies to new, not existing,forms of land-based pollution.
This summary of custom indicates that this kind of law does
little to ensure clean seas. Only the barest of rules have been found.
Nor is it likely much customary law will ever develop. The diverging
interests of a ballooning number of states, most of which, if not all,
want to play a role in shaping international law, make it improbable
286
that consistent state practice in environmental matters will occur.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that custom should not be relied
upon to address marine pollution since custom usually evolves slowly and
287
is unable to keep abreast of technology.
2. Judicial Decisions and General Principles
The judicial decisions discussed below have received consider¬
able comment in legal literature and in a published study by this
288
writer. Consequently, only a sketch of the factual background and a
summary evaluation of the usefulness of each case for controlling
marine pollution is presented.
a. Corfu Channel Case
289
In the Corfu Channel Case Britain asserted Albania was
liable for failing to warn British ships of mines in the straits of
Corfu, international straits within the territorial waters of Albania.
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Royal Navy ships struck the mines and were damaged and British lives
were lost. The ICJ found Albania responsible, stating every state
has an "obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for
290
acts contrary to the rights of other States." The case is often
291
given a prominent place in international environmental law. This
place is undeserved.
The foremost problem with the Corfu Channel rule for envi¬
ronmental cases, and marine pollution in particular, is its requirement
of "knowingly." The great difficulties confronting marine science were
described in Chapter One. Only in unusual instances will a state know
its pollution of the oceans will be "contrary to the rights of other
states." Damage to the marine environment is rarely caused by a sole
polluting source or one pollutant or by a single state. Furthermore,
what degree of pollution is contrary to interests of other states?
And what is to be made of the Corfu Channel rule when considered along
side the firmly entrenched customary norms that states have the right
to use the oceans as a waste disposal resource and every state must
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accept some harm from its neighbours? The ostensible conflict of
the rules can be clarified by emphasizing Corfu Channel is not an envi¬
ronmental case and its rule cannot easily be lifted from the case's
extraordinary facts -- involving armed conflict and military operations —
and applied to environmental problems.
b. Nuclear Tests Case
In the Nuclear Tests Case Australia contended, inter alia,
that French nuclear weapon tests over the South Pacific harmed the marine
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environment, thus violating international law. During oral submissions
Australia elaborated on its belief that it "is the duty of States not to
subject the natural resources of the high seas to any unwarranted environ-
294
mental hazard." Australia referred to a General Assembly resolution.
Article 25 of the Geneva High Seas convention, the 1972 Declaration of
Santiago, marine pollution conventions, and pronouncements of the
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. Unfortunately, the
Court did not reach the merits. Rather, it addressed a preliminary
issue: whether the case still had a purpose since France publicly
stated it no longer intended to conduct atmospheric nuclear tests. The
ICJ concluded: "the dispute having disappeared, the claim advanced by
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Australia no longer has any object." The Court repeatedly said it
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offered no opinion on the merits of Australia's contentions. As
Australia only objected to "unwarranted" environmental harm, even if
38
the ICJ had reached the merits and agreed with Australia this would
not take international law far in protecting the oceans. This hypo¬
thetical decision could only be applied to highly unusual polluting
activities, which are not the primary threat to the seas.
Of Australia's legal contentions the joint dissent of Justices
Onyeama, Dillard, Jimenez, de Arechaga, and Waldock said "we are not to
be taken to express any view as to whether any of them are well or ill
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founded." One publicist has stated that the joint dissent agreed with
Australia's claim that France was legally bound to refrain from polluting
298
the high seas by radioactive fallout. The writer erred, however, in
attributing to the dissenters an argument by Australia. The Justices
were only willing to say that Australia's claims were not "frivolous...
299
and appear to...be based on rational and reasonably arguable grounds."
The search for an obligation not to pollute the oceans is not advanced
by the Nuclear Tests Case.
c. Trail Smelter Case and General Principles
The most famous environmental arbitration is the Trail Smelter
300
Case. This decision is avidly grasped by many writers as proof inter-
301
national law forbids transboundary environmental harm.
The dispute, between the United States and Canada, arose out
of the operation of a smelting plant located in Canada. Fumes from the
plant drifted across the border and damaged natural resources. In its
decision the arbitration panel stated:
The Tribuanl...finds that...under the principles
of international law, as well as the law of the United States,
no State has the right to use or permit the use of its terri¬
tory...to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of
another... when the case is of serious consequence and the in¬
jury is established by clear and convincing evidence.
Considering the circumstances of the case the
Tribunal holds that... Canada is responsible in international
law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter. Apart from the under¬
taking in the 1935 Convention... it is, therefore, the duty of
the... Dominion of Canada to see to it that this conduct should
be in conformity with the obligation of the Dominion under
3 02
international law as herein determined.
As a result, the smelter was required to refrain from causing further
303
damage and to pay for past damage.
The most common objection to the claim this case is "a
304
weighty precedent" establishing "once and for all the principle
of international liability for damages caused to the environment of
305
another State" is that 1935 agreement submitting the matter to
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arbitration required the tribunal to apply both United States and
international law. This, the argument continues, makes it "difficult
to establish exactly the legal basis on which the tribunal decided the
306
case." This is unsound criticism. The arbitrators said in three
places in the above extract that Canada's duty was founded on interna¬
tional law, not just United States law. Furthermore, before making the
above statement the panel said it first had to decide upon what basis
to answer the issues, on United States or international law. It con¬
cluded this was immaterial because United States law on the subject
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"is in conformity with the general rules of international law." Des¬
pite this defense of the Trail Smelter Case, it is nonetheless doubtful
that it is in fact a "weighty precedent," but for other reasons.
The tribunal's reasoning for its conclusion on international
legal duties was based on a discussion of several United States Supreme
Court decisions. The panel then sought to prove these cases were repre-
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sentative of international law in four ways: by offering a quote from
Professor Eagleton, by saying other publicists had made statements like
Eagleton's, by "studying" international law (though failing to note what
sources it analyzed) and finding this law and United States law similar,
and by citing an intercantonal case from Switzerland. This is meagre authority
for the grand proposition that "under the principles of international law...
no State has the right to use...its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury...in or to the territory of another..."
The tribunal imposed responsibility only where the consequences
are "serious" and proven by "clear and convincing evidence." These re¬
quirements dilute, if not emasculate, the case's value for the problem of
marine pollution. "It goes without saying that the flexibility of any
standard of 'seriousness' of damage makes any application thereof
questionable. Furthermore... it is much easier to assess the 'serious
309
magnitude' of pollution on...land than on the sea." And Brownlie
states that water pollution is gradual and that it involves "problems
of identifying tortfeasors, of establishing... causation, and of remote-
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ness of damage." Of a medium similar to the oceans, the Great Lakes
of North America, the Canadian-American International Joint Commission
has said: "It is difficult to establish positively that the concentration
of a particular pollutant on one side of the boundary in the lakes is
311
due to a specific source on the other side." Thus, Trail Smelter's
requirement of material harm and strict proof impose high hurdles.
There are also geographic limits to the Trail Smelter rule.
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The award emphasizes territory when it says no state is entitled "to use
or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury...
in or to the territory of another..." This concentration on territory
robs the case of much of its value for the environmental law of the sea.
Ocean dumping, for example, "typically occurs close to the coast...of
the dumping state, and its effects on...areas beyond... national juris-
312
diction are largely speculative." Particularly harmful wastes are
often put into the high seas, not infringing on any state's territory.
This will also be the case with pollution from deepsea mining and
incineration at sea. All land-based pollution flows to the coastal
waters of the state producing it. Much of land-based waste stays and
does its damage in this zone. Likewise with offshore mining. Conse¬
quently, the tribunal's call for respect of territorial sovereignity
does not touch most acts and effects of marine pollution.
Though Trail Smelter concerned a land activity damaging
land interests, it is proper to apply it by analogy to harmful activities
313
in and damage to territorial waters, because, as Article 1 and the
1958 High Seas Convention and Article 2 of the LOSC say, a coastal
state's sovereignity extends to the territorial sea. In this zone the
coastal state has nearly all the attributes of sovereignity it has with
its land territory. It is, however, likely stretching the decision too
far by applying it to the high seas, an area where no state has territorial
314
or sovereign rights. The place of pollution in Trail Smelter was the
sovereign territory of a state and this decisive factor would seem a
necessary element to any situation the case is sought to be applied by
analogy. Granted, the recent expansion of terriotrial zones from typically
three to twelve miles will allow a broader geographic scope for the award,
but its requirements of serious injury and severe standard of proof will
give it a role in only dramatic marine pollution incidents, which rarely
happen.
The Trail Smelter Case is commonly said to apply the abuse of
rights principle and the maxim that one must use his own so as not to
315
injure others. This latter notion is often referred to as sic utere
316
tuo alienum non laedas. Another theory, good neighborliness, also
appears in many discussions of abuse of rights and sic utere tuo. The
three principles are not distinct and their interrelationship is recog-
317
nised by many scholars. This discussion will focus on the abuse of
rights doctrine because it is the theory most often referred to as creating
or evidencing a duty not to pollute and the significant overlap of all
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three principles makes an examination of each unnecessary.
Underlying the abuse of rights concept is the idea that the
law should restrict a right that, when exercised, unduly interferes with
other states. Like Trail Smelter, however, the principle offers little
guidance in determining enviornmental responsibilities. It is nebulous,
without criteria to guide its application. Understanding the difficulty
in determining what is abusive is advanced by considering these words:
In the fields of quasi-judicial, administrative, or
political decisions, the arbitrary exercise of discretion becomes
increasingly unverifiable, and the wider the discretion, the easier
it is to find the most plausible arguments to hide such reasons.
If discretion is exercised within so wide a framework as terri¬
torial jurisdiction, only the most patent abuses of sovereignity
could possibly be caucjht by any prohibition of the arbitrary use
of sovereign rights."^ ®
In the hurly-burly of world affairs, "views on what is reasonable are
frequently based on assumptions which, not entirely unreasonably, are not
319
shared by everybody. Environmental rules, policies, and even envi¬
ronmental awareness vary widely among states. United States nuclear
weapon testing in the Pacific was strongly defended by McDougal and
320
Schlei. "If such a 'use' of the environment can be considered
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'reasonable,' at least by two respected publicists, what cannot?" Of
sic utere tuo it has been said that it "is a very broad principle which
322
reaches nearly platitudinous levels of abstraction;" that it is "mere
323
verbiage" and "utterly useless as a legal maxim."
Given the wide entitlements of state sovereignity, the immaturity
of marine science,and that "good faith is tobe presumed, whilst an abuse
324
of rights is not, proving an act of marine pollution to be abusive
would be unenviable. The premise of abuse of rights is that the activ-
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ity complained of is prima facie lawful. A significant burden of
proof must thus be carried for a successful action to be founded upon
the doctrine.
Abuse of rights has been defined as the prohibition of a
326
right exercised solely to cause mischief or injury to another state.
This formulation considerably limits the utility of the doctrine for it
is doubtful any marine polluting activity is carried out to harm another
state. An abuse of rights also has been said to "occur when a state
exercises its right in such a way as to inflict on another state an
injury which cannot be justified by a legitimate consideration of its
327
own advantage." Formulated thus, the doctrine leaves the oceans
commons unprotected, for, rather than emphasize the polluting activity
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and its harmful effects to the marine environment, it focuses solely
on injuries caused another state.
This brings up a point that needs to be noted, that is, who
is entitled to invoke state responsibility for damage to the marine en¬
vironment? The status of actio popularis, the concept granting a state
standing to take legal action on behalf of the international community
to protect a common interest, is subject to debate.
In the South West Africa Case, the ICJ stated actio popularis
328
"is not known to international law as it stands at present." Yet,
329 . , 3 330
the Barcelona Traction case has been said to accept the doctrine.
But the remarks of the case that are relied on are dicta and the Court's
examples of its statement are derived from principles of basic human
rights and acts of agression and genocide. Although this list was not
exhaustive, marine pollution hardly fits the genre. In the Nuclear Tests
Case the Court did not reach the issue of the claimant's legal interest
and all the joint dissent said was that the existence of actio popuaris
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was capable of rational argument.
More recently. Justice Schwebel in his dissent from part of
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the Interim Order in Nicaragua v. United States accepted actio popularis.
His discussion of it, however, is paltry, referring merely to Barcelona
333
Traction and an International Law Commission (ILC) report. He only
discussed its applicability to "the observance of the principles of
334
collective security..." This is in accordance with the limted
categories offered by the Barcelona Traction dicta and perhaps Justice
Schwebel would take the doctrine no further than these unique categories.
The situations in which Barcelona Traction and Justice Schwebel
allow actio popularis seem to be fundamental rules of international law.
These rules are referred to by Aricle 53 of the Vienna Convention on
335
the Law of Treaties as "preemptorary norms of general international law,"
known as jus cogens. These rules are recognised by the international
community and no derogation is permitted from them. If the norms of
j us cogens can be determined, perhaps it will become clearer to what
situations actio popularis might apply. But identifying the norms of
j us cogens is difficult, as the ILC admitted in its Comment to Article
336
53 of the Vienna Convention. The Commission declined to offer examples
of j us cogens. Nevertheless, examples suggested by Commission members
include unlawful use of force contrary to the United Nations Charter;
performance of an act criminal under international law; and such acts
337
as trade in slaves, piracy, and genocide. Marine pollution is dis-
43
tinctly outside the purview of these classes as well as the Barcelona
338
Traction dicta and Justice Schwebel's acceptance of actio popularis.
It can, therefore, be said with some confidence that no state
has standing to take, on behalf of the world community, legal action to
339
protect the marine environment in any zone outside its jurisdiction.
Another problem is attribution. General international law
fails to view individuals or private entities as its subjects. States
are the foremost subjects and a state is not typically "under a duty to
control the activities of private individuals (being its nationals)
beyond the bounds of state territory. Thus a state is not responsible
for the delinquencies of vessels flying its flag or otherwise controlled
340
by its nationals... An ILC draft article on state responsibility
says: "The conduct of a person or group of persons not acting on behalf
of the State shall not be considered as an act of the State under inter-
341
national law." Some link must be found between the conduct complained
of and the state.
The problems of standing and attribution cast doubt upon any
widespread, ready applicability of abuse of rights, and other international
legal norms, to oceanic pollution. But there is a more fundamental problem
for the abuse of rights doctrine. Does in actually exist in international
342
law as many writers assert?
Two PCIJ decisions are often cited as evidence that abuse of
343
rights exists. But there is little in the cases to support this con¬
clusion and the part of the opinions relied on are obiter dicta. Opin¬
ions of the ICJ contain oblique comments that could intimate recognition
344
of abuse of rights, but the Court has never confirmed its existence,
let alone set forth a reasoned formulation of it. Nor has the Court
ever discussed any authority upon which one might conclude the doctrine
is part of international law. A number of separate and dissenting opin-
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ions have, however, referred to the maxim, but one of these admitted
346
abuse of rights has not yet entered the jurisprudence of the Court.
This statement was made over thirty years ago and the Court has yet to
accept the principle. As for arbitration awards, one can be cited as
347 348
having recognised abuse of rights, but another implicitly denied it.
As abuse of rights is not confirmed by international judicial
decisions, one might look to municipal legal systems. If it is part of
a number of systems and if each understands it similarly, perhaps abuse
of rights is a "general principle of law recognized by civilized nations"
within Article 38(l)(c) of the ICJ Statute.
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After studying many legal systems, two comparative law
scholars unequivocally conclude abuse of rights is not a general prin-
349
ciple recognised by most nations, an opinion shared by respected
350 351
publicists. There is a contrary opinion, but even if the concept
is found in most legal systems, this is half the battle, for any general
principle, once found, "must be applied with caution, for what may be
thought to be a general principle found equally in civil and common law
[let alone other systems]...may well be subject to different interpreta-
352
tion in those systems." Indeed, where abuse of rights has been found
353
it is often understood differently, depriving it of the status as a
general principle. The search for abuse of rights in custom also has
354
produced equivocal results.
There is another angle from which to view the question of the
existence of abuse of rights. Schwarzenberger maintains that the theory
is redundant. He reaches this idea by analyzing situations typically
said to support recognition of abuse of rights and finds there are
rules available to solve the problem presented. Thus, there has not
355
been an abuse of rights but a violation of a prohibitory rule.
To conclude, though abuse of rights is often used uncritically
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in the context of environmental issues, it has not been accepted by
international judicial decisions and there is serious doubt it is a
general principle of recognised by civilized nations. There is also
doubt whether custom has given rise to the maxim. If abuse of rights
is a part of international law, its vague formulation makes its applica¬
tion to the unique problem of marine pollution problematic, it being
more a policy slogan than a legal rule,
d. Gut Dam
The Gut Dam Case had its origin in 1902 when Canada constructed
357
Gut Dam across the boundary between a Canadian and American island.
Before the United States allowed construction Canada promised to compen¬
sate any American citizen who suffered damage due to the dam. In 1952
American property owners suffered flooding and erosion damage they
358
claimed was due to Gut Dam. In 1966 an arbitration panel was formed
to answer three questions: which American claimants were entitled to
compensation under the 1902 indemnification agreement, whether Canada's
obligation under that agreement had lapsed, and the amount of damage
and its cause. After the first two issues were answered in favor of




A number of scholars argue that the Gut Dam case is impor-
360
tant for international environmental law. Schneider asserts the
tribunal clearly accepted a rule of strict liability for transboundary
361
environmental injury. This is not so. Nor did the tribunal even
make a ruling or offer a comment on state responsibility under inter¬
national law for causing extraterritorial harm. Its role was limited
to answering the three questions, a restriction it respected. Though
Gut Dam did cause environmental damage and Canada did pay for much of
the loss, it did so because of its treaty obligation. Canada did not
assume liability nor did the tribunal impose it under a general rule of
international law. The award thus has been legitimately bypassed by
most publicists.
e. Lake Lanoux
Another arbitration award used too extensively is the Lake
362
Lanoux Case. Some writers give the impression the case concerns
transboundary water pollution. It does not. The case arose out of
France's intention to divert water from Lake Lanoux for a hydroelectric
project. Although the lake is in France, its waters flow to the Carol
River that crosses into Spain. The French diversiion would not, however,
deprive the Carol of its water for France devised a scheme whereby water
from Lake Lanoux would travel through a French-built tunnel to the Carol
watercourse, leaving the river with just as much water as it had always
had.
The relevant contention of Sapin was that the project would
modify the physical features of the basin; that is, that Carol waters
363
would be removed from their natural course. French guarantees that
the water volume would be maintained did not satisfy the Spanish, who
364
argued the project would give France "physical superiority." It is
clear from Spain's submissions that it feared France, in a time of
international tension, would close the spout and not allow water from
Lake Lanoux to reach the Carol. To prevent this possibility Spain
sought to stop the project. Transfrontier pollution was never a part
of Spain's position. About pollution, even the tribunal stated: "Neither
in the dossier nor in the pleadings... is there any trace of such an
365
allegation." It is also crucial to note that all Spain's arguments
were based on the disputant's 1866 Treaty of Bayonne. The question
posed to the tribunal was whether France's proposals constitute an
366
infringement of the treaty.
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Recognising that pollution was irrelevant and that general
international law was not addressed, where lies the significance of Lake
Lanoux for international environmental law? Its relevance is sought in
that part of the award where the tribunal, after concluding no Spanish
interests would be harmed because the water volume would not change,
added:
One might have attacked this conclusion in several
different ways.
It could have been argued that the works would
bring about a definitive pollution of the Carol or that the
returned waters would have a chemical composition or a temp¬
erature or some ot^gr characteristic which could injure
Spanish interests.
It is this language that scholars have focused on to support
arguments for not only the existence of international duty to avoid
368
transboundary water pollution, but more braodly yet, that international
369
law imposes strict liability for extraterritorial harm. What these
writers ignore is the sentence following the quote above which makes it
clear the tribunal was not relying on precepts of general international
law, but on the 1866 convention. That sentence is: "Spain could then
have claimed that her rights had been impaired in violation of the
370
[treaty]." Furthermore, Spain's contentions were based entirely on
the treaty and the tribunal itself declared that "the question presented
371
by the Compromis relates solely to the treaty..."
As the case concerned water volume and not pollution, and as
it interpreted and applied a bilateral treaty and not general interna¬
tional law, the tribunal's oft-quoted statement is obiter dictum. Further¬
more, having stepped beyond the agreement that established it, an agree¬
ment that limited its jurisdiction to applying the 1866 convention, the
372
tribunal's comments about pollution are null and void,
f. National Judicial Decisions
National courts have been involved in environmental disputes
between the component units of federated states. These decisions support
the rule that a federated state does not have the unfettered right to do
as it pleases on its territory, but must consider the effects its actions
will have on its fellow states and, if such acts are seriously harmful,
municipal courts have often ordered either cessation of the activity or
remedial measures to limit the damage. Such has been the jurisprudence
373 374 375
of Italian, Swiss, and German courts. A broad study of muni¬
cipal judicial decisions concluded that "in almost every system of muni¬
cipal water law will be found the prinicple that one State using water
376
must take into consideration the use of water by other States."
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The United States Supreme Court has dealt with many inter¬
state river disputes. In treating the state litigants largely as
sovereign states, the court has resorted to equitable balancing tests
377
to decide the disagreements. "[I]n all decisions ... concerning
pollution of Inter-State rivers...the Court acted on the presumption
that a riparian State of the federation which shares a watercourse
should not pollute its waters so as to cause serious damage to the
378
interests of other riparians."
The Supreme Court has thus allowed some transboundary harm to
occur but not if it is "unreasonable." What is unreasonable depends on
a myriad of factors unique to each case, and this robs Untied States deci¬
sions of thier usefulness for international law. Furthermore, it is
difficult to obtain from a study of national decisions the criteria
necessary to establish "the existence of a general principle of law and
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hence a principle of international law regarding pollution of waters."
The United States Supreme Court has said "controversies between states
over the waters of inter-state streams involve... complicated and delicate
380
questions..." Perhaps the resolution of these disputes is too de¬
pendent on their individual facts to allow for the development of general
principles recognised by civilized nations.
D. Conclusions
The customary law, judicial decisions, and general principles
surveyed in this chapter are those often invoked as evidence of a state
obligation to protect the seas. What has, however, been portrayed is the
weakness and relative uselessness of these sources in addressing the per¬
plexing problem of marine pollution.
Relevant and workable customary law is nearly nonexistant in
this field. The Nuclear Tests Case and Gut Dam have no role to play.
Lake Lanoux, considering as it did a bilateral treaty and a non-environ¬
mental matter, is not helpful. As for Corfu Channel and Trail Smelter,
they are accurate in stating a country may not act as it pleases and
harm another state. This broad proscription is well recognised. Muni¬
cipal cases support it, but the usefulness of such decisions, for any¬
thing more than evidence of this general rule, is doubtful. And the rule
of Corfu Channel and Trail Smelter can take international law only a
small step toward developing a legal regime protecting the marine envi¬
ronment from slow, steady deterioration. Territorial interests are
their focal point and thus the open oceans fall outside their ambit.
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Non-acceptance of actio popularis leaves this zone open to abuse. In
addition, under Corfu Channel and Trail Smelter, international respon¬
sibility arises only if the harm is serious and caused knowingly; more¬
over, the violation must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
These requirements mean that nearly all marine pollution activity es¬
capes their reach. Furthermore, application of the rule that one state
may not harm another collides with the rule that states may pollute.
Marine pollution being what it is, reconciling these two rights on the
grounds of reasonableness would be difficult. As such, the international
legal structure of marine pollution control is not advanced by judicial
decisions. Nor is one encouraged by a study of general principles. They
may not be recognised by international law and vagueness plagues them all.
General principles do little to clarify a state's responsibility and each
lacks elucidating criteria upon which a precise solution to a marine
pollution problem could be based. It is this difficulty Justice Read
probably had in mind when he wrote: "Practically speaking, it is, I
think, impossible for an international tribunal to examine a dispute
between two sovereign States on the basis of either good faith or bad
382
faith or of abuse of law."
States have recognised these problems with traditional inter¬
national law and that the institutions established "to administer the law
are too immature to meet environmental problems. Consequently, states
have sought to adjust their sovereign and often antagonistic rights by
treaty. Marine pollution control conventions are a recent phenomenon




GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE SEA OF A GENERAL CHARACTER:
LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
A. Introduction
The United Nations has sponsored several conferences that have
negotiated the general law of the sea. The 1958 Geneva Conference
383
adopted four conventions and all are in force. The second conference
was held in 1960 to resolve issues the 1958 conference was unable to,
384
the primary problem being the width of the territorial sea, but this
conference was unsuccessful. The third United Nations conference,
UNCLOS III, convened in 1973 and completed its work in 1982 with adoption
of the LOSC. As the LOSC is not yet in force, the 1958 conventions
remain the most important representation of accepted law of the sea,
although once the LOSC is in force, it "shall prevail, as between States
Parties, over the Geneva Conventions" (Art. 311(1)). For states not
LOSC parties, the Geneva Convention will remain applicable.
There are only a few environmental provisions in the Geneva
Conventions and the more important will be examined to assess their use¬
fulness. The LOSC contains many environmental articles, but because
385
these have been described and evaluated in numerous studies, only a
few comments will be made about the effectiveness of individual articles.
Rather, the thesis will concentrate on several interpretative problems
ffir
with the LOSC's environmental section, problens that must be resolved
if the section is to be effective
B. The 1958 Geneva Law of the Sea Conventions
Marine pollution not being a pressing issue in the 1950s,
it is not surprising the 1958 conventions have little to say on the
subject. Oil production from ships and radioactive waste disposal were,
however, within the interest of states at this time and a few references
to these problems appear in the treaties.
1. The High Seas Convention
a. High Seas Freedoms
Article 2 of the High Seas Convention (HSC) states that
the high seas are free to be used by all nations. Article 87 of the
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LOSC is similar and each provision provides examples of what uses con¬
stitute high seas freedoms. While the HSC lists the freedoms of navi¬
gation, fishing, laying pipelines and cables, and overflight, the LOSC
restates these four and adds the freedoms of scientific research and
constructing artificial islands. A caveat then follows. The earlier
treaty says high seas freedoms shall be exercised with reasonable
regards to the interests of other states. The qualification in the
LOSC is similar and it might be upon such caveats that environmental
duties may exist. On the other hand, can the provisions be interpreted
to include a freedom to use the seas for waste disposal?
As the ILC, which did the preparatory work for the Geneva
Conventions, stated in its Comment to Article 2 of the HSC, high seas
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freedoms are not confined to those mentioned. Furthermore, in the
ILC debates the point was often made that Article 2 freedoms are not
387
. . ...
exclusive, even though commissioners had misgivings that the list
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would be regarded as exclusive. Indeed, one publicists states that
"Article Two, it should be emphasized, does not include... the freedom
389
to use the sea as a receptacle for the deposit of harmful wastes...
The inference, of course, is that international law may not allow use
of the seas for waste disposal, but this is clearly wrong. From time
390
immemorial man has used the oceans to dispose of wastes and a range
of authority was presented above for the proposition that it is lawful
391
to pollute the seas. Article 2 of the HSC and Article 87 of the
LOSC actually reaffirm the legality of such use. Of course the pro¬
visions require reasonableness in exercising high seas freedoms, but
the acute problems in relying upon such an imprecise standard were
392
also discussed above.
A further problem with Article 2 (and Article 87) is that it
has nothing to say about the primary source of oceanic pollution, land-
based activities. The provision addresses only high seas freedoms.
Agricultural runoff and coastal outfalls are not high seas freedoms,
the only freedoms Article 2 restricts with the reasonableness standard.
It may be argued that because land-based pollutants can travel via the
atmosphere and coastal waters to the high seas, that they constitute
use of the high seas and are high seas freedoms. In the HSC, "high
seas" is defined as all parts of the sea beyond the territorial sea
and internal waters (Art. 1). Until recently, the width of the terri¬
torial sea was generally three miles. This relatively narrow breadth
allows more land-based pollutants to reach the high seas and, perhaps
fall within Article 2's reasonableness restriction. This situation
has largely changed with the widespread practice of extending territorial
waters to twelve miles, adoption of the LOSC, and emergence of the EEZ.
The LOSC's high seas section applies only to the area beyond the EEZ. As
many states have extended their territorial sea to twelve miles and adopted
EEZ's, the high seas encompass much less area than it did a decade ago.
Thus, under the LOSC it is unlikely any land-based sources will affect
the high seas.
b. Article 25
Article 25(1) requires states to prevent pollution from
dumping radioactive waste, taking into account standards formulated
by IGOs. Article 25(2), however, requires states to take measures to
prevent pollution "resulting from any activities with radioactive
materials or other harmful agents." The phrase "other harmful agents"
"has been seized upon by some publicists as a catchall provision in¬
tended to require preventive measures for all types and sources of
393
pollution..." This is an improper construction. "Harmful agents"
is an oblique reference to atmospheric hydrogen bomb tests and the
damage they might cause. The mid-1950s saw the rise of a worldwide
controversy over such tests. The United States carried out its first
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postwar nuclear weapons test in 1946 and continued testing without
395
much concern by the international community until 1954 when radio¬
active fallout from an explosion damaged Japanese fishing grounds and
396
contaminated Japanese fishermen, one of whom died. This touched




calls. B ain was also conducting nuclear weapon tests during
this period.
A study of Article 25's history aids in understanding what
"harmful agents" means. The 1955 HSC draft articles contained no pro-
399
vision such as Article 25, which made its first appearance in the
last year of discussion on the convention -- 1956, the time the tests
were being internationally questioned. The ILC was no exception. Mr.
Pal of India led the demand within this body for provisions ending
nuclear tests. His initial thrust was to have them excluded from
400
Article 2's specification of high seas freedoms. This failed as
the general opinion was that the article's requirement of reasonableness
401
sufficiently addressed Pal's concern. Pal then sought to accomplish
402
his purpose during the ILC session that discussed pollution. This
debate centered on the harm ionizing radiation, radioactive waste, and
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radiaoctive fallout could cause. Never did another kind of pollutant,
except oil, receive mention. Leading the opposition to Pal were the
ILC members from the United States and Britain, the states conducting
the tests. Although it is not clear from the ILC Summary Records,
the term "harmful agents" seems to have been included in exchange for
deletion of the words "ionizing radiation" and "radioactive fallout"
and replacing them with "radioactive materials." Presumably, the
broader "radioactive materials" was viewed less offensively than the
specific "ionizing radiation" and "radioactive fallout."
The ILC's Comment to Article 25 also proves a restricted
understanding of "harmful agents" is correct:
Finally, the Commission considered the case of
the pollution of the seas or air space above resulting from
experiments or activities with radioactive materials or other
harmful agents. In this connection, it felt that in view of
many-sidedness of the subject and the difficulties besetting
any attempt to impose a general prohibition, it should merely
provide for an obligation upon States to co-operate in drawing
up regulations with a view to obviating the grave dangers in¬
volved. In adopting this provision, the Commission in no way
intended to prejudice the findings of the Scientific Committee
set up [by the] General Assembly... to study the effects of
.. 403
atomic radiation.
No substance is specified other than radioactive materials. That no
examples were given of what substances are included in "harmful agents"
is a surprising omission. The term is so all-encompassing one would
think the ILC would have offered at least a hint as to what substances,
or classes of substances, it had in mind. If all substances are in¬
cluded, why were radioactive wastes (Art. 21(1)), radioactive materials
(Art. 25(2)), and oil (Art. 24) given separate treatment? Surely they
are harmful substances.
The ILC's reference to "grave dangers" also leads to the
conclusion that "harmful agents" is related solely to nuclear testing,
for in the 1950s few people recognized any danger from marine pollution,
let alone "grave dangers." Similarly, the mention of a "a general prohi¬
bition" in the quote above, points to nuclear tests. There certainly was
no discussion within the Commission or outside it about generally pro¬
hibiting all kinds of marine pollution. In addition, the Comment refers
to the intractability of the problem, the problem clearly being nuclear
tests. There is also mention of a Untied Nations committee created to
address the problems caused by such testing. For all these reasons, the
meaning of "harmful agents" is closely tied with "radioactive materials"
and does not extend to other classes of pollutants.
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This opinion is supported by the ejusdem generis doctrine,
according to which general words that follow special words are to be
404
construed as related to the genus of the special words. Thus "harm¬
ful agents" refers to "radioactive materials." A second interpreta¬
tive tool is provided by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
405
context and in light of its objective and purpose." "Harmful agents"
has no ordinary meaning. Even so, following Article 31's guide that is
is to be construed within the treaty context and purpose, one is led
back to the predominant concern with the environmental consequences of
atmospheric nuclear tests.
When the Geneva Convention discussed the HSC, it adopted a
406
resolution it thought would promote implementation of Artice 25(2).
The resolution refers only to radioactive materials. This point further
militates against the position that "harmful agents" is a catchall pro¬
vision requiring preventive action for all kinds and sources of marine
pollution. Besides, substantively the article is not worth much. "[I]t
does not prohibit anything; it does not distinguish between high-level
407
and low-level radioactive wastes; and it sets no standards..." It
merely requires consultation.
Article 25 does not accomplish much directly. Yet, it may
have provdied the initial steppingstone for the several treaties of
the 1960s and 1970s concerning radioactive materials. If so, the
article made a worthy contribution.
2. The Continental Shelf Convention and the Territorial Seas and
Contiguous Zone Convention
Article 5 of the Continental Shelf Convention places a weak
obligation upon states engaging in exploration and exploitation of their
continental shelf. They must take all appropriate measures to protect
living marine resources from harmful agents in zones around their
mining installations.
In the zone of the high seas contiguous to the territorial
sea, the Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone Convention (TS & CZ Conven¬
tion) provides that a coastal state may exercise the control necessary
to "[p]revent infringement of its custom, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
regulations within its territory or territorial sea..." (Art. 24(1)).
"Sanitary regulations" does not, however, have an environmental implica-
408
tion allowing for pollution control measures.
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Under the TS and CZ Convention, all states have the right of
409
innocent passage through territorial seas (Art. 14(1)). Passage is
innocent "so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State" (Art. 14(4)). The coastal state "may
take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which
is not innocent" (Art. 16(1)). Ships traversing territorial seas are to
comply with the coastal state's laws adopted in conformity with the con¬
vention and other international rules (Art. 17).
Although the convention does not set forth what activities
the coastal state may direct its laws at, the ILC agreed such states
410
might legislate to protect coastal waters from ship pollution and
411
that foreign vessels must comply with such laws. Thus, Article 14's
"peace, good order and security" includes environmental considerations.
Consequently, a coastal state has jurisdiction to control pollution in
its territorial sea; an opinion, be it based on customary law or on the
412
Geneva Conventions, that is shared by publicists. Coastal state
regulatory powers are limited only by the obligation not to hamper
innocent passage. It is not clear what regulations hamper innocent
413
passage, or, looked at from another perspective, what acts of a
ship are noninnocent. Nonetheless, the provisions on coastal state
jurisdiction over the territorial sea and innocent passage are a
"constructive ambiguity" creating a "workable balance" between the in-
414
terests of coastal and maritime states. Many states have adopted
laws regulating traffic in the territorial sea, yet the fear of shipping
countries of a patchwork quilt of different laws has not occurred and
. . 415
maritime commerce continues.
An integral part of an effective regime controlling ship
pollution is design, construction, equipment, and manning (DCEM) stand¬
ards. The cause of numerous tanker accidents resulting in discharges
416
often has been poor ship maintainence and it has been estimated that
417
75% of such accidents have been due to human error in ship operation.
The TS & CZ Convention and customary law allow coastal states to adopt
418
DCEM standards, subject, of course, to the proviso that such laws
not hamper innocent passage.
The TS & CZ Convention is progressive with regards to coastal
state rights over foreign ships in the territorial sea. Such rights are
becoming geographically more extensive with expansion of territorial
seas to twelve miles. Yet, the LOSC, as discussed in the next section.
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more carefully defines the meaning of innocent passage and in doing so
puts restrictions upon the coastal state's ability to protect its
marine environemnt.
3. Conclusion
Other than the grant of competence to the coastal state to
regulate ship pollution in the territorial sea, the Geneva Conventions
offer little to control marine pollution. This is not surprising.
The dangers of such substances as cadmium and organohalogen compounds
in the marine environemnt were unknown in the 1950s. Environmental
alarms were not sounded until the 1960s. The situation, however, was
completely different then the LOSC was negotiated and, as a result, it
contains numerous environmental provisions.
419
C. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
1. Introduction
In the late 1960s the law of the sea was perceived by many
420
countries to be unsatisfactory. Maritime nations viewed with alarm
unilateral extensions of sovereignity of some states over large ocean
areas. Some coastal states believed freedom of the seas antiquated,
limiting their ability to control coastal natural resources. The
aspirations of LDCs for more wealth contributed significantly to the
decision to convene UNCLOS III, where such states sought international
control of valuable seabed nodules. Environmental law was seen, by
some, as unsatisfactory. For these reasons, and others, "the need to
elaborate a new and comprehensive regime for the law of the sea was
■ a "421perceived.
After fourteen years of work involving participants from
nearly all states, UNCLOS III concluded with the adoption on 30 April
1982 of the LOSC by a vote of 130 in favour, four against, seventeen
422
abstentions. The most significant adverse vote was cast by the United
States. West Germany and Britain have announced their decision not to
423
sign the treaty. Some of the abstaining nations were the Soviet
Union, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. Thus far thirteen states
424
and the United Nations Council for Namibia have ratified the LOSC.
The treatywill enter into force twelve months after deposit of the
sixtieth ratification or accession (Art. 308).
It is appropriate to discuss this treaty that is not yet in
force for several reasons. It is, firstly, possible the LOSC will
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enter into force. If so, this "constitution of the oceans" will
be the document in which many maritime duties and rights, including
426
environmental ones, are set forth. Second, many scholars and states¬
men find the environmental articles an important addition to the law of
427
. .
the sea. An assessment of the treaty is needed to test this position.
Third, the convention exists, it is a fact. Whether or not it comes
428
into force it will have significant effects. "Its very existence
modifies political, economic, and legal relationships in countless ways.
How a stillborn agreement can affect international law calls for a few
remarks on the interplay between treaty and custom.
2. The LOSC and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy
a. General Remarks
An environmental article of the LOSC may be, or become, a
norm of international law even if the treaty never comes into force in
three ways. First, the article may codify a rule of international law
existing before the convention was concluded. Second, a developing
norm expressed in the article may have reached fruition as binding inter¬
national law during the long negotiating process of UNCLOS III. Third, the
article may initiate a state practice subsequent to the convention that
eventually leads to an international rule. In each instance, the binding
nature of the rule would rest not upon the convention, but upon custom.
An analysis of the articles in Part XII of the LOSC, the
environmental section, will not be undertaken to determine which of its
rules reflect antecedent international law, the crystallization of interna¬
tional law during the negotiating process, and which have become or are on
their way to becoming international law since the convention was con¬
cluded. It is sufficient to note that the environmental provisions are
theoretically capable of being legal norms without being conventional,
some of the problems involved in such a process, and some general comments
about the likelihood that this will occur.
The theoretical possibility that the three methods by which a
rule expressed in a treaty can bind states on the basis of custom is well
grounded. This is exemplified in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
430
as well as other ICJ decisions. The Court's view of the three
mechanisms in this process is accepted by those who have analyzed the
431
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases vis-a-vis the LOSC and by general
432
works as well.
b. Problems for the Emergence of Custom from Part XII
Though some LOSC articles undoubtedly confirm antecedent custom-
.429
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ary international law, such as the high seas freedoms of navigation and
433
overflight, and though some convention concepts have crystallized
434
into international law, such as the EEZ idea, are such processes
active regarding the LOSC1s environmental provisions?
The first point to make is that "many of the benefits of the
435
environmental provisions ... cannot be had under ... customary law..."
For example, Part XII's innovative concept of port state jurisdiction
is not recognised in customary law. That Part XII is not generally
declaratory of international law has historical roots. Environmental
concern is a recent phenomenon. Furthermore, ocean environmental issues
in the early years focused on oil pollution from ships and radioactive
wastes. States have thus not had time to develop consistent and suffi¬
ciently long standing practice in areas such as land-based and atmos-
436
pheric marine pollution that would enable customary law to emerge.
Part XII is beset with a further problem. Its most compre¬
hensive provisions address ship pollution and set forth complex juris¬
dictional duties and rights for flag, coastal, and port states (Arts.
211, 217, 218, 220). This very complexity makes it less likely that such
437
provisions either codify law or crystallize customary law. In this
respect Dr. Howard points out that if the "convention fails to enter
into force, the general nature of provisions... rather than intricate
technical features, is likely to characterize any customary law pro-
438
duced..."
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases elucidate four criteria
that need to be satisfied in the determination of how and when a treaty
rule acquires the status of customary international law. These criteria
are:
(1) The presence of a 'fundamentally norm-creating character
such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general
rule of law;'
(2) a 'very widespread and representative participation in the
convention,' including 'that of States whose interests were
specifically affected;'
(3) the extensiveness and virtual uniformity of state practice
evidencing 'a general recognition that a rule of law or legal
obligation is involved; ' and
(4) the passage of some time, short though it may be.
One must wonder if Part XII satisfies the first criterion
since the Part allows exceptional treatment for countries due to their
440
economic circumstances. Article 192 says "States have the obligation
to protect and preserve the marine environment." But this is followed
with two qualifications. Aticle 193 provides that "States have the sove-
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reign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their envi-
441
ronmental policies..." Then Article 194, which requires states to
take "all measures... that are necessary" to protect the oceans, adds
that states need only take "the best practical means at their disposal"
and that they need do no more than what is "in accordance with their
capabilities." Such elasticity, which applies to the articles on all
sources of pollution, seemingly robs Part XII of, in the words of the
ICJ, "a fundamentally norm-creating character having such as could be
442
regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law.
Although the second criterion of the ICJ has been fulfilled
by the widespread and active participation of countries in UNCLOS III,
the third element presents another hurdle. The very complexity of
articles on ship pollution will make it difficult to achieve state prac-
443
tice that is "both extensive and virtually uniform." It is difficult
to imagine nearly all countries applying or respecting Part XII in
virtually the same manner. Opinions vary widely over what threat pollu¬
tion poses to the oceans and what the response ought to be. Besides
the likelihood of state practice not being uniform, it may also fail to
meet the requisite extensiveness. A less developed state may not be
philosophically inclined or financially able to develop and enforce
regulations in its EEZ, but Canada, a country regarded as environmental¬
ist, may vigorously do so.
Precatory articles of Part XII are at the opposite extreme
and it may be equally difficult to reach "extensive and virtually
uniform" state practice with regard to them. Being hortatory, they are
valueless until enhanced with specificity. But this necessary develop¬
ment would likely lead to different rules. Justice Oda had something
such as this on his mind in discussing the EEZ. After recognising that
the EEZ concept had entered international law, he wondered about a prob¬
lem. "[Q]uite apart from the treaty-making process, the sui generis
regime of the [EEZ] is going to require much more careful examination
before the rules so far adumbrated may be viewed as susceptible of
444
adoption into existing international law..." Having a basic concept
as a part of law is one thing, he seems to believe, but determining
which of the proposed duties and rights that should or must appertain
to this regime will reguire thoughtful reflection. So too with the
exhortations of Part XII.
In determining whether a provision of Part XII has developed
into customary international law subsequent to the convention, the ICJ
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has cautioned in other circumstances that "this result is not lightly
445
to be regarded as having been obtained.
But perhaps one ought not to be overly pessimistic about the
chances of Part XII blossoming over the years into customary law if the
446
LOSC never enters into force. Some authorities believe Part XII's
most comprehensive articles, those on coastal and port state jurisdiction,
447
may become part of internaitonal law.
Also of some comfort is the fact that environmental provisions
448
were agreed to quickly at UNCLOS III and that countries remaining
outside the convention may not view Part XII negatively. Both the United
449 450
States and Britain have acknowledged their general acceptance of
Part XII. Indeed, "[m]ost delegates in Jamaica probably felt that, with
respect to Part XII, a proper political balance had been struck among
competing interests [and] appropriate institutional mechanisms... found
451
to deal with technical problems...
Such attitudes may indicate that those states outside the
LOSC will conduct themselves in conformity with Part XII. If signatories
did likewise, the Part may well enter into international law regardless
of the ultimate fate of the treaty. There may even be a move to secure
separate treaties that include LOSC terms on relatively noncontroversial
452 453
sections, such as the environmental articles.
On the other hand, environmental questions "played a very
454
small and subsidiary role [at UNCLOS III]" because the participants
455
were relatively unconcerned with the fate of the marine environment.
This is not encouraging for the emergence of Part XII into customary law.
Another opinion is equally discouraging. Mr. McManus states: "I do not
think that you get an agreement on an international level to protect
456
the marine environment for altruistic reasons. He believes such
agreements are made either when induced by fear, such as occurred after
the Torrey Canyon accident, "or else you give them something that they
want... badly, such as a clear title to real estate. Here we have a
treaty... giving a lot of people title to a lot of real estate they have...
457
wanted clarified for years..." If they do not in the end get these
things because of a failed treaty, one may not be able to expect wide¬
spread adherence to the environmentally beneficial parts of the LOSC.
A group of respected United States scholars wonder if their country's
rejection of the deepsea mining portion of the LOSC may not tempt
"other states to think in terms of rejecting or making exceptions to
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to other provisions." Any such unilateral exceptions may include
environmental articles.
3. The Relationship between Part XII and "International Rules"
The LOSC is unlike most other marine pollution control
treaties. Its provisions seek to protect the marine environment in¬
directly, by establishing a framework whereby international control of
marine pollution can be developed. No specific substantive, standard
setting clauses appear. The basic state responsibility is to adopt
and enforce national laws to control marine pollution from all six
sources. Nothing about the content of such national laws is stated,
other than they are to conform to something referred to as "international
rules."
This relationship between the national laws and "international
rules" is the key controlling Part XII, which establishes nearly all
state duties on this unique association. If this connection between
"international rules" and national law to be adopted in accordance
with such rules is unclear then a flaw appears in the cornerstone of
the treaty, making it liable to collapse.
Analysis of this relationship requires close study of treaty
terms. Before embarking on such an inspection, it is appropriate to
comment upon the general problem of interpreting Part XII.
a. Problems in Interpreting Part XII
Part XII is awash with general and ambiguous terminology.
Such cautiousness is probably due to uncertainty about the amount of
459
damage caused by marine pollution, economic consequences of envi-
460
ronmental duties, and necessary trade-offs with other interests,
such as the demand of maritime states that ships not be hampered by
environmental laws. Rather than allow a provision to fail, a resort
461
to vague language may have occurred to accommodate all sides. What¬
ever the causes, the morass of ambiguities will engender acute inter¬
pretative puzzles. Numerous difficulties stand in the way of resolving
these problems.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides the
general rule of treaty interpretation. A treaty is to be interpreted
in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning of treaty
462
terms in their context and in light of the treaty purpose (Art.31(l)).
Resort to the ordinary meaning of treaty words is not altogether help¬
ful with Part XII because many phrases in it lack an ordinary meaning,
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such as, "competent international organisation," "generally accepted
international rules," and "appropriate consultation." Even words with
a seemingly ordinary meaning, such as "cooperation" and "international
rules," will cause controversy. "The ordinary and natural sense of
words may at times be a matter of considerable difficulty to determine...
The interpretator not uncommonly has...a personal feeling toward certain
words and phrases. What makes sense to one may not make sense to another.
463
Ambiguity may lie hidden in the plainest... of words... And it has
been said that applying the "object and purpose" criterion to the LOSC
464
"would be exceedingly difficult if not impossible."
In the event ordinary meaning does not appear. Article 32
of the Vienna Convention allows recourse to supplementary means of inter¬
pretation. One such means is the treaty's travaux preparatories. These
records are often helpful in understanding United Nations sponsored
treaties. Such agreements are typically prepared by the ILC and developed
through a number of defined stages, all of which produce material useful
465
in interpreting the treaty. The LOSC is not in this benign situation
for UNCLOS III was unique in many ways. The ILC had no role and the
466
treaty arose from the consensus process, during which the origin
and development of articles "is exceptionally obscure... especially,
467
as at UNCLOS, when all substantive discussion was off the record."
As one conference participant said after the first two sessions, "the
468
real negotiations took place in informal groups..." This comment
is applicable to the discussions on marine pollution, a "greater part"
469
of which took place in informal meetings. Because of the informality,
all papers and documents used by the delegates are not available.
"For non-participants, attempts to interpret the final treaty will be
470
extremely difficult...
One of the informal groups was the Evenson Group, estab¬
lished between the first and second session and initially composed of
471
a limited number of individuals, most of which were delegation heads.
The Group met to work out compromises to present to the conference in
472
the event of deadlocks. Marine pollution was an issue addressed by
473
the Evenson Group. Although solutions found here "inevitably in-
474
fluenced the progress of the Conference," "[n]o official records
were kept for these... negotiations and the relevant papers were not
475
published or even numbered in any systematic way." Furthermore,




This is not to infer there is a dearth of conference
records. On the contrary, there is abundant material. But it is "an
477
amorphous mass of material," much of which lacks "the objective
478
character of negotiating facts, the essence of traditional travaux."
Some of the material is of a random and disorderly character and much
479
of the rest of a partisan character. Material produced by states in
480
their self-interest probably cannot be regarded as travaux preparatories.
Amidst this mass of material, how will one be able to pick
out the crucial element in the nine years of conference meetings that
is the decisive factor giving proper construction to a phrase? Advice
of the ILC is apt: "it is beyond question that the records of treaty
negotiations are in many cases incomplete or misleading, so that con¬
siderable discretion has to be exercised in determining their value
481
as an element of interpretation.
It is axiomatic that, for the effectiveness of a convention,
its terms be clear. Otherwise, the privileges it grants and demands it
makes will be obscure. An evaluation of the effectiveness of the LOSC
requires recognition that its unclarity negates some, perhaps a great
482
deal, of its value.
b. Part XII and "International Rules"
This study will not attempt to unravel the equivocal lang¬
uage of Part XII. A wide selection of the vague wording is set forth
and then phrases expressing the crucial relationship between state
obligations and "international rules" is studied to illustrate
the interpretative problems the LOSC presents.





221(1) "major harmful consequences"
226( 1 )(c) "unreasonable threat of damage"
230(2) "wilful and serious act of
pollution"
220(5) "substantial discharges"
The LOSC's reference to state obligations includes these
nebulous terms:
Article Term
194(1) "best practicable means"
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194(1) "in accordance with their
capabilities"
194(1), 217(3), 211(2) "harmonize"
197, 200, 201, 235(3) "co-operate"




In provisions 207-212, states must adopt laws to prevent
pollution from the various sources. The national laws to be adopted
are related to what is termed "international rules." This relation is
not the same with each source and understanding the relation is complex.
In establishing the relation the following terminology is used:
Article Term
207(1) on land-based pollution "taking into account internationally
212(1) on atmospheric pollution agreed rules"
208(3) on offshore activities "no less effective than international
209(2) on deepsea activities rules"
210(6) on dumping "no less effective than global rules"
211(2)(5) on ship pollution "same effect as generally accepted
international rules"
The relationship between national laws and "international
rules" is thus expressed in basically two ways. With regard to land-based
and atmospheric pollution, national laws must "take into account" "inter¬
national rules." With other sources, an "effectivity" approach is used.
The "taking into account" wording in the land-based and
atmospheric pollution articles reflects the wider issue of the tension
between the desire for economic development and the need for environmental
483
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protection. The marine pollution sources most entwined with economic
development are land-based and atmospheric. LDCs produce proportionately
more of these types of pollution than that from shipping, dumping, off¬
shore, and deepsea activities. Consequently, two standards were set for
484
determining how national laws must reflect "international rules.
With land-based and atmospheric pollution the weaker "taking into account"
guideline is used, pleasing the LDCs. The stronger "no less effective"
language is used for the other sources as developed countries produce
most of these.
The "taking into account" language means that states in
adopting national law have "no definite obligation to meet the require-
485
ments set out in international arrangements. Although international
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law cannot be ignored, what it comes down to is that states can largely
do as they please with their national laws on land-based and atmospheric
pollution.
The "effectivity" formulation falls between the mere "taking
into account" and adopting in toto the relevant "international rules."
"International rules" are not, therefore, strictly binding but their
486
effect is to be achieved by whatever methods the state chooses. The
looming problem is who is to decide if a state's laws are as effective
487
as these rules.
The second part of the four exerpts above also causes
interpretative difficulties, and these are more entangled. What do
"internationally agreed rules," "international rules," "global rules,"
and "generally accepted rules" mean? What distinguishes "generally
accepted" from "internationally agreed" and "global" from "international?"
In attempting to answer these questions, a first step is
to determine when a rule becomes international so as to require the
adoption of a national law based on it. First, "international rule"
488
is not to be understood as a rule of international law. Thus, an
"international rule" is something other than a state's obligation
under conventional or customary law, which are of course inherently
binding.
Dr. Hakapaa says "international rules" should be formulated
489
through diplomatic conferences or IGOs. Dr. Timagenis, however,
490
believes "international rules" are related only to conventions.
Both agree that the mere adoption of a conventional rule by a diplo-
491
matic conference will not create an international rule." Their
opinions then diverge again. Hakapaa argues that a convention signed
by a "considerable number of states" but not yet in force may give rise
492
to an "international rule." Not for all treaty provisons, however,
only those "essential for the attainment of the basic objectives of
493
the treaty... But for Timagenis the convention must not only be
ratified by the minimum number of states necessary to bring it into
494
force but by an additional number of states.
These men, both scholars of the LOSC and delegates to
UNCLOS III, are thus unable to agree upon what constitutes an "inter¬
national rule," the key aspect of Part XII.
It is submitted that each errs in failing to recognise
that state practice can create an "international rule" that states rnustbase
national laws upon. To illustrate. Article 207(1) says states shall
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adopt laws to control pollution from land-based sources "taking into
account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended prac¬
tices and procedures." Granted, "standards, recommended practices and
procedures" can only arise through the work of a diplomatic conference
or, more likely, an IGO. But "internationally agreed rules" can be
fairly interpreted as also arising through state practice, through
custom. A practice that has not reached the level of customary law may,
in the latter stages before reaching that plateau, be considered an
"internationally agreed rule." The rule may not have been agreed to
in a formal setting but it can be agreed to by one of the numerous
mechanisms that manifest state practice, or a combination of them.
This construction does not, however, apply to ship pollution for which
it is stated that "international rules" are only "established through
the competent itnernational organisation or general diplomatic conference"
(Art. 211(2)(5)). But Article 208(3) on offshore activities, 210(b) on
dumping, and 212(1) on atmospheric pollution are like Article 207 and
do not contain a reference to IGOs or international conferences. This
partial rejection of the interpretation given "international rules" by
Timagenis and Hakapaa, and their own disagreement, illustrates the inter¬
pretative problems with the LOSC.
Whatever the proper construction of "international rules,"
what is curious is that the LOSC has devised a new source of interna¬
tional law. Traditionally, the primary sources of this law are conven¬
tions, custom, and general principles. For parties to the LOSC there
will be a fourth source when the treaty comes into force. According to
Timagenis and Hakapaa's understanding, this new source will be conven¬
tions to which a state is not necessarily a party. Assume State A is
a party to the LOSC and a new treaty on land-based pollution comes into
force. State A, although not a party to this new treaty would nonethe¬
less be obligated, because it is a party to the LOSC, to adopt laws
on land-based pollution that take the new treaty into account. So too
would it have the same duty if a state practice developed for the control
of land-based pollution, a practice that had not yet reached customary law.
Once the problem of interpreting "international rules" has
been addressed, one can go on to analyze how these two words are quali¬
fied. In the four excerpts on page sixty-four, the rules are referred to
as: "internationally agreed rules" (land-based and atmospheric pollu¬
tion), "international rules" (offshore and deepsea activities), "global
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rules" (dumping), and "generally accepted international rules" (ship
pollution). The rules are thus "internationally agreed" for two sources,
are "global" for dumping, are "generally accepted" for ship pollution,
and for the remaining two sources the relevant rules are just "inter¬
national . "
Although there is the view that "generally accepted inter-
495
national rules are no different than customary rules, the weight of
opinion seems otherwise. A group of Canadian scholars believes this
phrase "may be taken to mean rules contained in a convention that has
been ratified and accepted by more than the minimum number but has not
496
crystallized into a principle of customary international law."
497
Timagenis concurs. Hakapaa' s understanding is similar but offers
more detail:
Here we are faced with a dilemma familiar in discussions
on the formation of customary rules. Obviously it is quite
impossible to state any minimum number of states the support
of which would precisely make the relevant rules and stand¬
ards "generally accepted." One might submit, however, that
such a limit may be placed somewhere lower than that required
of customary norms (otherwise the distinction between custom¬
ary norms and generally accepted international rules... might
simply disappear).
That there is some agreement about the meaning of "generally
accepted" does not solve the problem for the interpretation leaves much
to be desired. As Hakapaa admits, one is still faced with a dilemma of
deciding when a sufficient number of states have ratified a treaty so
as to make it generally accepted. Nor may this construction be accu¬
rate. At the conference "[s]ome felt that 'generally accepted' re¬
quired that only a few major states had signed [the relevant treaty]
while others felt the convention should be in force and most of the
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world a party to it." The French delegation made an internal
attempt to define "generalement accepte" but was unable to come to an
500
agreement. There is also the opinion that one of the decisive tests
for general acceptance is the majority of signatures, not ratifications."
To make the matter more confusing, it is probably true that the number
of states signing and ratifying, no matter what number is necessary, may
not always be sufficient to determine what is a "generally accepted"
rule. Will it not be necessary for the states whose interests are speci¬
fically effected to be among those accepting the rule before it is gen¬
erally accepted? Thus, Dr. Schneider argues: "If a convention, such as
MARPOL, has been signed by many states...and is being applied by major
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maritime states, even before entry into force, can it not presumed to
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be 'generally accepted' - and/or 'applicable?'" Based on all this,
it is submitted that states will have "the luxury of determining for
503
themselves when a given international rule is generally accepted."
One is in an equally uncertain position with the modifying
word "global." It is not clear where lies the difference between
"global" and "generally accepted" and "international." As for the
difference between "global" and "generally accepted," "[n]o direct
504
guidance on the matter...can be derived from [UNCLOS III]."
Even if one could accept the advice that "the difference
505
in language does not necessarily denote difference in substance,"
one would still have to struggle with ascertaining the substance. But
this advice cannot be taken. One scholar, after listing a number of
seemingly similar phrases in the LOSC, states: "Those who have not taken
part in international negotiations tend to underestimate the signifi-
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cance of these boundary concepts within jural relations." The result
is a text that depends on such modifiers to express the substance of
legal relationships, and these will have to be contended with when the
treaty is applied, an application that may be as varied as the possible
interpretations.
4. A Selective Evaluation of Part XII
a. General Principles and Double Standards
The perspective one brings to a study of Part XII defines
how one answers the question of its effectiveness, particularly with re¬
gard to its general provisions. The principles are precatory and it is
easy to be cynical about how states respond to such exhortations. One
must respect the argument that the treaty's general duties to protect
the environment (Arts. 192-196), cooperate in IGOs for protection of
the seas (Arts. 197-201 ), provide LDCs with technical assistance (Arts.
202-203), monitor the seas (Arts. 204-206), and harmonize national
507
anti-pollution laws (Arts. 207(3), 208(4)), will not stimulate
states to do anything more than they are. Many states might well argue
that their present effort constitutes satisfaction of their treaty ob-
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ligations, and the cynic would not be surprised at such assertions.
A more hopeful perspective is that the general duties will
be beneficial; that states will indeed take countenance of them in
setting national and international policies. The optimists do not
view the LOSC as a Utopian document that once in force will secure
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healthy seas. Rather, they assess the convention as "a step forward."
Perhaps the best approach to assessing the effect of the
general principles in Part XII, and maybe the entire convention, is to
adopt an ambivalent position. One must wait and see how states respond
to the hortatory language. They may ignore it and confirm the cynics
view or they may accept that they must, to some degree, do more about
marine pollution. Professor Charney says of Part XII: "At best, these
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provisions can serve as a source for progressive development of law.
Emphasis ought to be placed on the word "can." The worth of the LOSC
can be none or it can be significant; it depends upon the response to it.
Fuel for the cynical perspective lies not only in the pre¬
catory language of general principles, but also in the LOSC's acceptance of
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double standards, discussed above. These allowances apply to all
sources of pollution and are able to emasculate the provisions on each.
It may even make legal poor enforcement of ship pollution laws by flag
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of convenience states; or, at least, encourage listless enforcement.
b. The LOSC and Land-Based, Atmospheric, Offshore, Deepsea,
and Dumping Activities
LOSC duties to control pollution from land-based, atmospheric,
offshore, deepsea, and dumping activities are fleeting. For land-based
and atmospheric pollution, for example, states must merely "endeavour"
to establish within IGOs rules for controlling these sources and then
adopt national laws that only "take into account" such rules (Arts. 207,
212). Thus, the treaty does extraordinarily little with these two
sources of marine pollution. Based on this alone the convention, in
an environmental context, can be labelled a failure. Land-based pollu¬
tion contributes 80 to 90% of all marine pollution and air pollution
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adds more than was previously thought. Although controlling these
514
sources is markedly complex, by failing to address them there is an
extraordinary gap in the pollution control regime the LOSC seeks to
build.
c. The LOSC and Ship Pollution
Part XII's most comprehensive articles concern ship pollu¬
tion, thus a closer look at these will be taken by highlighting several
of the more important provisions. Flag, coastal, and port states are
the three classes of states that may take action to control ship pollution.
i. Flag and Port State Jurisdiction. The LOSC requires
flag states not only to adopt laws that "have the same effect as generally
accepted international rules and standards" (Art. 211(2)), but also to
515
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enforce such rules "irrespective of where a violation occurs" (Art 217(1)).
"If properly implemented [these articles] could substantially improve
516
the efficacy of flag state enforcement."
The port state's power to take proceedings against a foreign
ship is the most novel feature of Part XII. Such a state may take action
for violations in its internal waters, territorial sea, and EEZ, and is
able to investigate and prosecute ships that have violated applicable
international rules anywhere on the high seas (Art. 218(1)). It must in¬
vestigate such violations if .the flag state requests (Art.218(3)). If
the violations occur in the internal waters, territorial sea, or EEZ of
another state, the port state must investigate if the coastal state
requests (Art. 218(3)). Also, a port state is obligated to take admin¬
istrative measures to prevent from sailing a ship in violation of inter¬
national rules relating to seaworthiness (art 219).
This concept of universal port state jurisdiction is po-
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tentially an effective weapon against ship pollution. No longer
does the flag state have the sole right to proceed against its ships
that pollute the high seas, a right some states have not exercised.
No longer can a ship avoid the consequences of its violations in a
state's maritime zones by simply leaving them to escape the coastal
state's jurisdiction.
Even so, port state jurisdiction is not mandatory for high
seas offenses and it is difficult to see a port state exercising juris-
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diction over such violations. Only for serious discharges would a
port state be motivated to take the time and incur the expense of an
investigation. A port state may also lack incentive to investigate
• . 519
discharges in another state's waters. A number of European states
have in operation a form of port state control. This regime does not
give the port state as much authority as the LOSC. Under the Paris
Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, parties must inspect
a certain percentage of ships that enter its ports but it may not
prosecute such ships and may only detain them if they present a real
520
threat to the marine environment or the well-being of the crew.
The agreement came into effect 1 July 1982 and concern has been ex¬
pressed that the disparity of inspection levels and standards of the
521
parties may give rise to "ports of convenience." Such a problem
will be possible under the LOSC. A further drawback with port state
jurisdiction is that it is subject to safeguards that allow the flag
522
state to preempt port state proceedigns.
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Despite these problems, it is healthy that the power to
act is there, for "increasing the number of potential prosecutors should
facilitate the control of pollution and circumvent the problems created
by States which are unable or unwilling to effectively exercise their
523
jurisdiction over their ships."
ii. Coastal State Jurisdiction. The issue of coastal
state jurisdiction over foreign ships has for years seen considerable
debate between maritime and coastal states. Shipping countries fear
this jurisdiction will significantly interfere with ocean commerce.
Coastal states want more authority over ships in their maritime zones
to protect their marine enviornment and because of their belief maritime
states fail to sufficiently enforce ship pollution laws. At UNCLOS III
compromises were reached allowing for different degrees of coastal
state prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction in the territorial sea
and EEZ.
In its territorial sea the coastal state may adopt any
law provided it does not hamper innocent passage (Arts. 21(l)(f),
211(4)). There are two significant qualifications to this prescrip¬
tive power. One, no DCEM standards, which are vital for effective
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control of ship pollution, may be set unless they give "effect to
generally accepted international rules and standards" (Art 21(2)).
Two, a ship's passage is only non-innocent if it commits an "act of
wilful and serious pollution..." (Art. 19(h)). Rarely will a discharge
be "wilful and serious." A coastal state's enforcement jurisdiction
in the territorial sea is generally unlimited and this is akin to
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customary law. Yet, before exercising this jurisdiction the coastal
state must have clear grounds for believing a ship has committed an
offense and its competence is subject to the safeguard provisions.
Therefore, the LOSC tilts towards the interests of shipping
in defining coastal state jurisdictional rights in the territorial sea.
Under customary law, coastal states may arguably prescribe DCEM stand-
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ards, thus the coastal state has actually lost ground. And the
safeguard provisions, which allow the flag state a wide right to pre¬
empt coastal state enforcement proceedings have been referred to as
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making a 'Vrockery" of coastal state jurisdiction. The right of pre¬
emption is lost only if the coastal state has suffered major damage or
the flag state repeatedly disregards its obligations to effectively en¬
force international rules (Art. 228(1)). O'Connell says "[i]t is
529
difficult to see how this...would work in practice..."
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As for coastal state jurisdiction in the EEZ, the littoral
state may adopt ship pollution laws that give effect to "generally
accepted international rules and standards" (Art. 211(5)). A coastal
state may, however, adopt stricter laws where "special circumstances"
exist in the EEZ (Art. 211(6)). Yet these laws may only implement
"applicable" international rules. Thus,in the EEZ there is no role for
the coastal state. It can take no initiative and its laws may go no
further than generally accepted international rules that are tradi¬
tionally not vigorous.
Coastal state enforcement powers in the EEZ are equally
meagre. Only when "there are clear grounds for believing"a ship has
committed a violation that results "in a discharge causing major damage
or threat of major damage" may the coastal state prosecute (Art 220(6)).
But, in the typical case, that of pollution that is not significant,
the coastal state may only require information from the ship (Art. 220(3)).
Even when a "substantial discharge" causes "significant pollution," the
coastal state may only inspect the ship if it refuses to give informa¬
tion or the information is "manifestly" false (Art. 220( 5)). Thus,
530
coastal state powers in the EEZ are significantly limited. A
ship discharge that causes major damage is unlikely and the evidence
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to prove it not easily obtainable. And, were enforcement action
taken the flag state can invoke safeguard articles. The LOSC, however,
at least allows concerned coastal states to take action in the EEZ in
limited circumstances, which they will be particularly inclined to do
if natural resources in this zone are being harmed by ship pollution.
iii. Conclusion. In sum, it is error to conclude that
the LOSC makes the coastal state "the guardian of the marine environ-
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ment..." On the contrary, the flag state retains its predominance
in the creation and enforcement of ship pollution laws and it, if any
state, is the guardian. Granted, steps have been made that infringe
upon the flag state perogative: port state enforcement allows action
to be taken for violations on the high seas and in another state's
waters, coastal state jurisdiction is able to reach the extreme pollu¬
tion incidents in the EEZ, and the coastal state can set more protective
regimes in its EEZ if ecological conditions warrant and it has signi¬
ficant powers over ice-covered areas (Art. 234). But the LOSC's
jurisdictional provisions are not revolutionary: most port and coastal
state jurisdiction is permissive, not mandatory; coastal state juris¬
diction in the EEZ is closely restricted and in the territorial sea
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has been weakened; and port and coastal state proceedings may be
preempted by the flag state.
The battle between shipping and coastal interests has been
won by the maritime states.
5. The Potential of Part XV to Resolve the Ambiguities of Part XII
As a skeptical view of the LOSC is taken here, fairness re¬
quires a discussion of the possibility that clarification will be ob¬
tained through the convention's dispute settlement procedures.
These procedures makeup Part XV of theLOSC and have been
532a
described in other studies. In sum, they provide that all disagree¬
ments are to be peacefully settled by any means the parties choose (Arts.
279-280). If settlement is not reached, the dispute must be submitted
to binding settlement procedures (Art. 286). Several forums are named
to handle these procedures: the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, the ICJ, arbitration tribunals, and conciliation commissions.
There are, however, some exceptions to compulsory settlement and these
are set forth in Articles 297 and 298, of which only 297(1) is relevant
for this thesis. This provision begins by saying that a coastal state's
exercise of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction is free from compulsory
dispute settlement except in three instances. Before looking at these
three, it appears this exclusionary clause cuts a wide path through the
compulsory dispute settlement requirement. Furthermore, in discussing
an early version of Article 297, Adede stated: "Disputes arising from
the conduct of states in their territorial sea are presumed to be un¬
questionably within the competence of domestic courts... Thus no specific
exclusion was required under paragraph one...with respect to such dis-
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putes." Thus, excluded from binding settlement are the LOSC's
duties on land-based and atmospheric pollution and pollution from
activities conducted in the territorial sea, such as dumping and mining.
Returning to Article 297, its chapeau setting forth the
general exclusion of disputes involving a coastal state's sovereign
rights and jurisdiction is followed by three subparagraphs that include
cases that, even though they involve a coastal state's sovereign
rights and jurisdiction, are nonetheless subject to binding settlement.
These cases are thus exceptions to the exclusionary clause. Subpara¬
graph (a) says that allegations the coastal state has violated Article
58 are subject to third party settlement. Article 58 concerns the
EEZ and gives all states in this zone freedom of navigation, overflight,
laying submarine cables and pipelines and other lawful uses related to
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these freedoms. Thus, if a coastal state were enforcing illegally
strict environmental laws on ships passing through its EEZ, such state
could be brought before a judicial forum. Subparagraph (b) is a corrol-
lary of (a). It provides that if a state is alleged to have abused its
freedoms in a state's EEZ,then the dispute can go to third party settle¬
ment. Thus, if a ship violates internationally lawful environmental
provisions in an EEZ, the matter is one for third party settlement.
Subparagraph's (a) and (b) thus allow disputes concerning ship pollu¬
tion that arise in the EEZ to be taken before a forum set up by Part XV.
Subparagraph (c) of 297(1) gives a broader opportunity for
third party settlement of environmental disputes. It refers to alle¬
gations that the coastal state has violated "specified international
rules and standards" for the protection of the marine environment. The
operative word, "specified," takes a number of Part XII provisions
beyond the ambit of compulsory dispute settlement, for Articles 192,
194, and 197-206 on general obligations lack specificity. On the other
hand, the provisions on establishing and enforcing rules to control
marine pollution from the various sources, may be sufficiently specific.
Therefore, if a coastal state failed to abide by its environmental
duties under these articles, it might be required to defend itself
before a judicial body. Yet here Adede's correct interpretation men¬
tioned above, that what a state does in its territorial sea and land
territory is not subject to compulsory settlement, is to be recalled.
Were it otherwise, a state would be required to answer such allegations
that it is allowing too high a concentration of contaminants to be emitted
from its factories, is misusing herbicides, and is illegally permitting
discharges from outfalls. As it is, regarding environmental issues,
third party settlement includes only EEZ ship pollution problems and
polluting activities beyond the territorial sea. Of course, a coastal
state's polluting activities must effect another state's interests and
not just the oceans commons, for actio popularis is not recognised.
Although/the reach of the compulsory dispute settlement procedures
over environmental issues is hardly comprehensive it may be sufficient
to satisfy the concerns raised in the above discussion of Part XII.
This review of Part XV was undertaken to determine if it had the
potential to clarify the ambiguities in Part XII. The answer is yes.
First, the compulsory dipute settlement procedures do cover environ¬
mental activities that relate to provisions containing the same or
similar unclear words and phrases as are in the environmental articles
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not subject to impartial review. For example, judicial interpretation
of "international rules" in Article 211(2)(5) on ship pollution, that
is subject to third party settlement, will be valuable for understanding
"internationally agreed rules" in Article 207(1) on land-based pollution
that is not so subject. Likewise, if a decision clarifies the meaning
of "significant pollution" in Article 220(5) on ship pollution, this will
aid understanding "substantial pollution" in Article 206 on land-based
sources. Second, the ambiguous phrases of Part XII also appear in
other Parts of the LOSC. Thus, if a tribunal interprets, for example,
"generally accepted international regulations" in Article 41(3) on
traffic separation schemes in international straits, this will aid
interpretation of Part XII's "generally accepted international rules."
Thus far, this discussion has concentrated on judicial dispute
settlement. Yet other means of settlement may also contribute to clari¬
fication of Part XII. Article 284 provides that any disagreement may
be submitted to conciliation. A conciliation commission's report is
only a suggestion; it is not binding. Unlike courts and arbitration
tribunals, conciliation commissions typically are more concerned with
reaching a negotiated settlement influenced by non-legal considerations
than with interpreting legal instruments and making pronouncements on
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the law. Even so, depending on the commission's mandate and the
manner in which it carries out its responsibilities, its proposals
may contribute to understanding the ambiguous language of Part XII as
much as would the decisions of a judicial tribunal.
It is the opinion of "most experts that one of the great achieve¬
ments of [UNCLOS III] was that it established a very strict method of
dispute settlement for most disputes that might arise as to the inter-
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pretation and application of the Convention. This assessment is
incorrect regarding environmental provisions. For if all a state's
marine polluting activities carried out on its land territory and in
its territorial waters are exempt, the great majority of polluting
activities will not be subject to third party review. Basically,
only some ship pollution, deepsea mining, and the odd dumping opera¬
tion will be subject to impartial reveiw. On the other hand, if one
is looking only to compulsory dispute settlement for assistance in
interpreting vague terms, then this large gap is not so troubling,
for interpretative guidelines can be gained by analogy from non-en¬
vironmental disputes as well as from disputes that concern ship pollution
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and activities beyond the territorial sea. Less optimistically, uni¬
form interpretation and jurisprudence may not develop from Part XV
because it provides for a multiplicity of available fora. While this
has the advantage of encouraging the use of Part XV, it is also possible
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that conflicting interpretations will result. Another factor that
may impair the development of consistent law is that, in some instances,
the decision-making panel need not be versed in law. The qualifications
of conciliators are that they enjoy the highest reputation for fairness,
competence, and integrity (Annex V, Art. 2). Arbitrators are to have
similar characteristics and be experienced in maritime affairs (Annex VII,
Art. 2). Judges that are not law-trained may be less inclined to care¬
fully review and respect prior decisions.
In the end, the value of Part XV, which sets in place procedures
whereby a body of case law can be developed to give concrete formula¬
tion to principles and broad terms, depends upon what use states put
it, and this will not be known for many years.
6. Conclusion
The LOSC's environmental provisions, as stressed, rest upon an
understanding of "international rules" and the relationship between
such rules and national laws. Each of these elements have been awk¬
wardly drafted. In fact, obscure wording plagues much of the text,
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leaving one apprehensive about the value of the treaty.
Generally, the LOSC does little to develop international law
where it is most needed. Thus, its second major deficiency is its
scant attention to land-based sources. In effect, nothing is done
about this problem, nor with atmospheric pollution. Consequently,
the treaty addresses only about 20% of the marine pollution problem.
The convention does add a bit to control of dumping but this
is reasonably well covered by the various dumping conventions. While
the LOSC's treatment of ship pollution is detailed, the overall re¬
sult is mixed. In fact, the law for ship pollution is already fairly
well developed since entry into force of MARPOL 73/78.
Should the LOSC come into force,it is difficult to assess what
worth its environmental provisions will have considering their overriding
precatory and vague nature. Ultimately, all depends upon the approach
states take to interpreting the convention. Some states may interpret
it restrictively and accept only specific and unambiguous obligations.
Other states might accept as responsiblities all general language of
an obligatory character, respond to ambiguous language, and take action
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to the fullest extent possible where action is discretionary. Know¬
ledge that recourse to compulsory dispute settlement procedures is
possible may promote this latter approach.
In addition, the LOSC1s effectiveness depends so much on regimes
and institutions beyond it. Its repeated references to "international
rules" requires an examination of convention-based rules of marine
pollution control. If these are strong, the treaty may significantly
develop the environmental law of the sea by requiring nonparties to such
conventions to adhere to their terms. The LOSC's environmental articles
are also replete with references to "the competent international organi¬
sation." Directing the world community to other forums to solve the
marine pollution problem will enhance the importance of international
and regional organisations. Determining which IGOs have a role to
play and how they work together to accomplish the goals set by the
LOSC is a worthwhile study.
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CHAPTER FIVE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE SEA OF A SPECIFIC CHARACTER:
REGULATING DUMPING AND SHIP POLLUTION
A. Introduction
539
This chapter examines two global treaties, MARPOL 73/78 and
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the LDC. The analysis of each begins with a few words about their
origins followed by an explanation of the institutional arrangements
for administering each. This latter exercise is necessary for two
reasons. One, such bodies are IGOs involved in interorganisational
coordination of marine pollution activities, a subject of the thesis
and addressed in detail in Part III. Two, the adminstering bodies are
the focal point of MARPOL 73/78's and the LDC's development and imple¬
mentation and thus crucial to their effectiveness. This effectiveness
is not examined by a review of treaty terms, something extensively
done in other studies. Rather, the conventions' value is assessed by
studying how effectively they have been implemented, interpreted, and
developed by the institutions set up to administer them, and this
exercise comprises the bulk of the chapter.
B. MARPOL 73/78
1. Introduction
Oil pollution from ships was the first kind of marine pollution
to be internationally controlled. In 1954 the OILPOL Convention was
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adopted. It prohibits oil discharges except when conditions on
rate of discharge, total amount discharged, and geographic location
are satisfied (Art. 111(b)). Although the convention has been ratified
by states that collectively own over 90% of the world's tanker tonnage
it has not been, due largely to inadequate enforcement, overly successful
542
in preventing deliberate oil discharges. Under the treaty enforcement
rests almost completely with flag states. This drawback and others,
such as the convention's limited definition of "oil" (Art. 1(1)),
its failure to regulate ship design and other sources of ship pollution,
such as chemicals and sewage, combined with the Torrey Canyon incident
and pressure by the United States for more effective environmental
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protection, prompted IMO to draft the MARPOL Convention that was adopted
at a 1973 conference. The treaty, as modified by a 1978 Protocol, is
known as MARPOL 73/78 and its Article 9(1) states that it supersedes
543
the OILPOL Convention.
2 . Institutional Arrangements
MARPOL 73/78 names IMO as the administering body and IMO's
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) is intimately involved
with the convention. In fact, MARPOL 73/78 occupies the bulk of
544
the MEPC's time.
IMO's duties include acting as a repository of information. Con¬
tracting states are required to investigate any casualty involving their
ships that cause major environmental harm and supply IMO with the
findings (Art. 12). There are a number of provisions requiring states
to provide IMO with information regarding their implementation of
MARPOL 73/78. If, for example, a port state notifies a flag state
that one of the flag state's ships may have violated the treaty, the
flag state is to inform IMO of the action taken in response (Art. 4(3),
6(4)). Also, parties are to communicate to IMO the texts of their laws
on matters within the scope of the treaty, specimens of the ship certi¬
ficates issued under the convention, location and capacity of their
reception facilities for ship wastes, an annual statistical report on
penalties imposed for violations, and general reports on "the results
of the application of the present Convention..." (Art. 11(1)).
IMO's most important role, however, is preparing amendments to
MARPOL 73/78's long, technical annexes that may be accepted by parties
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through a tacit amendment procedure (Art. 16). The MEPC has already
adopted many amendments and the tacit amendment procedure, which avoids
time-consuming formal ratification, places the MEPC in a pivotal posi¬
tion to influence the treaty. The Committee also has a programme to
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develop uniform interpretation of certain provisions, many of which
are intricate and susceptibile to different understandings.
3. Development of the Convention
MARPOL 73/78 goes far beyond the OILPOL Convention. While the
latter was directed only at oil pollution, MARPOL 73/78 addresses five
pollutants. Annex I deals with oil and "oil" is broadly defined (Annex I,
Reg. 1(1)); Annex II with harmful substances carried in bulk; Annex III
with harmful substances carried in packages; Annex IV with sewage; and
Annex V with garbage. Under MARPOL 1973 Annexes III, IV, and V were
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optional; any state ratifying it had to accept at least Annexes I and
II but could declare its non-acceptance of Annexes III, IV, and V (Art.14).
MARPOL 1973 was to enter into force twelve months after at
least 50% of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant shipping had rati¬
fied the treaty (Art. 15(1)). But by late 1978 states with only 0.03% of
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the world's merchant fleet had ratified it. Although political inertia
and pressure from the maritime industry reluctant to incur the costs the
548
treaty would impose inhibited ratification, the basic problem was that
the requirements of Annexes I and II went beyond the limits of 1970 's
549
technology.
A primary purpose of the 1973 conference was to develop measures
550
for preventing oil discharges that were less subject to human error.
551
Thus, segregated ballast tanks (SBT) were to be placed on new tankers,
though this was only feasible for existing tankers. Complex monitoring
552
and control equipment was also required. Yet, by 1973, work on moni¬
toring equipment had concentrated only on crude oil and not on the many
553
other kinds of oil, and the accuracy of this equipment was imperfect.
Even less was known about the technology needed to comply with Annex II's
554
regulation of chemical tankers. A problem besetting both annexes was
their requirement for port reception facilities. These are required to
receive wastes that may not be disposed of at sea. But installation of
. . _ 555
reception facilities is expensive, restraining acceptance of the treaty.
Lastly, requirements of Annexes I and II are not always compatible. For
example, oil must be discharged above the water line and chemicals below.
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Yet, at times some ships carry both Annex I and II substances.
All technical and practical problems with the annexes had to
557
be solved before states would ratify. This factor, coupled with
demands by the United States, which suffered a series of tanker casual¬
ties off its coasts in 1976 and 1977, led to a 1978 conference to consider
558
ways the convention might be brought into force. At this conference
a Protocol was adopted stating that Annex II will not come into force
until three years after Annex enters into force. This provided time to
solve Annex II's technical problems that were more complex than those
559 560
with Annex I. This delay may actually have expedited ratification
561
and the 1978 conference did improve the annexes.
MARPOL 73/78 did enter into force on 2 October 1983. Annex I
became applicable on that date and though Annex II was to come into
force on 2 October 1986, in 1985 the MEPC agreed its implementation
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should be delayed until April of 1987 so that it might enter into
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force at the same time as amendments to the annex enter into force.
The optional annexes. Annexes III, IV, and V, also require ratifica¬
tion by at least fifteen states, that combined merchant fleets of
which are at least 50% of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant
shipping (Art. 15(2)). As of 18 March 1985 the status of the
563
annexes was:






All the marine pollution conventions studied in this thesis,
except the United Nations conventions, rely upon an IGO to administer
and develop them. MARPOL 73/78 is no exception and it may be that
IMO's efforts to implement and improve this treaty have been consider¬
ably more involved and successful than that of other administering bodies.
As mentioned, the treaty contains a number of reporting require¬
ments. The parties, acting within MEPC, have approved standard formats
for reporting obligations required by Articles 4, 5, 6, and 11 as these
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provisions relate to Annex I. There are three general formats: (a)
an annual report of incidents involving oil spillages of 100 tonnes
or more; (b) an annual enforcement report concerning coastal states'
allegations of discharge violations referred to flag states and the
flag states' response, and flag states' allegations of inadequate
reception facilities referred to port states and the response of port
states; and (c) an annual assessment report to provide data to assess
the overall effectiveness of MARPOL 73/78, containing reports by port
states on the effectiveness of port state control and on violations re¬
sulting in detention or denial of entry, and a report by all states of
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penalties imposed for MARPOL 73/78 violations.
Under Article 8, states are to report on pollution incidents in accordance
566
with the provisions of Protocol I to the treaty. The MEPC has
developed this duty. There was an opinion that only incidents re-
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suiting in significant discharges need to be notified. It was.
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however, agreed that all discharges, other than those permitted under
568
the convention, are to be reported. At its April 1985 session,
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the MEPC also improved Protocol I. It is now clear that incidents
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involving substances other than oil are included. Furthermore, not
only are masters of ships involved in an incident required to report
but now so are masters of any "ship engaged in or requested to engage
in an operation to render assistance to or undertake salvage of a
571
ship involved in an incident..." Lastly, some provisions in the
recommendatory draft Guidelines for Reporting Incidents Involving H'arm-
572 573
ful Substances have been moved to the binding Protocol.
Collectively, these various reports will, provided they are
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properly completed and faithfully submitted, provide information
upon which to assess MARPOL 73/78's effectiveness, something typically
difficult to determine with marine pollution control treateis. This
uniqueness of MARPOL 73/78 is due not merely to its provisons but also
to the manner in which the MEPC has developed them. The Committee's
work has been helpful in other areas.
Regulations 5, 5A, and 8 of Annex II contain criteria for the
discharge of noxious liquid substances. The regulations state that the
procedures and arrangements by which chemical tankers can satisfy the
criteria must be approved by the flag state but be based on Procedure
and Arrangement Standards (P & A Standards) developed by IMO, giving
the organisation an instrumental role in ensuring that Annex II is
implemented, and IMO has done considerable work developing P & A Stand¬
ards. The MEPC has developed the Standards and at its last session
575
approved revisions it expects to adopt at its December 1985 meeting.
The changes are based in part on operational trials conducted with the
original Standards, which revealed problems in their application.
576
Remedying these will enhance timely entry into force of Annex II.
IMO thus carried out its obligations to develop P & A Standards that
provide a uniform international basis for the guidance of states in




in bulk can c ply with Annex II. The MEPC will keep the Standards
under review.
IMO's most significant work regarding Annex II, however, concerns
amendments. A 59 page text of proposed amendments has been approved by
579
the MEPC and its adoption has been given priority for the Committee's
580
December 1985 meeting. The MEPC believes the proposed amendments,
by significantly reducing the generation of ship wastes, will not only
effect a remarkable reduction of ship-generated pollution by noxious
82
liquid substances, but will also drastically reduce environmental
problems ashore involved with the treatment and ultimate disposal
581
of ship wastes. The changes also provide for improved possibili¬
ties for executing effective port state control and should increase
582
the likelihood of more ratifications.
Some of the MEPC1s other work involving Annex II concerns
setting reception facilities guidelines; defining terms; and making
plans to develop guidelines for implementation of Regulation 8, ship
583
surveys, and port state control. An important part of the MEPC's
present and future work with Annex II is its attempt to develop inter-
584
pretations to some Annex II Regulations.
As for the MEPC's work with Annex I, a number of long interpre-
585
tations for numerous Regulations have been adopted and a 34 page
586
text on Guidelines for Port State Control Procedures has been approved
587
as has a 28 page text of guidelines for ship surveys. In addition,
the Committee has adopted a number of amendments to Annex I that are
588
to enter into force in early 1986. The amendments do not include
new requirements but seek to resolve difficulties and provide a prac-
589
tical solution to implementation problems. Furthermore, as Annex I
includes important provisions on equipment to be carried on board to
ensure discharge limitations are met and since there have been problems
with the effectiveness of such equipment, IMO has worked to improve the
equipment. At each MEPC session in the past few years, substantial
time has been devoted to the issue and the Committee has, among other
things, approved several sets of guidelines for the operation of the
590
equipment.
One of the foremost problems that inhibited ratification of
MARPOL 73/78 in the 1970s was the expense of constructing port recep¬
tion facilities. Lack of these facilities continues to make problematic
the effectiveness of the treaty. In 1983 the International Chamber of
Shipping reported that it had "received a disturbingly high number of
591
reports of inadequate facilities." The following year the MEPC
stated "that in many parts of the world reception facilities were in-
592
adequate or not available." Of particular concern is insufficient
593
facilities in special areas, particularly the Mediterranean, where
594
discharges are prohibited. If a ship in a special area does not
have a reception facility to discharge its wastes to, the novel special
595
area concept will not be implemented. IMO has developed a questior
nairre on reception facilities to determine whether such facilities
83
are available and, if so, who should be contacted for their use,
596
whether charges are involved, etc. This project will enable infor¬
mation on the adequacy of reception facilities to be readily available
597
to shipping companies. Other than such limited projects and exhorta¬
tions for the compliance with this crucial part of the treaty, there is
not much IMO can do, although it has, through its technical assistance
598
programme helped states to develop reception facilities.
As noted, the optional annexes are not in force. Questionnairres
for each annex have been prepared to determine the problems inhibiting
599
acceptance and possible solutions to such difficulties. Replies to
the questionnairres for Annex IV have been received and in December 1985
600
the MEPC will consider the problems upholding ratification of this annex.
4. Conclusion
MARPOL 73/78 represents a dramatic improvement over the 1954
OILPOL Convention and the common assessment is that it will make a
601
significant contribution to reducing ship pollution. Its structural
requirements, such as SBTs, will limit environmental damage from acci¬
dental discharges caused by groundings and collisions. Discharge
standards will reduce the amount of pollution caused by operational
discharges. Indeed, the amount of oil entering the oceans has been
602
appreciably diminishing in recent years. An important provision
requires parties to apply treaty terms to ships of non-parties "as may
be necessary to ensure that no more favourable treatment is given to
such ships" (Art. 5(4)). It may be possible to assess the treaty by
the costs it imposes, and the structural and discharge control standards
will impose significant direct and indirect costs on the shipping
603
industry. In 1982, a year before Annex I came into force, an IMO
publication stated:
[MARPOL 73/78] has already had a considerable influence upon
tanker design and operations.
Most tankers built since 1973 have conformed to
many features of the original MARPOL Convention -- for example,
SBTs...the limitation on tank size and other structural
arrangements have generally been followed, since... conformity
to international standards is an important bonus when... selling
a ship. Equipment, such as oily-water separators, is also
widely used.
The 1978 Protocol has had an even greater impact,
particularly because it was clear that...[it] would enter
4- * 4- ■ , 604into force comparatively quickly.
Such positive remarks must be tempered with recognition that none
of the optional annexes are in force and the manner in which states will
implement and enforce Annex I and II is yet unknown. Although the re-
84
suits of United States inspections, involving 2 ,095 ships in the
second half of 1984, to check compliance with the treaty are en¬
couraging. Of the ships, 94.5% complied with oil pollution prevention
certificate requirements, 95.8% with oil record book duties, and 96.2%
605
with equipment requirements. Yet, there are flaws in the oil dis¬
charge monitoring and control equipment that make their operation in
606
accordance with the treaty problematic. Lack of reception facilities
for oil and chemical wastes makes full implementation impossible. Even
the Port of Rotterdam, an ultramodern and generally high standard port,
607
has problems providing reception facilities. Such difficulties are
not due to a failing by IMO, which is doing a number of things to solve
the reception facilities problem and otherwise advance the convention.
The MEPC has held MARPOL 73/78 under constant review and will continue
to do so. This is particularly important since the shipping industry
is characterized by rapid change and ship pollution control mechanisms
608
are subject to technical advances. Meeting twice a year the MEPC
has made significant and beneficial contributions to the treaty.
From its beginning in 1973, MARPOL 73/78, despite its long delay in
entering into force, is a vital part of the international law for the
control of marine pollution and IMO has played a pronounced role in
developing and promoting it.
C. The London Dumping Convention
1. Introduction
The initiative that resulted in the LDC was begun by the United
609 6
States, which, in 1971, placed a draft convention to control dumping
before the United Nations Intergovernmental Working Group on Marine
Pollution, a body preparing for the Stockholm Conference. A number of
international conferences considered the draft before a London confer¬
ence adopted the LDC. The agreement did not, however, contain provi¬
sions the United States sought, for its initiative was prompted by
more reasons than just a concern for the health of the seas. While the
United States was developing a draft treaty, discussions that eventually
led to the ODC were ongoing. Indications were that the Scandinavian
countries intended to present strong proposals to the Oslo Conference.
Fearing the Oslo approach, though regional, might develop into a global
convention detrimental to its interest in retaining the seas as a
disposal resource, the United States sought to preempt this possibility
611
by offering a draft convention to a wider forum. This draft was a
85
mild regulatory scheme, scathingly referred to by Canada as a "license
612
to pollute." The draft, however, was greatly modified on its way
through the various conferences to final acceptance at London and bears
marked similarity with the ODC, discussed in the following chapter.
2. Institutional Arrangements
LDC parties did not establish a body to service the treaty.
Rather, IMO provides the Secretariat, performing numerous administrative
duties (Art. XIV). It supervises implementation, considers reports on
dumping operations and the treaty's efficacy, and reviews convention
annexes and recommends changes to them. Of course the entire IMO is
not at the service of the LDC, only one IMO official is. As he has
other responsibilities within the organisation, he is able to give
613
the treaty only about 30 to 40% of his time. A one person, part-time
613a
Secretariat is inordinately small for a global treaty of 56 parties.
The LDC also has a Scientific Group on Dumping to assist the
614
Secretariat in implementing, reviewing, and updating the treaty.
Though a subsidiary body, the Scientific Group plays a prominent role
in the work of the LDC, for clarification and progressive development
of it is dependent upon solid work by and agreement within this body.
3. Development of the Convention
a. Substances Regulated
All wastes are regulated by the LDC. They are not, however,
dealt with similarly. Wastes are divided into three categories, the
dumping of which (a) is prohibited, (b) may take place upon a specific
permit, and (c) is allowed upon a general permit (Art. IV(1)). This
is known as the black, gray, and white list system. The substances
on the black list are set forth in Annex I of the convention and are
considered the most harmful. Annex II contains the gray list of sub¬
stances that maybe dumped, but because these require "special care" a
special license must be obtained prior to their disposal and it may
place conditions on the dumping operation. All other substances,
that is those on the white list, may be dumped under a general permit.
Annex III sets forth a number of criteria a licensing authority is to
consider in deciding whether or not to approve a dump, such as the
character of the waste, proposed dumping site, and method of dumping.
Unfortunately, the LDC does not specify criteria for allocating
substances to Annexes I and II. In order to review the status of the
lists in the annexes and to provide a framework that allows new sub¬
stances to be objectively assessed, the parties have sought to establish
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such criteria; no doubt a useful exercise since some of the sub¬
stances were included in the annexes on the basis of little scientific
616
evidence. In 1977 the Scienitific Group "pointed out that consider¬
able advantage could be gained by following a uniform classification
617
procedure for allocating substances to particular Annexes" and
618
agreed upon Draft Guidelines. The LDC 1980 and 1981 Consultative
Meetings, however, merely took note of the Guidelines and said they
619
should not be rigidly applied because other criteria may be relevant.
Although the Scientific Group continued its work nothing had
been decided by the 1984 Consultative Meeting, at which the parties
decided "major efforts should be made" to develop allocation criteria
620
for Annex I and II substances. An intersessional group was estab¬
lished to present proposals to the Scientific Group which will, in
621
turn, report to the 1985 Consultative Meeting to be held in September.
As a first step to developing allocation criteria, the parties advised
the group to clarify the concepts and purposes underlying the annexes
and, based on this, to develop scientific rationale to support these
purposes, including identification of characteristics of substances
622
that might be included in the annexes. For a treaty that has been
in force nearly a decade, one would think the underlying purposes of
its key provisions would be settled. Without allocation criteria it
is possible the treaty has been prohibiting dumping substances the seas
can safely absorb and permitting disposal of substances that should not
be dumped.
It is important the LDC parties resolve this issue because other
decisions depend on it. No agreement has been reached on whether lead
623
should be moved from Annex II to Annex I and whether organosilicon
624
substances should be deleted from Annex II. Both questions have been
put aside until a determination is made of what criteria distinguish
625
the two annexes. Furthermore, Annex II contains the nebulous term
"significant amounts." If substances listed are present in a waste
in significant amounts, then a special permit is required. Although
626
the parties quickly agreed on an interim definition for this term,
there is "general uneasiness" within the Scientific Group about it
627
and some states find it "arbitrary and inadequate." A final solu¬
tion will be attempted when criteria for allocation of substances to
628
the annexes have been developed.
More success has been had in establishing guidelines for inter¬
preting Annex III criteria that govern issuance of permits. Guidelines
87
are needed because the criteria's nonspecificity has likely led to
subjective interpretations and thus wide variations among states con-
629
cerning the nature, quantities, and locations of dumping. Though
630
attempts to add more criteria have failed, the 1980 Consultative
Meeting adopted Guidelines for the Application of Annex III that
631
parties "shall take full account" of when issuing permits.
Another implementation problem is that overall supervision of
the dumping industry can vary. For example, in 1979 Britain licensed
the dumping of 11.3 million tonnes of industrial and sewage wastes
but sampled only 1% of industrial loads to determine if applications
632
accurately stated the quantity and nature of the waste. Such lax
633
supervision, it is asserted, has led to serious violations of the LDC.
„ 634
Following this criticism test sampling of loads was to increase to 7%.
This figure is short of the 10% proposed by the House of Lords Committee
635
on Science and Technology,
b. Exceptions
The LDC has numerous exceptions to its obligations. Such pro¬
visions dilute the treaty's effectiveness but attempts have been made
to elucidate some of the exceptions and thus limit subjectivity in
their use.
Article V(2) exempts Annex I substances from the prohibition
against dumping if they pose an unacceptable risk to human health and
no other solution than dumping is feasible. This emergency exception
is highly uncertain and one publicist concludes it "is a sleeping
giant" that if awakened "could seriously undermine the notion of a
636 637
blacklist." Although the clause has been seldom invoked, it can
be interpreted to allow any substance to be dumped that would pose a
significant risk if disposed of on land. Thus, it could be argued
that all radioactive waste must be placed in the ocean. Recognising
this vagueness of Article V(2) the parties adopted Interim Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Emergency Situations that elucidate the
638
Article. Also, the Scientific Group proposed developing criteria
for designation of emergency dumping sites, though little work on
639
this seems to have been done.
The prohibition of dumping Annex I substances is also lifted
if those substances occur only as a "trace contaminant" in a waste
(Annex 1(9)) or are "rapidly rendered harmless" by the ocean (Annex
1(8)). In 1978 Interim Guidelines for the inplementation of these
exceptions were adopted that include test procedures for interpreting
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"trace contaminant" and "rapidly rendered harmless." The Guide-
641
lines were amended and expanded in 1979 and in 1984 the Scientific
Group reported it would continue to pursue improvements in the defini-
642
tion of trace contaminants." Such activity does not necessarily
mean a great deal is being accomplished and it has been said that the
attempts to clarify "trace contaminants" "are no less baffling (and
therefore no more useful in practice) than the original opaque phrase
643
that has given rise to the effort." The value of the efforts to
elucidate the "harmlessness" exception have also been challenged as
"an extremely vague statement of the desiderata for any test procedure
644
a Contracting Party may choose to employ...
Perhaps recognising some of these problems, the parties have
adopted a prior consultation procedure that must be used by a state
before invoking the exceptions. The process requires the scientific
data used by a state to determine the acceptability of dumping a black¬
listed substance to be submitted to the Secretariat which distributes
it to all parties so they may assess its validity and comment to the
645
state proposing to dump. Although final decision is with the
dumping state, the prior consultation procedure may encourage it to
act cautiously.
c. Activities Regulated: Defining "Dumping"
The convention seeks to prevent marine pollution by dumping and
defines "dumping" as, basically, "any deliberate disposal at sea" (Art.
Ill(1)(a)).
Immediately after entry into force the question was raised
whether incineration at sea was dumping, for although it is a method
646
of disposal conducted at sea, it places nothing directly into the sea.
Despite this ambiguity, the parties promptly acted to control incinera¬
tion. Technical Guidelines on Incineration were adopted by resolu-
647
tion in 1977. The resolution recommends states implement the Guide¬
lines and that the parties consider making them mandatory.
While Article IV(l)(a) prohibits dumping all substances named
in Annex I, a 1978 amendment allows incineration of some balcklist
648
substances. The amendment requires that incineration of such




tion that were also ado ed in 1978 and "take full account" of the
Technical Guidelines.
This work prompted a concern that by establishing incineration
as a disposal method practiced in accordance with internationally accepted
650a
rules it would increase contrary to the parties' intention. Indeed,
the development of incineration rules can be looked upon negatively for
what has arguable been done is to create another exception to the black-
89
list prohibition. Most delegations, while agreeing incineration is an
interim solution, consider premature a proposal to set time periods
during which incineration would be phased out in favour of land-based
651
disposal because land-based ternatives are undeveloped. It is,
however, important to note that the parties consider incineration at
sea an interim solution and that its acceptability may be reconsidered.
A loophole in the LDC rules on incineration is that wastes pro¬
duced in a contracting state are being exported to non-contracting
states to avoid incineration controls. This may result in neither the
incineration Regulations nor Guidelines applying to the operation.
The problem was addressed in 1980 with the adoption of a resolution
that mentioned the need for improving implementation of the treaty,
noted the problem of re-routing wastes, and resolved "that Contracting
Parties...will, to the best of their ability, ensure that wastes ex¬
ported to a non-Contracting Party for loading on board a marine incin¬
eration facility should be incinerated in accordance with the require-
652
ments of the [LDC]..." Although the resolution is weak, it does
represent a willingness to acknowledge problems with implementation
and an attempt to solve them.
LDC parties have also attempted to strengthen the effectiveness
of the incineration rules by defining "rapidly rendered harmless" and
"trace contaminants" as these terms relate to wastes to be destroyed by
653
combustion. Besides such regulation of the actual combustion process,
LDC states are considering the need for control of cleaning and re¬
pairing incineration vessels. Proposals for mandatory supervision of
654
such work will be discussed at the 1985 Consultative Meeting.
Although LDC parties have been able to address incineration
relatively unacrimniously, the issue of radioactive waste disposal
has engendered vigorous debate. Considerable time has been spent dis¬
cussing two aspects of this issue: whether disposal of all radioactive
waste should be banned and whether emplacement into the seabed of the
waste falls within the definition of "dumping."
With regards to the first aspect, in 1983 a resolution was adopted
calling for suspension of radioactive waste dumping pending the results
655
of a comprehensive scientific and technical study of this activity.
The study is to be submitted to the 1985 Consultative Meeting, at which
proposals to amend the treaty to prohibit such dumping will likely be
^ 656considered.
As for the second aspect of the radioactive waste issue, at
90
the 1983 meeting participants learned of research being conducted by
several states on the feasibility of emplacing into the seabed high
657
level radioactive waste. Questions were raised whether emplacement
into the seabed, as compared with disposal into the sea, is within the
658
treaty's definition of "dumping." The LDC's definition refers to
"any deliberate disposal at sea." The words "at sea" lead to two in¬
terpretations: (a) any disposal operation from a vessel is within the
treaty because it is conducted at sea; and (b) only a disposal operation
that leaves the wastes in the sea or on the seabed is within the treaty,
and, as emplacement into the seabed does neither, such activity is not
659
regulated by the LDC.
The 1983 Consultative Meeting decided to handle the problem by
660
assigning it to an intersessional group, which, unfortunately, was
unable to agree on defining "dumping" and returned the matter to the
1984 meeting. Two draft resolutions were tabled at the meeting repre-
661
senting the two divergent views. One says dumping includes sea¬
bed emplacement and disposal of high level radioactive waste into the
seabed contravenes the treaty. The other proposed resolution says
such activity is not to proceed until research proves it is technically
and environmentally feasible, thus implying seabed emplacement is not
dumping. As no accommodation between these opinions was reached, other
than no seabed emplacement should take place until it is proven techni¬
cally and environmentally feasible, the matter is to be taken up again at
662
the 1985 Consultative Meeting.
d. Reporting Obligations
States are to keep records of their dumping activities and send
these to the Secretariat. Reports are to concern the environmental
condition of the seas; the number of permits issued; the nature and
quantities of all matter permitted to be dumped; and the location,
time, and method of dumping (Art. VI(4)). Most countries, however,
663
do not report. The following table presents information on dumping
reports submitted from 1976 to 1982, 1982 being the most recent year
664
for which information is available.









This record is not quite as poor as it appears. Those states
that do most of the dumping, industrialized states, do report. Most
of the non-reporting states do not dump or, if they do, the amount
665
is small and the contents not particularly dangerous. Most in this
group of states are developing countries and their failure may be due
more to the lack of sufficient infrastructure and organisation than an
666
intentional avoidance of treaty terms. Hindering effective reporting
by some developed states are constitutional problems that the Secre¬
tariat believes are gradually being addressed and better record keeping
667
on dumping and compliance with reporting duties can be expected.
Even when reporting is done, it is often done improperly, so
much so that the Secretariat must engage in considerable guesswork to
668
determine what the reports purport to include and mean. Other prob¬
lems include the Soviet Union's failure to report permits issued for
669
dumping in its territorial sea; permits are "very often" issued as
669a
"open," with no quantity specified; no state has ever used the for-
670
mat established for submitting dumping reports; and only rarely
have special permits for incineration been reported immediately after
671
issue as is required. Reports on monitoring ocean health are only
672
complied with haphazardly and the approved format for monitoring
673
data has never been used.
Based upon information submitted, and despite the many prob¬
lems with it, perhaps trends can be determined in the amount and haz-
ardousness of dumping. If trends can be established, this may aid in
determining the effectiveness of the treaty. With this objective in
mind, an examination will be undertaken of information regarding the
number of licenses issued, quantities of waste permitted to be dumped,
and amount of hazardous substances in dumped waste.
The number of licenses issued by LDC states from 1976 to 1982
674
; as follows:
1976 1977 197 8 1979 1980 1981 1982
INCINERATION PERMITS
General 4 2 7 10 4 6 5
Specific 0 2 0 4 8 35 39
Total 4 4 7 14 12 41 44
DUMPING PERMITS
General 389 484 518 598 597 587 570
Specific 24 18 19 12 12 15 16
Total 413 502 537 610 609 602 586
TOTAL 417 506 544 624 623 643 630
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Little use can be made of this information to ascertain dumping
trends. Although it appears a marked increase in the number of dumping
licenses occurred in the late 1970s, this was due to the increasing
number of states ratifying the LDC and to improved reporting. Further¬
more, a permit issued may not necessarily be used, a general permit may
license dozens of individual dumpings or just one, and it is not the
number of dumpings that matter, but the quantity and, even more impor¬
tantly, the harmfulness of the substances dumped.
Based upon information received by the LDC Secretariat, a study
has been undertaken of the nature and quantities of wastes dumped by
675
LDC parties from 1976 to 1981. The study was organised by dividing
wastes into three categories, industrial waste, sewage sludge, and
dredge spoils. An attempt was then made to assess the quantities of
and harmful substances in each. It was planned that the substances
to be studied would be those in Annex I and II of the LDC but, because
of poor reporting this exercise was not considered useful. Thus,
only three substances were assessed, cadmium, mercury, and lead, and
only for two years, 1980 and 1981. The study found that almost all
information the Secretariat holds on these comes from parties to the
ODC, that is, West European states. Consequently, a worldwide assess¬
ment is impossible. As for quantities of waste, the ODC countries
676
also supplied the bulk of information used m the study, though
the United States and Canada sent useful data. As for the rest of
the world, little information was received. Regarding the quantities
of industrial waste, sewage sludge, and dredge spoils dumped, it is
unwise to attempt to find trends because of the short reporting period,
1976-1981, and because the reporting of the early years in unreliable.
With this caveat in mind, the apparent tendencies are as follows. It
appears dumping of industrial wastes by West European and North American
677
states has declined and that sewage sludge dumpipg by West European
678
states and the United States has, if anything, slightly increased,
but neither variation is large. For dredge spoils the information from
Western Europe is too unreliable to enable anything to be said about a
679
trend, while in North America the amount of this waste dumped appears
680
to have remained static. Whether the quantities move up or down is,
however, largely unimportant since it is the presence and amount of
persistent, toxic substances in dumped waste that is the more telling
681
feature. But as mentioned, information on this is available only
for 1980-1981, only for mercury, cadmium, and lead, and mostly from
93
Western Europe and trends cannot be determined from a two year period.
4. Conclusion
As the LDC deals with the same pollution source as the ODC,
dumping, and as the two treaties were brought into force at about the
same time, contain similar provisions, have been similarly developed,
and a number of comparable conclusions can be drawn about the effective¬
ness of each, it is worthwhile to delay offering conclusions about the




EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE SEA:
LEADING THE WAY TO A HEALTHY MARINE ENVIRONMENT
A. Introduction
This Chapter examines five regional European treaties, the ODC,
the Paris Convention on Land-Based Sources, the Helsinki Convention,
the ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, and the
Barcelona Convention. The analysis of each follows the form used in
discussing MARPOL 73/78 and the LDC. Thus, the origins and institu¬
tional arrangements for administering each are briefly set forth,
followed by an examination of how the parties have developed the treaties.
Of course, marine pollution control agreements are not unique
to Europe. In fact, there has been a worldwide regionalization of
the law of the sea.
. , 682
The reasons for regionalization are varied. While the
regional response to such problems as conservation and economics in¬
creased awareness of regionalism as a method by which international
problems might be handled, it is the nature of marine pollution that
made regionalism the major trend in ocean management. Only ship
pollution and deepsea mining reguire greater than regional treatment.
In most cases, marine pollution is a localized problem primarily the
result of land-based pollution.
There are also a number of practical reasons for the regionali¬
zation trend. One, the phenomenon reflects the general inability of
the world community to make solid global marine pollution control
agreements. Reaching a global consensus is tortuous and the result
often platitudinous. There is too much enmity in the world, and
political, economic, and cultural differences create gulfs normally
too wide to bridge. But countries of a region, at a similar stage
of development, with a common culture, accustomed to dealing with
one another, and sharing a common problem are better able to work
together. Though this is not to deny that ancient grievances may
exacerbate implementation of a regional treaty or even prevent its
683
conclusion. Two, the preceived success of early regional marine
95
pollution agreements prompted similar approaches. Three, as marine
regions usually have unique biological characteristics and environ¬
mental problems, the local approach allows the legal regime to be
adapted to local features. Thus, regionalism has a scientific
rationale. Four, the institution administering a regional treaty
can be tailored to the needs of its members who will be better able
to control and influence it than they can global agencies. Regionali-
zation of the law of the sea is likely to continue for these reasons
684
and because the LOSC has codified the trend.
B. The Oslo Dumping Convention
1. Introduction
The origin of the ODC is due to the initiative of Norway and
685
the outlandish voyage of the Stella Maris. This ship, a Dutch
freighter loaded with a highly poisonous waste, sailed from Rotterdam
in July of 1971. The barrels of waste were to be dumped in Holland's
territorial sea, something Dutch officials disapproved of but were
apparently unable to stop. Instead, they shrewedly sent a boat used
for combatting oil spills to follow the Stella Maris at an embarassingly
close distance. The sheepish captain of the Stella Maris decided not
to dump where planned but turned northward, intending now to dispose
of his cargo 300 miles south of Norway. The Dutch passed this informa¬
tion on to the Norwegian government by telegraph. The message, how¬
ever, erroneously stated the dump was to be within thirty rather than
300 miles of Norway's coast. The error was not intentional, but nor
was it corrected.
This led to an uprise of public protest in Norway,
which spread to the international press. The journey of the
'Stella Maris' now became a veritable odyssey, again and again
chased off as she was by diplomatic interventions of the
states she approached. Fishing boats blockaded a Scottish
harbour when the 'Stella Maris' wanted to refuel there. Great
Britain intervened with the Dutch Government when it became
known that dumping was planned westwards of Scotland. Ireland
and Iceland protested against a dumping position westwards of
Ireland. Finally, the vessel carried the cargo back to the
port of Rotterdam.
Because it was not unlawful for the Stella Maris to dump any¬
where, except in the territorial waters of a state, the absence of inter¬
national regulation was exposed. This gap was partially closed in 1972
687
by adoption of the ODC. The general area to which the ODC applies
is the high seas and territorial waters of the North Sea and Northeast
96
Atlantic (Art. 2).
2 . Institutional Arrangements
The ODC establishes the Oslo Commission (OSCOM), composed of
contracting parties and responsible for supervising the treaty's
implementation, considering dumping reports, reviewing the condition
of the seas, considering the treaty's efficacy, reviewing its annexes
and recommending changes to them, and other administrative tasks (Art.
16, 17). A Secretariat staffed by three professionals assists OSCOM.
This Secretariat is also the Secretariat for the Paris Convention on
688
Land-Based Sources and the Bonn Agreement. OSCOM established a
Standing Advisory Committee for Scientific Advice (SACSA) with the res-
689
ponsibility of providing advice on technical matters. Like the
LDC's Scientific Group, SACSA plays a prominent role in the develop¬
ment of the treaty and initiatives towards more environmental protec-
690
tion usually are borne in SACSA.
As OSCOM works closely with the Paris Commission of the Paris
Convention on Land-Based Sources, a Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) was
established by the Commissions to exchange technical information and
691
coordinate monitoring activites. The JMG oversees the Joint Moni¬
toring Programme (JMP) that aims to assess the level of marine pollu¬
tion, its hazards to human health and marine life, and the effectiveness
692
of the ODC and Paris Convention for the reduction of marine pollution.
693
Work in the JMP has focused on cadmium, mercury, and PCBs. The pro¬
gramme is thus limited and the work done for which reports are available
indicate a number of problems with the JMP, such as lack of intercali-
bration among participating laboratories, gaps in geographic overage,
inefficient guidelines, poor reporting, and a lack of understanding
694
of the JMP's basic objectives. Discussion is underway about
expanding the JMP beyond the few substances now studied, and now that
the programme has been in operation a few years it may be expected to
encounter less problems.
3. Development of the Convention
Provisions of the ODC are similar to the LDC's. Each treaty
regulates the dumping of all kinds of wastes and does so with a
black, gray, and white list system and the substances listed in the
annexes of each are nearly the same, although the ODC does not mention
radioactive waste. These factors have led to similarities in the im¬
plementation and development of the conventions. Consequently, this
discussion of the ODC follows the format of the LDC analysis. In
97
addition, ODC developments are often treated summarily here because
explantion of the issues was provided in the LDC discussion and it is
unnecessary to repeat them.
a. Substances Regulated
The ODC does not contain criteria by which substances may be
allocated to either Annex I or II. But unlike LDC parties, OSCOM
695
agreed on allocation principles in 1980 and will discuss improve-
696
ments to these at its 1985 session. The criteria will be useful
in OSCOM's quinquennial reviews of the annexes to assess substances
697
and assign them to the proper annex.
b. Exceptions
The ODC contains numerous exceptions to its obligations. It
does not apply to ships with sovereign immunity (Art 5(6)), even though
. , . 698
many dangerous substances are carried in government vessels. Annex
I substances may be dumped in cases of force majeure (Art. 8(1)), in
emergencies (Art. 9), and if the substances are "non-toxic" or "rapidly
rendered" "harmless" by properties of the ocean (Annex I(l)(2) ). There
is also an exception for "trace contaminants" (Art. 8(2)).
OSCOM adopted interim definitions of "non-toxic" and "trace con-
699 700
taminants" in the mid 1970s. But, as these are imprecise, OSCOM
has agreed upon procedures to measure, through six groups of harmonized
tests, the toxicity, bioaccumulation potential, and persistence of
701
wastes. The tests are to determine if a substance is a "trace
contaminant," if it will be rapidly converted by the sea so as to
become harmless, and if it is "non-toxic." Once an ODC party has made
the tests and decides the substance falls within the exception, it is
not free to dump for it must also comply with a prior consultation pro-
702 703
cedure like that discussed under the LDC. The procedure is also
required when a state seeks to dump Annex I substances under the emer¬
gency exception and when its incineration of a waste is with a lower
704
than 99.05% efficiency. The procedure has been used by Belgium
regarding toxic munitions, by the Netherlands regarding waste from
the production of a weedkiller, and by Britain regarding organochlori-
nated waste. Some ODC parties raised objections to aspects of these
proposed dumpings and these concerns were taken into account by the
dumping states before issuing dumping permits. For example, a pro-
705
posed dump into the North Sea was switched to the deep Atlantic Ocean.
c. Activities Regulated: Defining Dumping
The ODC defines dumping as "any deliberate disposal of substances
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and materials into the sea by or from ships or aircraft..." (Art.
19(1)). Normal operating discharges, as those from ships and off¬
shore mining activities, are excepted (Art. 19(1) (a)). While MARPOL
73/78 covers ship discharges, no convention specifically deals with
pollution caused by the offshore mining industry. OSCOM, however,
adopted a resolution recommending control of the disposal of pipe
metal shavings and other wastes from offshore oil drilling that may
706
interfere with fishing and navigation. Since this action the
number of requests for compensation submitted by professional fisher-
707
men has decreased and in 1984 SACSA reported the resolution was
708
being implemented and that no further steps were necessary. At
its 1985 meeting OSCOM intends to discuss the question of the removal
709
of seabed pipelines. These actions close somewhat the gaps in the
law for the control of offshore mining.
The ambiguity of the ODC's definition of "dumping" as it relates
710
to incineration was quickly addressed by OSCOM. After adopting in
711
1977 a Code of Practice for incineration in 1983 OSCOM opened for
712
signature a protocol on mandatory incineration rules. The rules
are nearly identical to those accepted by LDC parties and, if accepted
713
by all ODC states, will become Annex IV of the treaty. Furthermore,
ODC parties have agreed to meet before 1990 to set a final date for the
714
termination of incineration at sea. When such discussions begin,
the parties have obligated themselves to negotiate in good faith on
715
setting a precise date for ending this activity. A last develop¬
ment of the treaty as it pertains to incineration is the 1983 agree-
716
ment on principles to control repair and cleaning of incineration ships,
d. Reporting Obligations
Parties to the ODC are to submit reports on the same matters
717
as are LDC states (Arts. 11-13). These duties are far more faith¬
fully carried out in the regional dumping treaty than the global one,
718
although some ODC states now and then fail to report and Spain
719
has continually failed to report. But the Oslo Secretariat does
experience problems with the manner in which ODC states report. "[I]n
many instances" the data for special permits does not include all that
, 719
is required. More information is needed on the components of the
wastes, their toxicity and biodegradability, and the industrial pro-
720
cesses from which they come. Nor have states regularly complied
721
with the duty to justify incineration operations. As for general
reports on dumping, the information is often unclear, requiring the
99
Secretariat to interpret it or communicate with the contracting party
722
for clarification. Furthermore, dumping in internal waters is not
723 724
required to be reported; even though most states voluntarily report,
this is insufficient because a substantial amount of dredge spoil is
725
dumped here and these reports do not include a chemical analysis of
the waste, necessary information if the potential harm of this activity
726
is to be known.
OSCOM has compiled figures for 1976-1982 on the quantities of
industrial waste, sewage sludge, and dredge spoil dumped, these
727
figures, in thousands of metric tonnes, are:
Industrial Waste Sewage Sludge Dredge Spoil
1976 7 ,200 7 , 631 71,454
1977 7,516 8,176 76,962
1978 8,444 8,650 84,958
1979 9 ,891 8,799 64,538
1980 9,048 9 ,221 112,581
1981 8,685 8,632 111,051
1982 7,838 8,245 101,910
728
Since only information from 1980 to 1982 is reliable, there
does seem to be evidence that the ODC may be preventing some dumping.
While recognising that the economic recession may have contributed to
729
the decline in dumping industrial waste, OSCOM believes national
measures to implement the treaty have "clearly" resulted in a reduction
730
in dumping of all three wastes. Belgium evaluated the effect of
the recession on industrial waste dumping and when economic influences
were removed the study found "clear evidence" that dumping by Belgian
731
companies had decreased. This was attributed to dumping control
732
laws and increasing costs of transport and ocean dumping.
The decline in sewage sludge dumping is primarily due to
pressure from West German authorities on sludge producers to end their
733
disposal at sea. Data from Britain, which is responsible for 95 to
99% of all sewage sludge dumped, shows that heavy metals in the waste
734
have decreased notably. Waste from the production of titanium
dioxide has declined because of pressure from Dutch and Belgian author¬





It is difficult to determine the LDC's and ODC1s affect on
dumping practices and the health of the seas. The treaties probably
have caused a decline in dumping practices that were causing particu-
736
lar concern when the agreements were signed. There also probably
has been a decline in dumping due to administrative costs on industry
737
to comply with national implementing regulations. Yet there is
doubt whether the conventions have contributed to much of a general
738
decline in dumping, particularly the LDC. It was hoped such an
assessment might be made on the basis of dumping reports but, as ex¬
plained, it is impossible to say anything, positively or negatively,
about the global effect of the LDC. As for highly radioactive wastes
in the LDC's Annex I, the IAEA is responsible for defining those that
are unsuitable for dumping but it has failed to supply a definitive
definition. In view of this and the inability of the Consultative
Meetings to react vigorously, "it is highly doubtful that the Conven¬
tion will result in any substantial reduction in radioactive contamina-
739
tion of the world's oceans."
The ODC, on the other hand, may be limiting some dumping and
contamination caused by dumping. Though such conclusion is tentative
for not only have reports been submitted for too short a time to discern
trends but the reports are not always complete. Furthermore, there are
no data on pre-ODC -- as well as pre-LDC -- dumping practices so
conclusions of a before and after nature cannot be made.
Although ODC states have fairly well adopted national measures
740
to effectuate the treaty, it is uncertain if LDC states have done
741
so. In addition, there is little information on whether states are
742
enforcing such national measures. States are not obligated to in¬
form the Secretariats of any investigations of dumping violations
they have conducted nor of penalties imposed, and neither Secretariat
743
has any knowledge about the way the treaties are enforced. The
Task Team 2000, established by LDC states to develop a future strategy
for the convention, made a couple of statements in its report that
indicate problems exist with inadequate implementing measures and
744
enforcement of such measures.
When it comes to deciding how provisions ought to be interpreted
or implemented, LDC states have problems. Although they did quickly
and positiviely respond to the incineration issue, such action is an
abberation. A good example of LDC inaction is the issue of establishing
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criteria for allocation of substances to the annexes. Since the LDC
has come into force, this question, and several others dependent upon
it, has continually been before the Consultative Meetings. Adoption
of allocation criteria, if they are scientifically sound and honestly
implemented, will make the LDC a better treaty: wiser in its use of
the seas as a waste disposal resource and more respected by its con¬
tracting parties. Resolution would free the parties of a problem that
has pestered them for years and perhaps provide impetus for the prompt
resolution of other problems. Of course, the radioactive waste issues
have stymied the last three Consultative Meetings and the efforts to
elucidate language granting exceptions have not been fully successful.
OSCOM, on the other hand, seems more able to made decisons and
develop its treaty. Incineration was quickly addressed and brought
within the treaty. There is now a question whether sea disposal of
platforms used for offshore recovery of minerals is within the treaty.
Yet, there seems to be a consensus that OSCOM has competence and regu-
745
lations on such operations will likely be adopted. SACSA is studying
problems caused by anti-fouling paints applied to pleasure boats. Though
the contamination caused when these paints peel and enter the marine en-
746
vironment is not a result of dumping, OSCOM may regulate the paints.
OSCOM has also been able to influence better implementation of the ODC.
Whereas some permits were being issued without a time limit, pressure
747
within OSCOM brought an end to this undesirable practice. A common
incineration site has been designated where all incineration at sea is
to be conducted and all such operations must now be controlled by a
748
data recording device that cannot be influenced by the crew. SACSA
is investigating the possibility of ensuring, by electronic means,
749
that violations during dumping operations are detected. SACSA
conducts paper exercises of the parties' response to a marine pollution
750
emergency. A Code of Practice for the Dumping of Acid Wastes for
the Titanium Dioxide Industry has been adopted, as have guidelines on
methods of monitoring dumping grounds for sewage sludge, dredge spoils,
751
and for monitoring areas where titanium doxide wastes are dumped.
Whereas in 1981 26% of incinerated waste was not licensed, in 1982
752
this had been reduced to 13%.
Besides these specific examples of OSCOM developing the ODC,
the discussions it holds on particular dumping practices of a state
may be an important factor in preserving the marine environment. A
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state may be challenged to justify its practices and this may lead to
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the end or at least restriction of some practices. Such pressure
is not brought to bear within the LDC Consultative Meetings, the size
of which does not easily lend itself to scrutinizing the actions of
one country.
These differing traits between the two dumping treaties are not
only due to the marked disparity in the size and activeness of their
Secretariats, but also to their differing scope, one being regional and
the other global. This study gives some validity to the argument that
regional IGOs and treaties have a better chance to succeed than global
ones. The two treaties are similar in many respects yet OSCOM has
moved its treaty forward more expeditiously than have the eight LDC
Consultative Meetings.
There are other regional dumping treaties besides the ODC and
it seems their number will grow. Where does the IDC fit in this network?
Will it slowly die as states concentrate their efforts to control dumping
within regional agreements?
Although this study has been critical of the LDC, it is recog¬
nised that its parties have been able to act with regard to incinera¬
tion at sea and this is a partial rebuttal to the negative view of the
convention. And perhaps one ought to reserve judgment until conclusion
of the September 1985 Consultative Meeting at which a number of impor-
tnat matters will be addressed. How these are handled will give one a
better idea of the LDC's effectiveness and future. Also, the LDC has
symbolic value that does affect national decisions on dumping. For
example, in March of 1975 the Finnish tanker Enskeri left Helsinki with
7
a cargo of poisonous waste, intending to dump it in the South Atlantic.
The cargo began to leak en route and at first no state would allow the
Enskeri to enter its ports, giving the episode a look of the Stella
Maris voyage. Meanwhile, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and Canada
all called upon Finland to recall the ship. Even the United Nations
Secretary General became involved. Finland did, eventually, decide
not to dump and although it is unclear whether the LDC was the deter¬
mining factor, its presence surely allowed protesting states to mount
755
more effective diplomatic action.
The LDC probably has a beneficial effect on administrators of
national regulatory agencies who attend Consultative Meetings. The
meetings also provide a clearinghouse for scientific information, as
does the Scientific Group on Dumping, and allow dialogue between con-
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tracting parties with different environmental policies.
Beyond these perhaps limited advantages, the LDC does have a
role to play in the world netwrok of marine pollution control agree¬
ments. It is the forum in which to discuss truly global dumping issues,
as the radioactive waste problem, a conundrum with greater than regional
ramifications. The LDC is best situated to study and develop alterna¬
tive disposal techniques that will lead to a decline of ocean dumping.
As a global convention, it can, perhaps, not only assist the work of
regional dumping treaties but coordinate their activities. Furthermore,
the LDC, along with, its Secretariat, IMO, should take the lead in pro¬
viding technical assistance to developing countries on dumping questions,
something regional dumping groups are less likely to undertake. While
Consultative Meetings deal with global dumping issues and provide an
overall framework, it is for regional treaties to do the day to day,
detailed work and to apply more stringent standards to reflect local
problems. The fault with viewing the LDC with such a role is that not
all its constracting parties participate in a regional dumping treaty.
Nonetheless, the LDC is unlikely to be much more than it presently is.
Indeed, as a global convention it may be performing as best as can be
expected under the system of sovereign states, in times of economic
restraint, and with difficult environmental problems the effects of
which are unclear.
C. The Paris Convention on Land-Based Sources
1. Introduction
Adoption of the ODC provided an impetus for the conclusion of other en¬
vironmental agreements and while the ODC success was fresh West European states
turned their attention to the primary cause of marine pollution, land-
based sources. A number of these states and the EEC Commission met in
1974 and agreed to the Paris Convention to address the intractable
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problem of land-based pollution. Eleven states and the EEC are parties
to the treaty which covers the same ocean area as the ODC.
2. Institutional Arrangements
The convention establishes the Paris Commission (PARCOM) with
administrative responsibilities similar to that of OSCOM (Art. 15-16).
The Secretariat is the same as that serving the ODC. The convention
also has a technical advisory group, the Technical Working Group (TWG).
757
PARCOM's scientific work contributes to the JMP.
3. Development of the Convention
Under the treaty, "pollution from land-based sources" means that
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reaching the sea from rivers, the coast, and offshore platforms (Art.
3(c)). Air pollution is not specifically mentioned in the treaty, but
758
PARCOM has been debating its competence over this source and has
undertaken studies of the scientific aspects of air pollution and of the
759
work being done by other IGOs in this area. If these studies suggest
it would be useful and practical to control air pollution of convention
waters PARCOM will consider whether the treaty needs to be changed to
760
take specific measures in this field. In fact, there is a fair
chance the treaty will be amended to give PARCOM specific competence
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over atmospheric pollution.
Implementation of the Paris Convention is largely concentrated
in Article Four, which states the parties undertake to eliminate, if
necessary by stages, pollution by substances listed in Part I of Annex A.
Not only has the list system reappeared here, but the substances of the
convention's black and gray lists are similar to those of the ODC and
LDC. There is, however, a fundamental distinction between the systems.
While the ODC prohibits the disposal of blacklist substances, the Paris
Convention calls for an end to the pollution these substances cause.
Furthermore, Article Four only requires parties to "undertake" to end
pollution, "if necessary by stages." Since there is no obligation to
end disposal of blacklist substances and since the duty to eliminate
pollution caused by them is tentatively expressed, it is a mistake to
conclude that this treaty has a blacklist in the sense that idea is
usually understood. The disparity between the ODC and Paris Convention
in dealing with the same hazardous substances is symptomatic of the per¬
plexing problem of land-based pollution.
Article Four goes on to require that elimination of pollution
from blacklist substances and the strict limitation of pollution from
graylist substances "shall" be achieved by implementing programmes and
measures. These implementation methods "shall" include specific regu¬
lations or standards governing (a) the quality of the environment, (b)
discharges into the convention area and watercourses affecting this area,
and (c) the composition and use of substances and products that cause
land-based marine pollution. The programmes and measures are to "take
into account the latest technical developments" and "shall contain
time-limits for their completion." To assist PARCOM in developing
abatement programmes, the treaty requires the parties to establish com¬
plementary scientific research programmes and to progressively estab-
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lish monitoring systems to assess existing marine pollution and the
effectiveness of the Commission's measures to reduce it (Art. 10-11).
To implement Article Four PARCOM uses a systematic approach.
The Commission has not attempted to address all hazardous substances
but only a few of the more dangerous ones. The work on each typically
begins with trying to determine the origin of the pollution, often a
difficult task because sources are frequently diffuse. Only once a
contaminant's origins have been identified can a decision be taken re-
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garding programmes and measures of control.
PARCOM's substantive work thus far has been directed at mercury;
oil; PCBs and PCTs; cadmium; aldrin, dieldrin, and endrin; and discharges
. , . , 763
from the titanium dioxide industry. Preliminary research on air
pollution has been undertaken and recently consideration has been given
764
radioactive discharges from nuclear power reprocessing plants. As for
PARCOM's research and monitoring activities, these are concentrated
within the JMP.
Reviewing PARCOM's Annual Reports with the objective of determining
how it has developed the convention, one is struck by the slowness with
which it operates and its reluctance or inability to agree upon binding
decisions and to adopt measures that will make a significant reduction
in land-based pollution. These characteristics can be illustrated by
discussing the work on a few substances. In this analysis it is to be
kept in mind that the Commission's work began before the treaty entered
into force in 1978. An Interim Commission met between 1974 and 1978,
not only to prepare for PARCOM's work when the convention entered into
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force, but also to begin that work.
Regarding cadmium, in 1979 PARCOM instructed the TWG to collect
information on the sources of pollution by cadmium and the possiblity
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of reducing cadmium in the environment. By 1983, however, the infor-
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mation collection phase was not complete and not until 1984 was some¬
thing substantively done. In 1984 most parties agreed to accept the
mild recommendation that they "should take all necessary measures to
remove... cadmium from industrial point sources..." and that "product
control oriented measures should be adopted so as to remove as much as
768
possible of the cadmium circulating in the environment. Spain and
Britain reserved their position on this recommendation because its first
part was covered by a draft EEC Directive and they wished to await EEC
769
discussions on this Directive before taking action in PARCOM. Thus,
after six years of studying cadmium all PARCOM has done is adopt -- and
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not even unanimously -- a mildly worded recommendation that restates
an EEC draft Directive.
The Interim Paris Commission recommended the use of aldrin, diel-
drin, and endrin be gradually abandoned when less harmful substitutes
770 771
were available, a recommendation reaffirmed by PARCOM in 1979.
In 1984 the TWG said less harmful substitutes exist for most uses of
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"the drins," yet no decision was taken by PARCOM. Rather, instructions
were given the Secretariat to update past studies and the TWG to propose
, . . 773
a recommendation for phasing out the three substances.
The TWG stated in 1983 there were "no technical or economic
reasons" why the use of PCBs and PCTs in new transformers, capacitors,
and heat-transmitting fluids should not be phased out in a "very short...
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time. PARCOM, however, was only able to recommend that parties
775
should as soon as possible phase out PCBs and PCTs in this eguipment.
Although it also agreed to consider at its 1984 meeting setting a
776
precise date for carrying out this recommendation it did not do so.
Rather, a "declaration of intent" was adopted in 1984 stating the parties
intend to prohibit by a formal decision in 1985 the use of PCBs and
777
PCTs in new equipment from 1 July 1985. Spain and Portugal doubt
whether they will be able to immediately implement such a ban and France
maintained a reservation on the proposed date for entry into force of
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the prohibition. If there are no technical and economic reasons why
PCBs and PCTs cannot be excluded from future production of certain equip¬
ment then PARCOM is moving unduly slow. This is particularly so since
the proposal does not include existing equipment.
The Commission's work in these three areas substantiates the
observation above about the leisurely pace of its work and reluctance
to take strong action. This is not, however, always true, for PARCOM
has taken binding decisions with clear terms on, for example, oil dis-
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charges from new refineries and mercury discharges from the chloralki
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industry, and has taken positive steps with regards to discharges
781
from the titanium dioxide industry, as well as a number of measures
782
relating to the control of pollution from offshore platforms.
It is impossible to assess the Paris Convention's effectiveness
by using information produced as a result of its monitoring duties.
The problems that beset LDC and ODC data also appear here. Not all
states submit reports they are obliged to, those that do may not submit
anything on certain ocean areas, some contaminants are neglected, and
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sometimes the information in the reports is unclear. Furthermore,
the three years for which data is available is "too short to draw firm
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conclusions as to the effectiveness of the 'programmes and measures'
784
being taken to eliminate pollution...
4. The Intractable Problem of Land-Based Marine Pollution
Although a critical view of PARCOM's work has been taken, it
would be unfair to argue that it could accomplish a great deal, for
land-based pollution presents "problems of enormous economic and
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political complexity" and is "doubtless one of the most intractable
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environmental problems of our time." Without understanding the reasons
behind these statements a proper assessment of the treaty cannot be made.
The hesitant approach of the convention and PARCOM is due in
part to economics. Although the economic effects of controlling land-
based pollution are not clear, it will cost huge sums to even modestly
787
curb this source. Because of the economic costs, business is able to
persuade governments to respond without vigor. If a state did otherwise,
788
it would risk the international position of its goods. On the other
hand, application of strict national environmental laws to imported
goods may raise considerable trade barriers. Orders to close or even
limit the operation of a polluting factory would lead to unemployment
and perhaps disruption of neighbourhoods and towns dependent on the
industry. Such societal and political costs weigh heavily in places
of decision. And recognising the inadequacies of marine science it
is asking more than a little of governments to accept such costs and
react strongly to a problem that causes an uncertain amount and degree
of harm.
Furthermore, because land-based pollution is the result of all
man's activity, his agricultural, domestic, and industrial practices,
all of which produce a plethora of environmentally harmful substances,
the problem of locating specific sources of contaminants -- the legally
proximate cause -- is difficult and often impossible, particularly as
a good deal of land-based pollution comes from non-point sources. But
this information is necessary before controls can be imposed.
There is with land-based pollution the unique question of up¬
stream states. Such countries may contribute significant amounts of
waste to rivers that empty directly into oceans, but because they are
not littoral states of a marine region they may not be inclined to join
the effort to control land-based pollution. Such regulation would
benefit a resource such states are unable to use. Austria attended
the conference that produced the Paris Convention but has not signed
the treaty, and it, along with Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia
108
are not a party to any agreement on land-based pollution. The Sudan
Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya contribute contaminants to the Mediterranean
Sea but have not acceded to the Athens Protocol on Land-Based Sources.
Without participation of all contributors to the problem, littoral
states are unlikely to address the problem with as much drive as they
would if all polluters were partners in the effort, nor will the effort
789
be fully succesful.
Although the international community has made important strides
to protect the seas from ship pollution and dumping, these sources differ
from land-based pollution and recognising these the lack of response to
pollution from land will be better understood. The effects of land-based
pollution are subtle. Rare is it that a dramatic polluting incident
such as Amoco Cadiz results from land-based pollution. Nor can interest
in this source be promoted by the voyages of such hapless ships as the
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Stella Maris and Enskeri. Crises with land-based pollution have occurred
but the causes and, more importantly, the effects have been confined to
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national territory. Because the harm in invisible" and because of
the lack of international crises, there has not been the catalyst to
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action as with some other sources. In addition, ship pollution is
clearly an international problem because ships travel all seas and enter
the ports of many states. There is little question of the transfrontier
effects of air pollution. Before extension of territorial seas to twelve
miles and acceptance of the EEZ, most dumping took place on the high seas,
lending the practice more susceptibile to international control. Dumping's
high visibility makes it easier to identify and control. Land-based
pollution lacks these characteristics and as the activities that produce
it arise from land, international regulation is less possible because
states view it as a greater imposition on internal affairs and infringe¬
ment upon sovereignity.
Therefore, PARCOM is faced with problems that do not confront,
for example, OSCOM. Yet the complexity need not lead to the conclusion
that little or nothing can be done, for certain approaches can reduce
the immensity of land-based pollution and make it manageable.
5. An Approach for the Control of Land-Based Pollution
To make the problem simpler, attention must initially be directed
to only wastes with the greatest potential for harm. Since the list
system is widely used, ascertaining the critical substances is relatively
easy. They are those on all blacklists. It must also be questioned
whether land-based pollution is a global problem. In truth, a signi¬
ficant amount of land-based pollution requires only a national response.
Some of its consequences may require a bilateral or regional response.
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but then for just a single activity or substance. In sum, it is ill-
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advised to attempt to control all land-based pollutants in all places.
How does the Paris Convention and the work of its Commission
compare with this suggested approach? The convention wisely does not
deal with all wastes, as does the ODC. The substances of its lists
have been included on the basis of their unique potential for persis¬
tence, toxicity, and bioaccumulation (Annex A). Yet the treaty also
wisely allows PARCOM to control a substance not listed in Annex A if
scientific evidence establishes a serious hazard may be created by
that substance (Art. 4(4)).
The treaty thus approaches the problem realistically and
PARCOM's work generally follows the scheme proposed above, for its
research and regulatory work is concentrated on blacklist substances.
On the other hand, the Commission is considering modestly widening the
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JMP for the next ten years beyond mercury, cadmium, and PCBs and is
contemplating amending the treaty to specifically include air pollution.
Questions may be raised about these ostensibly encouraging developments.
In its Strategy for the Future, PARCOM stressed the need to finalise
work on "the following priority substances as quickly as possible:
795
cadmium, aldrin, dieldrin, and endrin, mercury, and PCBs. Not
only have the parties failed to develop sufficient monitoring and report-
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mg habits on the most hazardous substances, but there is much
substantive work to be done with these substances. Therefore, is it
wise to begin new work? Although amending the treaty to gain competence
over air pollution is probably good, one must wonder how much of PARCOM's
limited funds and the Secretariat's limited time will be devoted to air
pollution. As a Working Group has stated, if a comprehensive long term
monitoring programme to assess atmospheric inputs were initiated "this
would require a considerable degree of commitment in both time and ex-
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penditure..." PARCOM's readiness to take on new work may give it
the appearance of progressive development when a good deal more might
be accomplished with programmes presently underway.
6. Conclusion
Whatever work is done under the Paris Convention, it, like other
international agreements, has symbolic value. Its mere existence may
have contributed to the recent acceptance of the Athens Protocol on
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Land-Based Sources by the Mediterranean states. The treaty also
affects national policies. For example, Belgium's environmental agency
has traditionally not been a force in Belgain decisionmaking, but.
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after Belgium's acceptance of the Paris Convention, this agency has been
able to use the treaty as a persuasive debating tool to move the govern¬
ment to take a greater interest in environmental matters and control
799
some pollution that would otherwise be unregulated.
While the adoption of programmes and measures by PARCOM has been
slow, this is not necessarily bad. Dr. Birnie states:
It has...to be remembered that there are some advantages in
the slow pace of some commissions... One commentator has pointed
out that the willingness of decision makers in the Oslo and
London Dumping Conventions to allow matters to be thoroughly
aired at a scientific and technical level and to proceed on a
basis of consensus even if it takes time to achieve has avoided
the 'divisive and counter-productive arguments that can result
from scientific considerations being too politically inspired
or overtaken too soon by political considerations.'
These points might be considered when thinking about the few binding regu¬
lations PARCOM has issued. The use of recommendations may, because of
the procedure by which they are adopted, be just as effective as binding
regulations. This procedure often moves a proposal from a working group
through the TWG and then to the Commission, allowing each state's
scientific and political considerations to be taken fully into account
and it may be fair to assume a recommendation reached through this long
consensus procedure and within a group of homogeneous states will be
faithfully implemented.
It was stated above that there is a general unwillingness on
the part of PARCOM to adopt measures that would make a significant reduc¬
tion of land-based pollution. Yet one cannot dismiss the Commission's
efforts. Though the problem is difficult, foundations are being laid
for more significant programmes. Reducing land-based pollution is a
long process and in evaluating the Paris Convention a historical sense
is needed. Relatively few years have passed since the environmental
awakening and any expectation that the problems should already be solved
is unreasonable.
D. The Helsinki Convention
1. Introduction
In the late 1960s dramatic statements were made about the im-
801
pending death of the Baltic Sea. Although the Baltic still lives,
it does suffer acute stresses produced by its exceptional hydrographic
and ecological characteristics and these may eventually destroy its
802
ecosystem. The activities of seven highly industrialized states
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that surround this semi-enclosed sea exacerbate the problem.
Although Baltic states long ago recognised these problems, initially
they were unable to jointly address them; international politics
stood in the way. There were problems of the western states' refusal
to recognise East Germany and the Soviet doctrine of the regional sea
that proclaimed the Baltic closed to military units of nonlittoral
803
states. These problems were solved in the early 1970s when all
Baltic states recognised East Germany and the Soviets gradually dropped
804
their regional sea doctrine. Detente, the 1972 Stockholm Conference,
and the 1973 Baltic Sea Convention on Fishing and Conservation enhanced
chances for an agreement protective of the Baltic environment. Several
meetings in 1973 and 1974 produced a draft convention that was adopted




The Baltic Marine Environment Commission, known as the Helsinki
Commission (HELCOM), is established to carry out duties similar to those
of OSCOM and PARCOM (Art. 12-13). HELCOM's decisions are always recom-
806
mendatory and must be unanimous. A small Secretariat of three pro¬
fessionals serves the Commission. The Helsinki Convention is unlike
the regional treaties discussed thus far, for it is directed at all sources
of marine pollution. Yet its Secretariat is the same size as OSPARCOM
807
and too small for the Baltic's problems.
Three subsidiary bodies advise HELCOM. The Scientific-Technologi¬
cal Committee (STC) consels especially on land-based pollution, dumping,
808
and scientific cooperation. Prevention of ship pollution is the pur-
809
view of the Maritime Committee and the Expert Group on Co-operation
in Combatting Matters (EGC) addresses questions of combatting pollution
810
caused by spillages of oil and other harmful substances.
3. Development of the Convention
Article 3 of the Helsinki Conveniton sets forth the broad duty
to protect the Baltic's environment and is followed by provisions on
each source of marine pollution, except deepsea mining, an activity
that will not take place in the Baltic.
The most exemplary provision prohibits all dumping, with the
exception that dredge spoil may be dumped subject to certain restric¬
tions (Art. 9). There are extensive provisions on combatting spills
of harmful substances (Art. 11, Annex VI). Though all "appropriate
measures" are to be taken to prevent pollution from seabed mining (Art.
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10) the little exploitation of the Baltic's seabed is mostly of
811
sand and gravel. There are the usual duties of scientific coopera¬
tion and monitoring (Art. 16).
The treaty considers air pollution as land-based pollution and
the list system has been adopted to address land-based pollution. The
parties, however, are ambiguously required to "counteract" blacklist
sbustances (Art. 5) and the number of substances on this list is "excep-
812
tionally limited" in comparison with other agreements. All "appro¬
priate measures" to strictly limit pollution by gray list substances
are to be taken in accordance with Annex II (Art. 6(2)). Because the
813
main dangers to the Baltic are deoxygenization and eutrophication,
these problems are specifically mentioned and wastes causing them are
to be "controlled and minimized" (Art. 6(6)). Annex III contains a
general requirement that municipal sewage, industrial wastes, and certain
water discharges are to be treated to prevent deoxygenization and eutro¬
phication. It is to be noted that internal waters are excluded from
the convention area. Thus the area through which all land-based pollution
flows is not part of the regime, although the parties do "undertake" to
ensure convention purposes will be obtained in these waters (Art. 4(3)).
Protection of coastal waters thus depends entirely upon a state's
willingness to act.
Most of the provisions on the various sources are general,
except those on ship pollution, for which the parties are to take mea¬
sures set out in Annex IV, which is long and involved (Art. 7). Prof.
Boczek discusses this disproportionate attention to ship pollution.
This drafting feature is due to the fact that only a
few months prior to the adoption of the Baltic Conven¬
tion the problem had been regulated at length by...
[MARPOL]. Furthermore, that Convention had established
more rigorous rules for ships operating in 'special
areas'...Since the Baltic nations had achieved their
objective of recognizing the Baltic as one of these
special areas, they decided to incorporate the bulk of...
[MARPOL] rules...into the regional convention. The
assumption was that the Baltic Convention would enter
into effect sooner than...[MARPOL].®^
Development of the Helsinki Convention by HELCOM has been disap¬
pointing. Even before HELCOM formally began work in 1980 observers
probably became pessimistic about its chances for success as the 1970s
went by without the treaty entering into force. In 1976 one writer re¬
marked that the treaty, adopted in 1974, was expected to enter into
815
force in 1977. Not until May of 1980, however, was this state reached.
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More than six years is an unusually long time to wait for a regional
marine environment protection treaty to be put into effect; particularly
since only seven ratifications were needed to reach this position, it
does not generally contain rigorous provisons, and it addresses a
uniquely common problem of some magnitude.
Whereas the parties to the LDC, ODC, and Paris Convention allow
their Secretariats to publish helpful annual reports, the Baltic states
have not. The 1980 to 1984 annual reports of HELCOM are available but
they only present an overview of the subjects discussed by HELCOM and
its subsidiary bodies and often in skeletal form. In addition, there is
never, unlike reports of other commissions, a mention of disagreement.
The annual reports do, however, contain the texts of all recommendations
adopted by HELCOM and these, supplemented with statements by each party
and collected in a document commemorating the treaty's tenth anniversary,
provide a means to assess the treaty's effectiveness.
Although the Helsinki Convention did not come into force until
1980, the parties established an Interim Commission in 1974 to begin the
816
cooperation called for by the treaty. HELCOM began work in 1980 and
has adopted 37 recommendations. Of these, eighteen concern ship pollu¬
tion, eleven combatting spillages, five land-based pollution, and the
remaining three are of a miscellaneous character. Consequently, not
only does the treaty text give disproportionate attention to ship pollu¬
tion, HELCOM has addressed 29 of its 37 recommendations to this source.
Some of the ship pollution recommendations are insignificant.
For example, two recommend that certain international conventions be
signed and ratified by the Baltic states and several deal with minor
procedural matters, such as the proper form to use in alleging a part's
reception facilites are inadequate. The recommendations on ship pollu¬
tion are often broadly formulated and many simply request Baltic states
to implement action previously taken by IMO with regard to IMO conventions.
Though such recommendations may result in IMO's work being more quickly
accepted by Baltic countries, the practice does illustrate a lack of ini¬
tiative by HELCOM. Because IMO's work is directed at the development of
provisions in global treaties, perhaps Baltic states should do more to
control ship pollution than merely reassert this work. The Baltic Sea
is semi-enclosed, in uncertain health, and distinctly unlike most ocean
areas to which IMO's work applies. While one would hope the ship pollu¬
tion recommendations adopted by HELCOM that are not related to IMO's
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Recommendation 1/1, for example, merely suggests the parties take "appro-
817
priate steps" to ensure reception facilities are fully used and re¬
minds parties that cost and time delays are disincentives for using
818
reception facilities.
Recommednations concerning combatting spillages include suggestions
on what clean up methods to use, exhortations to further develop the
ability to respond to an incident, and suggestions to facilitate joint
responses. HELCOM's ECG has established a scheme for the exchange of
information on oil combatting operations and equipment, devised a
communication plan for reports on significant spillages, and provides
819
a forum for the discussion of national contingency plans. HELCOM's
recommendations, provided they have been implemented, together with
work by the ECG, have probably well-prepared Baltic states to combat
most pollution incidents.
The five recommendations related to land-based pollution are
not too significant. For example, one, adopted in 1981, recommends
820
the use and production of DDT be abandoned, but prior to this Baltic
821
States had already stopped such practices. Recommendation 5/1 asks
the parties to ensure effective water control measures are applied to a
stormwater system receiving oil wastes and Recommendation 5/2 suggests
controls on oil waste and seepage from oil refineries, with stricter
822
measures called for on new refineries than on existing ones. Neither
of these recommendations is directed at a pollutant on the convention's
blacklist.
Generally, HELCOM has done little to develop the convention
through recommendations. In additon, numerous specific duties placed
upon HELCOM and the parties by the treaty have remained unfulfilled.
Article 6(2) says the parties are to strictly limit pollution by gray-
list substances and to this end they are to adopt "specific programmes,
guidelines, standards, or regulations concerning discharges, environ¬
mental quality, and products containing such substances and materials and
their use." Few of such measures have been adopted. Annex II, to which
Article 6 refers, says mercury and cadmium are "for urgent consideration"
823
but no recommendations have been adopted with regards to these substances.
Article 6(3) says Annex II substances shall not be introduced in "signi-
824
ficant quantities" but this ambiguous phrase has not been clarified.
Article 6(5) requires states to endeavour to adopt common criteria for
825
issuing permits for discharges; but they have failed to.
Other articles of the treaty remaining unsatisfied, include,
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Article 7(2) which obliges parties to develop and apply uniform require¬
ments for the capacity and location of reception facilities; Regulation
6 of Annex IV requiring the application of suitable uniform rules for
the carriage of harmful substances in packaged forms or in freight con¬
tainers, portable tanks or road and rail tank wagons; Regulation 7 of
Annex VI on the duty to "as soon as possible" agree bilaterally or multi-
laterally on those Baltic Sea regions in which they will take action
826
for combatting or salvage activities; and Article 17, requiring the
parties to "as soon as possible" adopt rules on responsibility for
damage resulting from actions in contravention of the treaty. The lack
of response to some of these obligations also marks HELCOM's failure to
fulfill its general duty to define pollution control criteria and
objectives (Art. 13(d)).
HELCOM has been more successful in seeing to it that the duties
of scientific cooperation, monitoring, and assessment have been carried
out (Art. 16). A Baltic Monitoring Programme (BMP) was started on a
827
routine basis in 1979. Seminars and workshops have been held, guide¬
lines for sampling procedures were adopted, intercalibration exercises
operated, and in 1980 a lengthy report on the assessment of the effect
of pollution on the Baltic was produced. An updated study is expected
828
shortly. The first stages of the BMP ended in 1983 and the next
829
year guidelines for the second stage were agreed to. Atmospheric
830
inputs of pollutants is being studied and numerous other scientific
831
work has been undertaken.
4. Conclusion
Because much of the Helsinki Convention is broadly worded,
the work of HELCOM is of fundamental importance, but its performance
has been unsatisfactory. In 1978 Prof. Boczek stated: "Whether the
regional system of the Baltic states will be able to carry out [the
832
convention's] objectives in the immediate future is doubtful..."
This review of HELCOM's work has proved Boczek prescient. Its recom¬
mendations on ship pollution are often mild and often restate IMO pro¬
nouncements. The marked imbalance in the treaty between ship and land-
based pollution has not been corrected by HELCOM's work. The recommenda¬
tions on land-based pollution are few and, overall, not of significance.
Are HELCOM's recommendations adhered to? Evidence is lacking
but there is an instance of a recommendation being largely ignored and
this may portend a general failure by Baltic states to respect recom¬
mendations. The instance involves the Baltic Position Reporting System
118
(BAREP), instituted in July of 1981. BAREP asks that ships of a certain
size carrying harmful substances transmit reports to position reporting
centres when inbound or outbound from the Baltic or when navigating in
833
. 834
it. Baltic states have given BAREP little support. If the states
cannot be bothered with this noncontroversial and inexpensive activity
perhaps they have not adhered to others. On the other hand, it would
appear from some of the national statements made in commemoration of the
835
convention's tenth anniversary that recommendations are generally followed.
Has the health of the Baltic Sea improved since adoption of the
Helsinki Conveniton? While some statements have been made about improve-
836
ments, a respected student of the subject has doubts. Dr. Kullenberg
says that, while the treaty has brought about machinery to observe and
assess the Baltic, one cannot infer from this that its health has im-
837
proved. He adds:
It probably has not, except possibly on a very local
basis. We know that DDT and PCB contents have de¬
creased in biota in large parts of the Baltic, but
this is probably due to national legislation before
the Convention.
An important problem of the Baltic is the large
nutrient and organic matter inputs from runoff. These
have not decreased in later years, rather increased....
...The oxygen content of the deep and bottom
waters have not improved over the last years. It is
not possible to say if inputs of various contaminants
have changed -- the data are not complete enough for
that.838
The national statements in the anniversary document provide little
information to answer the question about the Baltic's health. Only Denmark
offered some guidance. While it notes that the levels of harmful substances
839
and ship discharges and ship wrecks have decreased, it adds that in¬
creasing levels of many heavy metals in the Baltic sediment have been found,
that there is a problem of new contaminants in biota which might indicate
a negative trend, and that increasing eutrophication is reported in
840
several areas. A recent conference on the Baltic Sea reports that con¬
centrations of nitrogen and phosphorus compounds are increasing and inputs
841
from these substances from land and air are on the rise. But, like
other regional treaties surveyed, "it maybe a bit early to assess the
842
influence of the Convention." A new study of the Baltic is underway
and will be issued no later than 1986. This will provide clearer answers
to the treaty's effectiveness.
Despite the Helsinki Convention's deficiencies, its existence
is surely a good thing. Some of the national statements give accounts
119
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of action taken to control marine pollution. Such improvements in
environmental protection may not have come about as soon, or at all,
without the impetus of the treaty. In addition, it has stimulated
conventions in other marine regions and partially served as a model
844
for UNEP' s Regional Seas Programme. For Baltic states, the Helsinki
Convention is valuable because it provides them with a viable legal
and institutional framework to control marine pollution, should they
decide to use it as fully as they might.
E. The Mediterranean Action Plan and the Barcelona Convention
1. Introduction
The precarious health of the Mediterranean Sea was recognised in
the 1960s. Events leading to the Mediterranean's states' adoption of
the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) to protect their sea and develop its
844a
coastal areas have been well-described elsewhere. Sixteen of the
eighteen Mediterranean states attended the 1975 conference that adopted
845
MAP. The Plan has three main parts: legal, concerning adoption of a
framework convention and specific protocols; assessment, concerning eval¬
uation of the causes, magnitude, and consequences of environmental prob¬
lems; and management, concerning environmentally sound management of
natural resources.
2. Institutional Arrangements
Because of its several parts -- that themselves include subsections
calling for administering bodies -- the institutional arrangements for
implementing MAP are complex.
UNEP was the initial and remains the general administrator of
MAP, guiding its overall development and administration, including pro¬
viding the Secretariat for the legal instruments adopted pursuant to the
Plan. Since 1982 this work is largely carried out at the MAP Co-ordinating
846
Unit in Athens. The Unit's work for the legal instruments is similar
to the Secretariat duties of other regional treaty Commissions.
Under the legal component of MAP a framework convention and pro¬
tocols on dumping, land-based sources, and cooperation in cases of pollu¬
tion emergencies are in force. A protocol on specially protected areas
is yet to enter into force. Parties to the framework convention and
the protocols in force hold joint Ordinary Meetings every two years to
review implementation and take action to achieve treaty objectives.
These meetings are also used to review the management and assessment
components of MAP. The Regional Oil Combating Centre (ROCC) has been
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established in Malta to implement the protocol on cooperation in
847
emergencies and a Regional Activity Centre for Specially Protected
Areas has been set up in Tunis as a means to achieve this protocol's
848
objectives. Thus, under MAP's legal component, there are several in¬
stitutions, but the two other parts also have institutional arrangements.
The assessment component relies on several bodies. There is a
Working Group for Science and Technological Cooperation that is to meet
at least once a year to "advise UNEP on technical and policy matters re¬
lated to the programme and prepare recommendations for submission through
849
UNEP to the meetings of the Contracting Parties." Actual scientific
work is carried out by a network of national institutions and Greece has
established a Mediterranean Network and Environmental Information Centre
850
that all basin states may use. The states may also use the IAEA
laboratory in Monaco to maintain their analytical equipment and conduct
851
intercalibration exercises.
The management component of MAP includes the Blue Plan and the
Priority Actions Programme. A unit responsible for technical implemen¬
tation of the Blue Plan is in France and Yugoslavia hosts an activity
852
centre for the latter programme.
3. Implementation of the Mediterranean Action Plan's Legal Component:
The Barcelona Convention
The legal component of MAP has been extensively developed. In
1976 the parties adopted the Barcelona Convention to protect the Medi-
853
terranean from pollution. The Convention provides a framework for
developing MAP's legal component. It requires all appropriate measures
be taken to control marine pollution and repeats this duty for dumping,
land-based sources (broadly defined to include air pollution), and off¬
shore exploration and exploitation (Art. 4(1), 5, 7, 8). Article 9
requires cooperation in dealing with pollution in emergencies and Article
6 requires conformity with international law to prevent ship pollution.
Protocols on dumping and on cooperation in cases of a pollution
emergency were quickly adopted and came into force in 1978 along with
854
the Barcelona Convention. The Mediterranean states continued to
develop law in 1981 by adopting a Protocol on Land-Based Sources and in
855
1982 one on Specially Protected Areas. The former entered into
856 857
force in 1983 but the latter has yet to reach this state. Re¬
garding ship pollution, the parties rely on adherence to MARPOL 73/7
3 58
to regulate this source of Mediterranean pollution. Though sever
meetings were held to discuss regulation of offshore exploration and
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exploitation, a proposal at the 1983 meeting to do so was rejected.
Besides calling on the parties to control marine pollution, the
Barcelona Convention also requires pollution monitoring and research and
the adoption of procedures to determine liability and compensation for
damage resulting from marine pollution (Art. 10-12). The scientific
duties are carried out in the assessment component of MAP, discussed
below. As for the liability and compensation issue little has been
861
accomplished, although it has been much discussed and studied. Creating
a compensation Fund will be discussed again at the September 1985 Ordin-
862
ary Meeting.
The rest of this review of the legal component's development will
examine the protocols on dumping, land-based sources, and cooperation
on pollution emergencies.
a. The Dumping Protocol
Provisions of the Dumping Protocol to the Barcelona Convention
are remarkably similar to those of the London and Oslo Dumping Conven¬
tions. Thus, the Protocol uses the black and white list system. Some
advances, however, have been made. The definition of "ship" is broad,
encompassing offshore platforms (Art. 3(1)) and both Annex I and II in¬
clude more substances than in the LDC and ODC. On the other hand, some
of the same obscure words in the latter treaties reappear, such as "non¬
toxic," "rapidly converted," and "trace contaminant" (Annex I).
Though the Protocol has been in force since 1978 the parties have
taken few steps to improve it. In 1981 they recommended prohibition of
incineration at sea and elimination of all radioactive waste dumping
until the IAEA definition of the de minimis level of radioactivity for
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wastes has been accepted by all Mediterranean states. Along with these
positive moves, however, there are problems. Some states have not even
864
appointed a national authority to administer the agreement, the basic
step for implementation. The duty to submit reports is not always com-
865
plied with and when it is the reports are sometimes incomplete. It
would also appear that the relatively simple matter of agreeing on a
866
standard reporting format has yet to be done. Defining ambigous terms
has not been undertaken. The Protocol's "effective application will only
be optimized when the research and monitoring component of MAP start to
867
produce concrete and overall results." Something it has yet to do.
b. The Land-Based Protocol
Provisions of the Mediterranean Land-Based Protocol are much
like the Paris Convention's. The Protocol applies not only to open
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ocean areas but also to territorial waters (Art. 3). Importantly, the
agreement applies to offshore platforms, and the regulation of air
pollution is to be elaborated in a future annex (Art. 4). The list
system reappears and for Annex I substances pollution (not discharges)
is to be eliminated and for Annex II substances pollution is only to be
limited (Art. 5(1), 6(1)). To reach these goals the parties are to
adopt "programmes and measures" (Art. 5(2), 6(2)). Unlike the Paris
Convention, the Mediterranean Protocol goes on to name several particu¬
lar areas where guidelines and standards are to be adopted (Art. 7(1)).
In formulating regulations states are to take account of local ecologi¬
cal characteristics, the level of existing pollution, and their economic
capability (Art. 7(2) (3). Such qualifications were necessary to gain
acceptance of the Protocol by the Mediterranean's "southern rim" states
868
that are beginning industrial development. As with the Dumping
Protocol, monitoring and research results and reporting on measures
taken to control land-based pollution are required (Art. 8-13).
The essence of the Land-Based Protocol is the adoption of pro¬
grammes and measures to control pollution from land. Since the Protocol
has been in force only a few years it is not surprising little has been
done to develop it. In fact, it even took several years to convene a
869
meeting of experts on the Protocol. The experts finally met in 1984
and reviewed measures concerning environmental quality criteria for re¬
creational waters, shellfish for human consumption, shellfish growing
870
waters, and mercury in seafood. At the 1984 Extraordinary Meeting
of the parties these measures were recommended, not required, for im-
871
plementation and mark the first step in developing the Land-Based Pro¬
tocol, though it remains to be seen if they are implemented.
Though controlling land-based pollution is highly complex, the
difficulty in even convening a meeting does not instill confidence the
states will quickly develop the Protocol to control the most serious
source of marine pollution. Even if the parties desire to control this
source, "[f]or the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that many... states
will have the technical ability and financial means to comply with the
872
protocol provisions.
c. The Protocol on Cooperation in Emergencies
Article 1 of the Protocol requires:
[Cooperation] in taking the necessary measures in cases of grave
and imminent danger to the marine environment, the cost of re¬
lated interests of one or more of the Parties due to the presence
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of massive quantities of oil or other harmful substances
resulting from accidental causes or an accumulation of
small discharges...
To contend with emergencies, plans are to be developed and means of com¬
bating pollution are to be maintained (Art. 3). Monitoring must be done
to give precise information on a situation referred to in Article 1 (Art.
4) and the parties are to dessiminate information on the national author¬
ity responsible for combating pollution, on their research, and means of
combating pollution (Art. 6). They also are to inform one another of
Article 1 situations and any action taken in repsonse (Art. 7-9).
To facilitate implementation of these duties ROCC was estab-
873
lished when the Protocol was adopted, 1976. IMO provides ROCC with
874
administrative and technical support. ROCC's basic objective is to
facilitate cooperation among the states to combat pollution emergencies
875
and help develop their anti-pollution capabilities. Towards these
purposes ROCC has carried out the following activities: collection and
876
dessimination of information relating to marine pollution; develop-
877 .
ment of communication systems; promotion of technological cooperation
878
and training programmes for combating oil pollution; and assistance
in the development of national, sectoral, and sub-regional contingency
879 880
plans. Other activities are planned and ROCC has provided tech-
881
meal assistance in a number of pollution incidents. Such assistance
can only be given if requested for the states do not wish ROCC to under-
882
take an operational role. Because the parties have implemented the
Protocol on cooperation in emergencies, ROCC has succeeded in carrying
out its purposes.
4. Implementation of the Mediterranean Action Plan's Assessment Component
MAP's assessment component, that is, the evaluation of the
causes, magnitude, and consequences of environmental problems, is im¬
plemented through the MED POL programme, meaning Mediterranean Pollution.
Science is fundamentally important for the development of the Mediterranean
legal regime. Without solid scientific work MAP's legal component will
stagnate. Science is to be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the
Barcelona Convention and its protocols and assist in their revision.
MED POL's Phase I began in 1975 with seven projects organised by
UNEP and the specialized agencies and approved by the Mediterranean
883
states. Technical meetings were then held to develop details for the
projects and for each a network of national research centres was organ-
884
ised through the agencies and under UNEP's overall guidance. Actively




in sixteen states and the EEC.
Phase I had many achievements. One of the most important was
enhancement of scientific communication and the capabilities of some
886
Mediterranean states. To ensure comparability of results, methodology
887
was agreed to in a number of areas. Substantive results include a
888
wealth of knowledge gained from the projects, most of which were com¬
pleted as planned. Phase I, which ended in 1981, did, however, encounter
8
problems. Geographic distribution of the monitoring work was unbalanced.
Some reseach centres were reluctant to reorient their programmes and thus
the overall plan had to be tailored to fit activities of the institutions.
Consequently, research results resemble a mosaic rather than an integrated
891
scheme. Despite agreements to ensure data comparability, this was not
892
fully attained. Even so, "considerable progress" was made in under-
893
standing Mediterranean pollution and the results provided a basis for
national research activities and an international cooperative programme
for continuous monitoring of the Mediterranean as envisaged by the
894
Barcelona Convention.
MED POL Phase II was adopted in 1981 with the general objective
of furthering the purposes of the Barcelona Convention and its protocols.
Some specific goals indicate the significance of MAP's assessment compo¬
nent for realizing its legal part, these goals being providing data re¬
quired for the legal agreements' implementation, evaluating their effec¬
tiveness, and information that may lead to their revision and the formu-
896
lation of additional protocols.
The programme for Phase II contains a long list of specific activ-
. . 897 . , . 898
lties that are entirely up to the states to implement, though
Phase II still relies on overall coordination by the Athens Coordi-
899
nating Unit and on day to day coordinating by specialized agencies.
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Although operative in 1982, MED POL II is not yet off the
, 901 . .
ground. Numerous problems have been encountered. As a general criti¬
cism of the implementation, at the 1984 meeting UNEP stated:
[T]he simple matter of reporting available information to the
Co-ordinating Unit is either not carried out properly, or not
done at all. When the agreed information is provided by you...
only then will your small secretariat be in a position to pro¬
vide you with a comprehensive view of what is happening in the
Mediterranean.
5. Implementation of the Mediterranean Action Plan's Management Component
The management component, which seeks reconciliation of develop¬
ment with the environment of the Mediterranean by bringing "to bear upon
national decisionmakers an awareness of long-term development trends and
125
a realization of their interplay with the environment," is beyond
the scope of the thesis. Nonetheless, it may be noted that, overall,
904
Mediterranean states have shown little interest in this aspect of MAP.
6. Conclusion
The Mediterranean states recognised it was neither possible to
agree on a comprehensive convention with specific regulations for all
sources nor on separate treaties for all sources. Therefore, they adopted
a framework convention and two protoocls. The Barcelona Convention pro¬
vided a weak legal obligation to combat all pollution sources and an
impetus to adopt protocols. The protocols on dumping and cooperation in
emergencies, agreed to along with the Convention, were the only two
feasible for adoption in 1976, and their adoption marked a favorable
beginning for the Barcelona Convention. Later protocols on land-based
sources and specially protected areas were adopted and the far more impor¬
tant land-based protocol entered into force in 1983. Sources not inde¬
pendently covered are air and ship pollution and pollution from off¬
shore and deepsea activities. Yet these gaps are not as wide as they
appear. The land-based protocol considers air pollution as a land-based
source and though the duty under the protocol to regulate air pollution
by an annex has not been satisfied, two points should be kept in mind.
Oceans are not significantly polluted through the air and states on
the northern rim of the Mediterranean are parties to the ECE Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. It is these northern states
that pollute the air far more than other Mediterranean states. There
are provisions in the dumping and land-based protocols that reach off¬
shore activities. Furthermore, these operations are not widely under¬
taken in the Mediterranean. Nor is this sea thought to hold the minerals
sought by deepsea mining. Regarding ship pollution, the states rely
upon MARPOL 73/78 for regulation.
The Mediterranean states have well-developed the Barcelona Con¬
vention. Yet just looking for what protocols have been adopted under the
treaty is superficial. One must also assess their content and implemen¬
tation. In addition, the treaty and protocols contain provisions on
monitoring and research and because of the importance of this element
for development of a legal regime it needs to be reviewed as well. When
these points are examined the assessment of the legal regime is less
favorable.
The Protocol on Cooperation in Emergencies, for example, while
commendably developed, is hardly a cornerstone of the regime. It is
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reactive. It seeks to combat pollution incidents but does nothing to
prevent them. Provisions of the dumping and land-based protocols are
markedly similar to the LDC and ODC and the Paris Convention, and thus
have strengths and weaknesses similar to these agreements. Where these
three treaties differ from the Mediterranean protocols is in their
development. Here, Mediterranean states seem a bit indifferent. They
have done little with the dumping agreement. By contrast, parties to
the ODC are actively engaged in developing their agreement by, for ex¬
ample, working to define terms, reporting their dumping practices, re¬
viewing and criticizing dumping practices, and developing a scientific
programme. So too with the Mediterranean land-based protocol vis-a-vis
the Paris Convention. Although it is to be noted that the Mediterranean
agreement has not been in force long.
What is crucial to full development of the Barcelona Convention
and the protocols is implementation of MAP's assessment component, parti¬
cularly for the land-based protocol. It needs science to formulate sound
programmes and measures and to assess their effectiveness. The MED POL
programme began successfully with Phase I. Phase II, however, is encount-
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ering problems. These are mostly financial but a strain of disinter¬
est is also discernable from some states' failure to designate national
authorities to cooperate in the programme. Such disinterest is also
manifested in the management component.
At the 1984 meeting representatives of Greece and UNEP both spoke
of their doubts about the Mediterranean states' willingness to protect
906 . . . .
their common sea. This view, it is submitted, is accurate.
It appears MAP has completed its first stage and is beginning a
second. The first was largely successful. The Barcelona Convention was
adopted and protocols covering the source of 80 to 90% of pollution are
now in force. Scientific programmes were fruitful. But now, in the
second stage, the real work must begin. Protocols must be implemented
and developed and supplemented with science.
F. The ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
1. Introduction
Air pollution was seen as a problem in need of regulation during
the early years of the environmental movement. But the long-range trans-
boundary transport of atmospheric pollutants was not immediately viewed
as in need of international attention. Only after research began to
indicate that environmental harm in one state was due in part to emis¬
sions in others were calls for international regulation heard. In the
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forefront of this movement were the Scandinavian countries. They saw
their natural heritage damaged by activities beycnd their jurisdiction.
Also, Canada sought a commitment by the United States to decrease emis¬
sions because of damage to Canadian resources. In the late 1970s,
Switzerland, West Germany, and other states, also recognised that damage
907
to their forests was caused in part by emissions from other countries.
Prompted by a determined campaign by the Scandinavian countries
908
to make other states more aware of international air pollution, as
well as by the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe that advocated increased cooperation to solve en-
909
vironmental problems, the ECE sponsored a conference in 1979 that
adopted the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (ECE
910
Convention). It has thirty ratifications and entered into force 16
March 1983.
2 . Institutional Arrangements
An Executive Body composed of all parties administers the treaty
(Art. 10). Meeting annually, it reviews implementation and may estab¬
lish working groups to consider matters of treaty implementation and
development (Art. 10(2)). These groups may prepare appropriate studies
and submit recommendations to the Executive Body (Art. 10(2)(b)).
Secretariat duties are handled by the ECE (Art. 11), even though the
911
ECE receives no additional funds to carry out its duties. The
European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP), a UNEP programme,
is involved with technical implementation (Art. 10(3)).
3. Development of the Convention
The treaty sets no numerical goals, limits, timetables, abatement
measures, or enforcement mechanisms. Each state is free to decide for
itself how to reduce its emissions. The parties merely "endeavour to
limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollu¬
tion..." (Art. 2). They agree to develop "control measures compatible
with balanced development, in particular by using the best available
technology which is economically feasible..." (Art. 6). These weak
912
duties have led to criticisms that the treaty is toothless. Clear
duties, however, include sharing information and collaborative research
(Art. 7-9). Thus, like other environmental agreements, only perhaps
more so, "much will depend on the effectiveness with which governments
914
translate the vague terms of the Convention into firm commitments."
The Executive Body held its first meeting in 1983 and was faced
with a dispute that existed at the 1979 conference: the demand by some
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states that emissions be reduced by a particular amount within a certain
time, and the resistance of other states that questioned the need of
such a step. The treaty itself rejected the former position and, at
its first meeting, the Executive Body did so as well, even if the victory
this time was less convincing. The eventual consensus is expressed in a
Decision on Strategies and Policies. In it, the Executive Body agrees
on the "need" for parties to further develop emission reduction pro-
914
grammes by 1985 and decrease sulphur emissions by 1993-1995. No
mention is made of the 30% reduction called for during the session.
915
The "artfully worded" Decision contains no specific emission reduc¬
tion requirements.
Significant progress, however, was made at the 1984 and 1985
Executive Body sessions. Most importantly, in 1985 a Protocol was adopted
requiring its signatories to reduce sulphur emissions or their transbound-
ary fluxes by at least 30% by 1993-1995, using 1980 levels as the basis
916 917
for calculating reductions. The Protocol already has 21 signatories.
While the parties initally focused all work on sulphur emissions, in
1985 nitrogen oxide emissions were included as a part of the treaty's
918
_. . , 919scientific work, the first step to an agreement on their control.
920
Other pollutants may also gradually be brought within the treaty.
921
Problems existed with financing the EMEP, the monitoring part
of the treaty, but these were clarified by adoption of a Protocol in
922
1984. Though the agreement is not in force, 22 states have signed
. 923 , -Jr . 924
it and nine have, or are about to ratify it.
Parties to the ECE Convention have also embarked on an ambitious
work plan to implement various treaty provisions. The plan comprises
three broad areas.
a. Strategies and Policies. Parties are to annually submit
925
information on their national strategies for reducing emissions.
Each Executive Body session will review these reports and every fourth
year, beginning in 1986, a major review will be undertaken. This unique
mechanism to encourage treaty development may promote a decrease in
emissions.
b. EMEP. The objective of the EMEP programme is to determine
the flows of air pollution across European boundaries and the deposi-
926
tion of air pollutants. The data will provide a basis for abatement
927
strategies. Presently, 88 measuring stations in 23 countries are
928
operating.
c. Technical Cooperation. A good deal of scientific coopera-
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tion goes on under the auspices of the ECE Convention, thereby imple¬
menting its provisions on research, consultation, and the sharing of
information. For example, technical studies of air pollution's effect
929
on aquatic ecosystems have been made. Some of the many other coopera¬
tive programmes include an analysis of the cost-effectiveness of emissions
control mechanisms and of costs and benefits of sulphur emissions control,
930
and numerous conferences on a wide range of subjects. Although the
931
professionalism of the scientific work is sometimes questioned, it
appears the treaty's scientific duties are being fulfilled.
4. Conclusion
While the ECE Convention is weakly worded and problems exist
932
with the sometimes obstructive attitudes of the United States and
933
Britain, with the uncertainty of the East European states' willing-
934
ness to fully participate, and with an inadequately financed Secre¬
tariat, positive steps have been taken. Whereas the work between the
time the treaty was adopted and entered into force focused on sulphur
emissions, nitorgen oxides now also receive attention. The Protocol to
secure the financial future of the EMEP was quickly agreed to. Techni-
935
cal work has improved imternational scientific efforts and established
936
important avenues of international cooperation. The Executive Body
provides a central structure to assemble information on national emis-
937
sions, pollution control, and energy policies. The agreement to
reduce sulphur emissions by 30% by 1993-1995 is an important advance,
particularly since it is estimated that more than two-thirds of all
938
global air pollution is generated in the ECE region, making this
regional treaty something more than is usually understood by this term.
The Executive Body, composed of nearly three dozen heterogen¬
eous states and dealing with a problem entwined with economic and social
considerations, cannot have been expected to accomplish a great deal
within its first three sessions, particularly when it has to work with a
treaty lacking vigour. In fact, the Executive Body has well-developed
the treaty, an agreement that provides international recognition of the
acid rain problem and sets up a means to lessen its harmful consequences.
The mere presence of the ECE Convention may have spurred the EEC to
enact in 1980 a sulphur dioxide directive that had been long delayed
and may have accelerated negotiations between the United States and
Canada on their acid rain dispute, negotiations that resulted in an
,, 939
agreement about nine months after the ECE Convention was adopted.
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G. Conclusion
Europe has addressed marine pollution with a variety of legal
methods. The ECE Convention is directed at only air pollution and ini¬
tially at only sulphur dioxide emissions. Northeast Atlantic states
are proceeding in an ad hoc fashion with separate treaties on dumping
and land-based sources. Baltic states rejected separate treaties for
each source and adopted a comprehensive treaty that seeks to regulate
all sources. Mediterranean states, on the other hand, adopted a frame¬
work convention and have added three protocols to it.
The piecemeal approach has worked the best. The regime of the
Northeast Atlantic is superior to that in the Baltic and Mediterranean
and the ECE Convention has been better developed than have the Helsinki
and Barcelona Conventions. These latter two treaties represent the com¬
prehensive approach. It is doubtful the different progress under these
three approaches means marine pollution may be better controlled if a
region proceeds step by step,adopting and developing distinct conventions
for each pollution source. Northeast Atlantic states are far more homo¬
geneous than Baltic and Mediterranean states. Also, the Mediterranean
region includes less developed countries. It is more likely factors
such as disparate stages of development and political antagonisms account
for the different success of the approaches, rather than their form. An
opposing argument, however, may be founded on the possiblity that Baltic
and Mediterranean state have not yet matched the Northeast Atlantic states
because they have attempted with their comprehensive approach to do too
much too quickly. Perhaps attempting to control all the sources at once
is overwhelming and spreads financial and human resources too thinly to
deal with even one source adequately, at least in the short term. The
points made here are also relevant for the coordination issue, that is,
it may be that the region with the most order and legal and administra¬
tive tidiness is not necessarily the most successful in combating marine
pollution. Factors other than smooth and full coordination may be more
important.
What has been learned in this chapter is that action after rati¬
fication of a treaty is the salient point for determining its value.
To evaluate a marine pollution convention by looking only at its terms
is superficial. For example, the ECE Convention contains vague and
weak obligations but has been admirably developed. The comprehensive
Helsinki Convention, on the other hand, despite its provisions con¬
taining clear, although general, duties to control all marine pollution
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sources has stagnated.
Since it is the development of a treaty after ratification that
is the essence, the organisation responsible for implementation is funda¬
mental. Thus, the institutional arrangements established by the treaties
were described and found to bear marked similarity with one another. The
work undertaken by them make it clear IGOs, whatever form they take, are
the stewards in the development of the international law of the sea.
Because provisions in the European agreements are similar one
would hope a number of conclusions and trends could be drawn from their
collective analysis. This is, however, difficult, for as stated, it is
not treaty terms that are important. These are mostly general. It is
necessary to analyze implementation and development to determine conclu¬
sions and trends. But the development of each agreement varies too widely
for the reaching of many conclusions.
Overall, the development of the five treaties has been mixed, if
not disappointing. While the Barcelona Convention has been well developed,
little has been done with its more important protocols. The Helsinki
Convention has not been developed. Progress under the Paris and Oslo
Conventions has been only fair. Though the ECE Convention has started
successfully, its main objective is to protect forests and lakes from
acid rain, not the seas, and air pollution carries only little pollu¬
tion to the oceans. The mere adoption, however, of these agreements is
noteworthy. They have doubtlessly promoted greater public awareness of
marine pollution, stimulated better national environmental laws, and pro¬
moted other international action in and beyond Europe. They also give
more force to diplomatic protests of egregious polluting practices. The
five treaties have promoted a significant amount of international sci¬
entific cooperation that has produced more knowledge about marine pollu¬
tion than man would have possessed without the agreements. In time,
this knowledge may promote more substantial development of the treaties.
What European states have accomplished with these five treaties
is to lay a solid foundation for effective control of marine pollution.
The seas surrounding Europe are covered with treaties that include
provisions on nearly all sources. This is a significant achievement.
Concern over the health of the oceans is recent and Europe has res¬
ponded commendably, particularly in economically difficult times and
in the face of conflicting scientific evidence. Basic legal and insti¬
tutional structures to protect European waters are in place. The last
ten to fifteen years of activity mark the first stage in protecting
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the oceans, that is, establishment of the necessary machinery. This
having been succuessfully accomplished, the second stage has begun. The
machinery must be put into operation, the treaties must be developed,
regulations and standards nasd to be adopted, reports on polluting must
be submitted and then debated, scientific work must begin to contribute
to the adoption and evaluation of regulations, and states must begin to
fully support, particularly financially, the agreements they have ratified.
Whether the second stage is advancing international law of the sea cannot
now be determined, but by the end of this decade it ought to be clear
whether Europe has moved the foundation laying work of the 1970s and
early 1980s toward a legal regime that will insure protection of its
marine environment in the 21st century.
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PART III: COORDINATING THE COMPLEX ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSE TO
MARINE POLLUTION
CHAPTER SEVEN
REASONS FOR COORDINATION DIFFICULTIES AND THE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERORGANISATIONAL COORDINATION
A. Introduction
In Chapter Two a range of opinion was presented disparaging
coordination among IGOs. Although these views may not be wholly correct,
the network is indeed complex and attempts to coordinate it face weighty
difficulties. This chapter discusses these barriers and reviews the in¬
ternational law for interorganisational coordination, which is found in
the constitutive instruments of global and regional IGOs, their governing
bodies' rules of procedure, and the terms of reference of their technical
bodies.
The review of causes of coordination problems begins with the
historical reasons for the creation of specialized agencies. The prob¬
lems autonomous agencies engender is exacerbated by regionalism which
has multiplied the number of IGOs. Another cause of coordination diffi¬
culties is the nature of modern problems IGOs are asked to remedy. These
are typically complex and interdisciplinary, environmental threats being
their quintessence. Individual governments sometimes fail to coordinate
their policies in the IGOs. The result of national disorganisation may
be IGO incoherence.
B. Historical Roots of Coordination Difficulties and the Legal Framework
for Interorganisational Coordination
1. Historical Roots of Coordination Difficulties
That a host of specialized agencies deal with marine pollution
may lead to an instinctive reaction that the framework is irrational and
drastic restructuring is necessary. Yet there are reasons for the diffuse-
ness .
The habit of establishing IGOs outside of the global organisation
has origins in the inter-war period. There was a desire to restrict
membership of some IGOs to states directly concerned with the work of
940
the organisation. But if an IGO was set up within the League of
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Nations, all League members were entitled to be members. Consequently,
some institutions were set up apart from the League. Also, the United
States was not a League member and gaining its participation in an agency
941
required separating the agency from the League.
Although formal demise of the League of Nations did not come
until 1946, its fate was apparent long before. Thus, IGOs set up during
the war, such as FAO and UNESCO, were not associated with the sinking
League. In addition, these bodies, and WHO and IMO, were created during
a period of experimentation with the idea that IGOs ought to be estab-
942
lished on a functional basis to ensure efficacy.
Other historical roots of coordination problems lie in the debates
that led to creation of the United Nations (U.N.). There was discussion
about establishing either a central organ embracing all functional activ¬
ities or an organ with largely political and policymaking powers that
left technical matters to autonomous agencies. Drafters of the U.N.
Charter accepted the latter principle, that is, functional decentraliza¬
tion, thereby leaving the specialized agencies responsible for technical
943
work and independent of the U.N. Had the Charter given the General
Assembly or the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) power to control the
agencies, and had members of the extant agencies consented, coordination
would be less complex. There were a number of reasons why functional
decentralization was agreed to. One, because the League failed and it
was uncertain if the U.N. could be successfully launched, it was thought
wiser to leave the agencies outside the U.N. rather than expose them to
944
the dissension that might beset the central organisation. Indeed,
one of the lessons of the League was "that functional organisations in
the economic and social fields can still operate successfully when the
945
central political organ is failing." Two, technical cooperation in
946
independent agencies was to be isolated from political influences.
Three, not all U.N. members may have been willing to participate in all
agencies, in fact, not all original members of the U.N. were members of
947
all extant organisations. Four, rigid centralization would inhibit
948
efficient planning and implementation of functional programmes.
Five, successful international action in the various economic and social
fields depends on participation of national authorities in each field,
who would only be able or inclined to participate in relatively small,
948
functional bodies. Six, absorption of the agencies into the U.N.
950
would have caused severe administrative problems. Seven, in the 1940s
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the activities of the agencies were genuinely distinct and the inter-
951
disciplinary problems of today were not foreseen.
Thus, the specialized agencies remained apart from the U.N.,
deriving their authority from and responsible only to their member states.
As the U.N. has no budgetting or programming control over the agencies,
its means of influence is persuasion. Words, however wise, are usually
weak. A basic cause, therefore, of coordination difficulties is that
global IGOs, a central part of the network, is without executive control.
The U.N.'s founders, however, were not unaware of potential
952
problems with functional decentralization. The Preparatory Commis¬
sion for the San Francisco Conference emphasized that economic and
social objectives of the network would be more fully achieved if coordi-
953
nation were established between the U.N. and the agencies. Conse-
954
quently, the U.N. Charter contains several provisions on coordination.
2. The Legal Framework for Interorganisational Coordination
The Charter gives ECOSOC, under the General Assembly's super¬
vision, responsibility for coordination. The coordination tools given
ECOSOC, however, are limited. Article 57(1) states the agencies shall
be brought into relation with the U.N. in accordance with Article 63.
Article 63(1) merely says ECOSOC is responsible for concluding the rela¬
tionship agreements, and this has been done with all specialized agencies
955
and all agreements follow a similar pattern. Numerous mechanisms
to enhance cohesion are provided for in each agreeement, such as exchange
of documentation and information and reciprocal representation at one
another's meetings. The relationship agreements, however, while they
presented the opportunity for the U.N. to increase the limited super¬
visory powers given it by the Charter, do not materially add to the
956
U.N.'s powers.
Though only specialized agencies are mentioned about being brought
into relation with the U.N., the intent of the drafters of the Charter was
not to preclude ECOSOC from negotiating agreements with other IGOs, in-
957
eluding regional ones. Yet ECOSOC has made agreements only with the
agencies.
Another significant Charter provision is Article 58: "The Organi¬
sation shall make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies
and activities of the specialized agencies." ECOSOC may take steps to
receive reports from the agencies (Art. 64(1)); allow representatives
of agencies to participate in its deliberations (Art. 70); coordinate
agency activities through consultation with and recommendations to them
and by recommendations to the General Assembly and its members (Art. 63(2));
136
make studies of economic and social matters and make recommendations on
these matters to the General Assembly, U.N. members and the agencies
(Art. 62(1)).
There were proposals to give the U.N. more control over the agencies
than these provisions allow, but the United States objected on the ground
additional U.N. power might make it difficult to get the agencies to
958
enter any agreement with the U.N. Other countries agreed. They con¬
tended success would depend on the good will of the agencies and on the
gradual and voluntary development of relations with them under a loose
959
authorization.
The key of the Charter's scheme is that relationships between
the U.N. and agencies is determined by agreement and the U.N.'s coordi¬
nating function is exercised by consultation and recommendations and not
960
by over-riding authority. The design is clear: the agencies have sig¬
nificant independence.
Complementing the Charter's coordination provisions are corres¬
ponding terms in agencies' constituent instruments. All agencies in¬
volved with marine pollution have a provision in their constituent in¬
struments similar to Article 55 of the IMO Convention: "The Organisation
shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance
with Article 57 of the Charter... This relationship shall be effected
through an agreement with the United Nations under Article 63 of the
961
Charter..."
Most agency constitutions also contain several general provi¬
sions regarding relations with other IGOs. Some use mandatory language
962
on cooperation while in others it is discretionary. Despite such
differences one general conclusion emerges: "All the specialized agencies
have been designed to play a part in a co-operative scheme of world
organisation, and all of their constituent instruments lay the necessary
constitutional foundation for their participation in such a scheme,
based essentially on autonomy tempered by common responsibility and
963
organized consultation."
A number of inter-agency agreements have been concluded to carry
964
out the cooperative requirements of the constitutions. There is a
general pattern to these agreements that may be illustrated by discussing
965
the one between IMO and FAO. It says the agencies, with a view to
attaining the objectives in their constitutions, "will act in close co¬
operation with each other and will consult with each other regularly in
regard to matters of common interest" (Art. 1). The agreement provides
for reciprocal representation, a framework for joint committees, for
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exchanges of information and documentation, a duty on the Secretariats
to "maintain a close working relationship," and articles on cooperation
in administrative, technical, and statistical matters.
Thus, inter-agency agreements are not detailed but concern the
formal structure of relations and in most cases merely state "principles
and procedures by means of which substantive questions can be considered
,,966
as occasion arises.
The legal relationship between the United Nations and agencies and
between the agencies themselves is, therefore, governed by their constitu¬
tions and the relationship and inter-agency agreements. Though the United
Nations and agencies derive their authority from independent grants of
authority from their members, it is clear that in drafting the constitu¬
tions coordination was a leading preoccupation. "Those instruments and
agreements constitute the fundamental law of inter-organisational rela-
,,967
tionships.
Constituent instruments of regional IGOs generally do not give
as much attention to coordination as do those of the specialized agencies.
968
The North Atlantic Treaty contains no reference to coordination, nor
969
does the agreement that formed the Nordic Council. The Council of
Europe Statute and a 1951 resolution by its Committee of Ministers
970
provide for a general coordination obligation. There are, however,
971
several fairly specific coordination duties in the OECD Convention
972
and in the treaties of the European Communities. Although there
are considerable differences on coordination in the constituent instru¬
ments of regional IGOs, there is a general recognition of the need to
take cognizance of activities of other IGOs and to cooperate with IGOs.
Another place to look for the law of inter-organisational coordi¬
nation is in marine pollution treaties. These may place coordination
duties on their administrative bodies. The LDC requires its Secretariat,
in carrying out its duties, to consult with IGOs (Art. XIV(3)(c)) and
relies on the IAEA to advise on problems of radioactive waste dumping
(Annex I, para. 6; Annex II, para. D). Article VIII of the treaty re¬
quires its parties to cooperate with parties to regional treaties to
973 974
develop consistency. The ODC, MARPOL 73/78, and the Helsinki Con-
975
vention also contain collaboration provisions. Advisory bodies of a
Secretariat may also have coordinating duties. For example, SACSA of
the Oslo Commission is bound "to seek advice on specific questions from
976
the appropriate international scientific or technical organisation."
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These general frameworks have been aided by the relationship and
inter-agency agreements, rules of procedure, and by placing coordination
duties upon subsidiary bodies, all of which envisage global and regional
977
IGOs functioning to some degree as parts of a wider structure. On
the other hand, the obligations to coordinate are broadly stated, as
they must be in founding charters, and the IGOs have significant dis¬
cretion in interpreting and implementing them, but a basic law of
interorganisational relationships exists.
C. Regionalism as a Cause of Coordination Difficulties
The U.N. and agencies are but a part of a complex network of
bodies addressing marine pollution. The additional involvement of
regional institutions leads not only to the need for more coordination
but also to the less likelihood this will be achieved.
A steadily growing number of problems are being dealt with on a
less than global basis, both within and outside the U.N. network. The
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reasons for this have been set forth above. Essentially, regionalism
is the trend in ocean management because it presents a better chance for
success. In the past decade or so there has been an explosion of re-
979
gional bodies concerned with marine pollution. Most marine pollution
treaties created institutions adding to the number of IGOs requiring
coordination. The U.N. and agencies have themselves resorted to
980
regionalism. The Regional Seas Programme of UNEP has already formu¬
lated ten regions, many of which have created new institutions and
all of which mean additional activities for many existing IGOs. The
981
FAO has six regional fisheries commissions.
These developments have come rapidly making it more difficult
to set up and effectively operate coordinating machinery within the welter
of regional U.N. bodies, regional IGOs, and the specialized agencies and
the local divisions they have established. The regional IGOs include
not only the commissions of the marine pollution control treaties, but
also the long-standing regional IGOs of wider competence. The majority
of these, "especially in Europe, believes that they each have a special
function or constituency which distinguishes their role from that of
982
other organisations, and thus justifies their existence." If true
the goal of the coordinator is more unobtainable.
D. The Challenges of Modern Society as a Cause of Coordination Difficulties
Professor Sharp says:
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Perhaps the most appropriate point of departure of
this exercise is to recall... that the economic and social
problems within the competence of the U.N. system do not break
down according to the categories of responsibility set by the
[U.N.] Charter... and the Constitutions of the specialized
agencies. Problems have multiple aspects, and often sit astride
the agencies. Topics merge constantly into other topics.
Coordination is accordingly an extremely complex and difficult
task.
984
Environmental problems of the oceans illustrate these points.
Pollution, because it is caused by a range of man's activities, inevit¬
ably falls within the competence of many IGOs, and IGOs desire to do as
985
much as possible rather than as little as possible. The typically
broad constituent instruments of IGOs allow them to legitimately address
environmental problems. Thus, IMO, originally concerned with such
shipping matters as navigation and safety, is now heavily involved with
ship pollution; because FAO is concerned with developing fisheries as a
food source, it addresses marine pollution's effect on this food source;
UNESCO's large education and training work has been expanded to assist
the development of marine scientists in understanding marine pollution;
because the atmosphere carries pollutants to the sea the WMO now studies
this source of marine pollution. Other IGOs, as WHO and IAEA, are also
legitimately working in certain spheres of marine environmental protection
work.
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Professor Sharp says modern problems merge with one another.
So it is with ecological threats. For example, significant reductions
of land-based pollution would be extraordinarily expensive, have acute
internal political ramifications, and cause some states to limit the
industrial development they seek.
Man's inventive mind constantly brings about new environmental
challenges that expand the tasks of more than one IGO and make rational¬
ization and priorization of activities more perplexing. For example,
the feasibility of exploiting deepsea nodules may endanger the marine
environment and has led to the likely creation of a new IGO, the ISBA.
But other IGOs, as FAO, IMO, and UNEP, will also have a role in this
area.
Modern challenges are exacerbated by the expanding number of
states. This makes it less likely IGO governing bodies will be consis¬
tent with one another. In an era of a growing number of states, with
the consequent growth in the number of interests demanding satisfaction,
developing a tidy organisational network is not easy. These factors
140
lessen the chance of agreement on priorities and lead not only to the
demand for more activities by IGOs, but also to the creation of new
IGOs, such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and
the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation. These factors
have also caused the placement of some IGOs far from the centres of inter¬
national activity in Geneva and New York. Lack of geographical proximity
inhibits optimal coordination.
UNEP's headquarters is in Kenya and the ISBA's will be in
Jamaica. UNEP's location has been referred to as a "critical" problem
987
that puts it in a "state of quasi-permanent isolation." "Senior
staffers find themselves almost continually spinning their wheels in
988
their effort to get to and from conferences." Until August 1985
UNEP's successful Regional Seas Activity Centre was in Geneva. It is
now in Kenya. The Centre's entire staff has resigned and its past
Director believes the favorable conditions under which the Centre operated
in Geneva cannot be even closely matched in Nairobi, and, consequently,
989
the transfer will detrimentally effect the Centre for many years.
E. Lack of National Coordination as a Cause of Coordination Difficulties
In carrying out the objectives of coordination the principle
990
responsibility rests upon the national governments...
Since specialized agencies are intergovernmental, it is states
that control them; so too with the U.N. Though membership of the U.N.
and all the agencies is not identical, it is largely the same. Simplis-
tically, if IGOs are feuding it is the state representatives in them
that are feuding and it is a "simple" task for states to instruct their
representatives to cooperate and ensure coordination. Activities of
different IGOs can only be expected to be coherent when the members
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conduct a consistent policy in each. These propositions apply to
the European IGOs as well, that have for the most part a group of states
that are members in each. Lack of national consensus can also inhibit
the effectiveness of a coordinating body, such as ECOSOC. If its members
do not have a consistent coordinating policy, ECOSOC will not.
That national coordination is fundamental to coordination of
IGOs was recognised soon after the U.N. was created and has continued
to be emphasized. General Assembly resolutions on this have been
992
adopted in 1947, 1950, 1955, 1956, 1958, and 1967. UNESCO studied
993
the issue in 1948 as did the U.N. Secretariat in 1958. The Five-Year
Perspective, written in 1960 for the U.N., said national coordination
994
in IGOs was not "fully satisfactory." In the mid-1970s the U.N.
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Secretariat expressed the need for states "to improve their national
coordination in the marine field if they wish to see better inter-agency
99 5
coordination." A recent meeting of experts on regional marine pro¬
grammes reminded states to coordinate their internal policies so the
United Nations system develops coherent policy towards the various
996
regional ocean programmes. Professor McRae has said:
If each state can determine its own objectives in relation to
the international management of the oceans, and can then pursue
these objectives consistently within the different organisations
concerned with the oceans, then many of the [coordination] prob¬
lems referred to here will diminish.
If states can coordinate their own policies within different
organisations, then the organisations themselves will have a far
easier task of coordinating their activities.
At the national level "marine matters are often...distributed
among a number of different government departments and coordination is
998
probably difficult to achieve." A consistent oceans policy is a prob-
999
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lem for large states, such as the United States. This country's
policy formulation for LOSC negotiations was troubled by "petty and un-
1001
controllable interagency squabbling;" not surprising since its delega¬
tion included representatives from eleven agencies and nine Congressional
1002
committees. A Foreign Policy article explains the tortuous path the
United States tread in 1970 to arrive at a law of the sea policy and how
in 1971 and 1972 pressures from industry and disputing bureaucracies
1003
broke the compromises of this policy.
In 1977 concern was expressed about the division of authority
over ocean activities among twenty British governmental departments
1004
and the need for a coordinating body. The situation persists as do
1005
calls for coordination. Analyses have revealed similar problems in
1006 1007
the Netherlands and Norway. In fact, "[f]ew European countries...
have a truly centralized approach to their various maritime responsi-
1008
bilities." A study of the political and economic factors in formu¬
lating IMO conventions on ship pollution found that national ministries
involved in the negotiations at IMO "are often in conflict with others
• , • , ■ ,,1009within their own governments.
Regarding just environmental matters, there is also significant
1010
dispersion of responsibility in a number of countries. In Canada six
1011
departments play a role in controlling marine pollution. But none
1012
"has a clear mandate... and no department is exercising a lead role..."
Such problems also affect developing countries and have been aggravated
by the creation of many new states with only rudimentary administrative
1013
structures and a lack of able administrators.
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A problem affecting many countries "is frequent restructuring
of bureaucracies responsible for environmetnal matters, accompanied by
personnel changes. This results in frequent shifts in the composition of
1014
national scientific or governmental delegations sent to meetings."
Maintaining consistent, coordinated policy is difficult under such cir¬
cumstances .
"[I]t would be a mistake to assume that for practical purposes
it is the same government that is represented in each of the specialized
1015
agencies behind the name-plate of a single member state."
In the experience of the writer, and of virtually every head
of an intergovernmetnal body with whom he has talked, the co¬
ordinating mechanisms in capitols very rarely perform their
tasks, and it is common experience to see the representative
of a particular Government putting forward in the governing
body of an organisation to which he is accredited a line of
policy quite different from and incompatible with the line
taken by another representative of the same Government in another
organisation. This is the bane of any head of organisation who
conscientiously tries to programme his body with an eye upon the
activities of other organisations.''"®"''®
Such complaints were substantiated in 1966 by Sir Robert Jackson's study
1017
of the U.N. system.
Thus, it is not surprising the totality of IGO programmes some¬
times lacks consistency and direction. An attempt to properly coordinate
policy must, furthermore, contend with bureaucratic competition among
governemntal departments that tend to promote the activities of the IGOs
1018
with which they continually deal. "One result of this is a confusion
on the part of secretariats of various organisations which believe that
1019
they are espousing the will of their members... It also hampers
the work of IGOs, leads to lack of coordination, and dissipates resources.
While it may be true that the environmental work of IGOs is best
visualized as a roof with "'a jungle of gables and turrets of unequal
1020
height which has a tendency to leak,'" it is unfair to place the blame
solely on the organisations and individuals working in them. One reads
continually about lack of coordination among IGOs, but too often the
critics fail to distribute responsibility. States themselves constructed
the ungainly roof of gables and turrets and have the power to redesign
it. Adlai Stevenson's comment that "Governments cannot be wiser than





THE GLOBAL IGOS: MARINE POLLUTION ACTIVITIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CAPABILITES TO DEVELOP INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Introduction
Not all global IGOs address marine pollution and those that do,
do so to varying degrees. The relevant IGOs are IMO, UNEP, ISBA, IAEA, IOC,
FAO, WHO, and WMO. Of these, IMO, UNEP, and ISBA are the most signifi¬
cant. They have more marine pollution activities and have played, or
are capable of playing, a more prominent role in developing law.
Two general aspects of the organisations are reviewed. First,
their mandate and powers are discussed. The survey of mandates involves
the search for an environmental competence while analysis of powers
seeks to ascertain a constitutional capability to develop international
law. Second, the organisations' marine pollution activities are sur¬
veyed. Such activities may include the exercise of their law-making and
law-promoting powers and, more commonly, disseminating information,
convening conferences, and making scientific investigations -of the sources
and effects of marine pollution. This latter group of activities will
be referred to as research and information.
There are several reasons for this study of global IGOs. A
purpose of the thesis is to examine the world community's response to
marine pollution. The legal response has been reviewed and now the
organisational response will be surveyed. And, as will be shown, the
work of IGOs is an important part of the response. The IGOs are also
studied because a review of their constituting instruments, along with
how they have exercised delegated powers, will reveal what role they
are able to play in developing the international environmental law of
the sea. A review of the organisations will also help understand another
theme of the thesis, coordination. It is hoped the survey will reveal
whether mandates and activities overlap and which, if any, IGO has
lead responsibility for addressing each source of marine pollution and
which have subsidiary roles. This latter analysis may aid in sorting
out the coordination issue for it may reveal that jurisdictional demar¬
cations for each pollution source are clear; or it may reveal not only
constitutional confusion but also poorly coordinated activities.
Before reviewing the global IGOs, it will be helpful to comment
144
on the concept of international legislation, as this subject is a feature
of the chapter. This discussion is brief and it is recognised that the
that the concept is a matter of controversy.
The basic features of international legislation are similar to
national legislation, where legislation "means the enactment of rules
by a law-making organ of the community as a whole in a manner which
1022
effectively overrules dissent." Thus, when an IGO has been granted
the power to adopt or revise rules of international law without them having
to be accepted by the states to which they are addressed, such a body
1023
has the power to legislate. A legislative act has been defined as
"one which is binding on its addressees by virtue of the decisions of the
organisation and which lays down general and abstractly formulated rules
1024
of conduct." Three elements can be found in this notion of inter¬
national legislation. One, such legislation issues from and is imputed
to an IGO exercising a power to create law for the members to which it
1025
is addressed. It is not imputed to individual members, as in the
case of a treaty or other act requiring consent. Two, legislation
1026
creates law for its adressees. Three, there is the element of gen¬
erality; that is, the legislation must be directed to an indeterminate
1027
number of states and susceptible of repeated application. Legis¬
lative acts of an IGO may take two forms.
The first consists of States individually consenting to the
rule, and when their ratifications (or other acts of approval)
reach the required number, the rule becomes binding for all,
and not exclusively for those consenting. The second form is
an [IGO's]...law-making resolution which enters into force for
all members without the necessity of any subsequent ratification
or similar act by individual States.^
The study below reveals states have not given global IGOs legis¬
lative competence. Though it is true ISBA may adopt regulations for
deepsea mining, this body does not yet exist and, as several of the few
countries capable of deepsea mining are unlikely to ratify the LOSC, the
ISBA's power to legislate may be irrelevant. Although without truly
legislative competence, a few IGOs -- IMO, WHO, and WMO -- have quasi-
legislative power. An IGO with quasi-legislative power is able to make
law through majority decision, but members retain the right to reject
the law or make reservations to it and sometimes the adopted act has
1029
only a qualified legal effect under the IGO's constitution. Under
MARPOL 73/78, for example, IMO may amend the technical annexes. States
have the option, however, of rejecting the amendment and, if they do so
in a timely manner, the amendment does not apply to them. This mechanism
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is referred to as opting or contracting out and allows states to retain
sovereignity and denies IGOs pure legislative functions. WHO is em¬
powered to adopt health regulations but its constitution provides for
contracting out. WMO may adopt regulations and, though opting out is
not available, the legal effect, though binding, is qualified, for states
must only do their "utmost" to implement regulations labelled recommenda¬
tions and they need not implement regulations labelled standards if it
is "impracticable to do so."
Besides quasi-legislative powers, global IGOs have also been
given functions that contribute to the development of international law.
These may be referred to as law-promoting powers. Many IGOs may draft
treaties and either adopt them or convene intergovernmental conferences
for their consideration. They may also adopt non-binding acts, variously
called recommendations, resolutions, guidelines, prinicples, and codes.
While each of these law-promoting acts have sometimes been labelled
1030 1031
legislation or quasi-legislation, this is improper. Such actions
bear insufficient resemblance to legislation. Also failing to satisfy
the elements of legislation are acts that, though binding, require unan¬
imity for adoption. Application of the consent principle makes such
acts more like treaties than legislation. Nonetheless, it is to be kept
in mind that although the bulk of IGO actions are not legislation, they
may contribute to the development of the internaitonal environmental
law of the sea.
B. The International Maritime Organisation
1. Mandate and Powers
Article 1(a) of the IMO Convention sets forth the agency's pur-
1032
poses for this thesis. These include the duty to encourage the
adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning the
prevention and control of ship pollution and to deal with related legal
issues. Article 2 says IMO's functions are "consultative and advisory."
This portends a limited legislative role, but Article 3 on how IMO is
to achieve its purposes is more hopeful. It says IMO shall make recom¬
mendations on ship pollution matters submitted to it by member states,
the United Nations, and any IGO; provide for the drafting of conventions,
agreements, and other instruments and convene conferences; provide
machinery for consultation among members and exchange of information
among states; and perform functions assigned to it under international
instruments. Some instruments give IMO a considerable legislative role.
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IMO's Assembly may adopt regulations and guidelines, but these
are not binding, only recommendatory (Art. 16(j))• The Assembly does
not generally draft its recommendations. This is done by IMO's
committees, which pass them through the Council for comment or re¬
vision (Art. 22(b)). In fact, control of IMO is in the Council (Art.
1033
16(i)).
The Maritime Safety Committee is IMO's main technical organ.
It has numerous subcommittees and drafts most IMO regulations and many
1034
of its conventions. The Legal Committee, responsible for considering
legal matters within IMO's mandate (Art. 34(a)), began as an ad hoc body
1035
to study legal questions that arose upon the Torrey Canyon incident.
It was soon recognised, however, that the committee would have to be¬
come permanent to give IMO an institutional framework to deal with the
legal problems made strikingly apparent by the incident. Yet it is
the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) that is at the van-
gaurd in IMO's effort to protect the seas from ship pollution. The
MEPC began in 1965 as the Maritime Safety Committee's Subcommittee on
1036
Oil Pollution, eventually becoming the full-fledged MEPC in 1973.
Its mandate is to "consider any matter within the scope of the Organi¬
sation concerned with the prevention and control of marine pollution
from ships..." (Art 39). More specifically, MEPC is to perform those
duties conferred on IMO by treaties for the control of ship pollution,
"particularly with respect to the adoption and amendment of regulations
or other provisions, as provided for in such conventions..." (Art.
39(a)). MEPC is also to submit to the Council recommendations and
guidelines and proposals for regulations for the control of ship
pollution, and for amendments to such regulations (Art. 40(a)(b)).
"In practice...most of MEPC's work deals with the development and




The manner in which IMO carries out its mandate is varied and
includes drafting and amending conventions, adopting codes and regula¬
tions, and providing technical assistance.
The IMO Convention allows IMO to convene conferences to consider
103 8
draft conventions it has produced. IMO has commonly done this and
twenty treaties have been adopted under its auspices. Most of these
are in force and, as a whole, mark a significant contribution to inter¬
national law, including international environmental law.
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A number of IMO's conventions did not result from its initiative,
an indication perhaps of the organisation's passivity. The 1969 Inter¬
vention and Civil Liability Conventions were prompted by the international
1039
clamour for action following the Torrey Canyon incident. MARPOL 73/78
1040
came about largely due to pressure by the United States, as did the
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
1041
Seafarers. And IMO marine pollution conventions have been criti¬
cized as being "largely limited to confirming what the transportation
industry has already found to be economically and operationally accept-
1042
able." The 1969 and 1971 amendments to the OILPOL Convention, for
example, "merely [codified] existing industry practice as far as opera-
1043
tional discharges and tank sizes...are concerned. Similar comments
1044
have been made on an IMO resolution on gas inert systems for oil tankers
and on a 1969 amendment of the OILPOL Convention to require the load-on-
1045
top system.
It is the membership of IMO's committees that determines the
effectiveness of its proposals. But the developed states dominate the
committees; in fact, a study in the mid-1970s found that developing
countries seldom sent representatives to meetings of the Legal Committee
1046
and MEPC.
IMO conventions provide that proposed amendments are to be
either rejected or adopted in IMO, and IMO has been active here, for
amendments to various treaties have been drafted by IMO and adopted
1047
by states. There is often a need to revise environmental agree¬
ments for they typically contain technical provisions subject to obso¬
lescence. The traditional method of amending treaties is time consuming,
expensive, and often futile. It is necessary to convene a diplomatic
conference each time an amendment is proposed. Elaborate ratification
procedures are often required under national law. To come into force
a certain number of states must ratify the amendment and this number
rises as a treaty attracts more parties. A representative of Britain
to IMO said "'unless the problem of entry into force of amendments was
solved in a more satisfactory way than at present, [IMO] would be wasting
1048
its time, since a great deal of its work would be futile.'" Thus,
1049
IMO decided to facilitate revising treaties by tacit amendment,
giving IMO significantly more power to develop international law.
[Tacit amendment] means that the body which adopts the amend¬
ment at the same time fixes a time period within which con¬
tracting parties will have the opportunity to notify either
their acceptance or...rejection...or to remain silent on the
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subject. In case of silence, the amendment is considered
to have been accepted by that party.1050
Such a method is well suited for conventions with technical annexes.
The classical method of amendment remains for revising articles in the
body of a treaty. Though a number of IMO conventions have a tacit amend¬
ment clause, MARPOL 73/78 does as well.1051 Thus, with IMO's most impor¬
tant environmental treaty, the organisation has a tool to efficiently
develop it and keep it apace with changing circumstances. Careful use
of this quasi-legislative mechanism, which is likely to be icnluded in
all future IMO conventions, will enhance IMO's role as a norm creating
IGO. It does, however, remain to "be kept in mind that even though
amendments have come into force they must still be implemented; entry
1052
into force and implementation are two distinct phenomena."
Besides drafting conventions, working for their entry into
force, and amending them, IMO's other method of work is promulgating
recommendations, initiating studies and making the results available to
1053
states, and providing technical assistance. While the latter two
activities are important, particularly technical assistance, it is the
promulgation of recommendations that deserves attention here.
Several hundred recommendations dealing with a wide range of
1054
subjects have been adopted by IMO. They support or assist implemen¬
tation of treaties or IMO's principal codes and provide guidance to
1055
states in framing national legislation. The recommendations include
codes, guidelines, and recommended practices and mark a considerable
contribution to safe maritime practices and, hence, less pollution. The
recommendations are not legally binding but many find their way into
1056
national law. Depending upon the extent of such absorption, they
may become customary international law. IMO's codes "are held in high
esteem by experts... and it can fairly be said that they have become
1057
indespensible tools for the conduct of maritime shipping. Also,
the "Codes are increasingly being used as testing grounds for regula¬
tory concepts later to be incorporated into conventions which, in their
turn, have a binding character."1058 Some of the codes are voluminous.
The International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code), for example,
1059
comprises ten volumnes. Such comprehensive regulations, adopted by
international consensus, may well have the character of a "standard" as
that word is used in the LOSC. The IMDG Code has been adopted by
37 states, including all major maritime states, partially by one state,
and is being considered for adoption by five others.1061
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3. Conclusion
Of all IGOs existing before the environmental awakening, IMO
has made the most forceful move into marine environmental issues. Its
response has involved internal restructuring and an attempt to develop
environmental law of the sea. The MEPC began in 1965 as a subcommittee
of another committee and only concerned with oil pollution. By 1973 it
was institutionalized on an equal status with the Maritime Safety Com¬
mittee and given a broader mandate. While this change may have been
1062
largely in IMO's self-interest, this is irrelevant. The rise of
the MEPC has meant a concomitant redirection of IMO's activities and a
positive effect on international environmental law.
IMO does not intend to go on adopting treaties at the pace it
has. Instead, it will seek ratification and implementation of existing
1063 . , ,. . „ 1064
treaties. It also hopes to avoid amending treaties as often.
One important project for international law is called the Uniform In-
1065
terpretation and Application of the Provisions of MARPOL 73/78.
IMO will continue to update codes and recommendations and adopt new ones
where necessary, some of which may, as their predecessors have, mark the
initial step towards a convention, be incorporated into national law,
develop into rules of customary law, or become part of international
law through the terms of the LOSC. The tacit amendment procedure will
allow IMO to keep agreements abreast of changing circumstances. Such
future work will build on the already "substantial progress" states
1066
have made in IMO to control ship pollution.
IMO is the unrivalled IGO to handle ship pollution. It also
has a role to play in controlling other sources. At UNCLOS III, IMO
expressed its opinion that it was the appropriate IGO to consider
1067
issues of ocean dumping. There may be truth to this. The global
dumping convention, the LDC, convenes its Consultative Meetings at IMO
and IMO provides the secretariat. Representatives of regional dumping
agreements as well as UNEP believe the LDC is the place to address
1068
the broader issues of ocean dumping. As a result IMO is well-situated
to play a significant role in dumping questions. Problems of pollution
from offshore activities have not been brought within the mandate and
activities of any one IGO. As IMO has done work and has projects planned
1069
, .
in this area and since its expertise in ship pollution is probably
adaptable to offshore processes, it is likely IMO will play a prominent
role in developing law to control pollution from offshore mining, doing
so through its blend of conventions, recommendations, codes, guidelines.
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and technical assistance. Similarly, IMO may be helpful in regulating
deepsea mining, although the ISBA will be the lead institution here.
C. The United Nations Environment Programme
1. Mandate and Powers
UNEP was the foremost consequence of the 1972 Stockholm Conference
on the Environment. Representatives to the conference recognised there
were plenty of IGOs to do environmental work. Thus, another specialized
agency with regulatory powers was viewed as unnecessary. On the other
hand, something was needed because the system was perceived as inadequately
responding to environmental challenges. An institution was needed "to
coordinate environment-related activites, to serve as a focal point for
global environment concerns, and to stimulate and catalyze action where
1070
it was needed." Thus, UNEP is not an operational body, it does not
have the power to promulgate binding regulations, enforce treaties, nor
to assume the environment work of other IGOs. It does not have quasi-
legislative power. It is to be concerned with the results and information
obtained by other bodies and with determining what gaps exist in environ¬
mental programmes and regulations and how they ought to be filled. The
novelty of UNEP is that it is to be catalytic. "It is more a centre of
initiative, centre of coordination, a centre through which information
flows, a mechanism by which governments [and IGOs] can get together to
1071
do things." In the hope of less bureaucracy and more effectiveness,
UNEP was given a small secretariat to serve as the focal point for envi-
1072
ronmental coordination.
UNEP does not have a constitution setting forth its mandate. The
United Nations General Assembly resolution establishing UNEP merely
1073
sketches UNEP's functions. More guidance to UNEP's purposes can be
found in several sources. There is the Stockholm Declaration, which
1075
1074
UNEP was designed to complement. In fact, the General Assembly
referred the Stockholm Declaration to UNEP "for appropriate action."'
The Declaration is thus something more than a bundle of hortatory state-
1076
ments, it is akin to a constitution for UNEP. From time to time
the General Assembly issues instructions to UNEP about what activities
1077
it should undertake. UNEP's Governing Council also provides guidance
in the form of decisions that elaborate the Stockholm Declaration and
General Assembly resolutions.
In what areas is UNEP to exercise its role as a coordinator and
catalyzer? Recommendations in the Stockholm Declaration's Action Plan
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provide some answers. Recommendations 86 to 94 deal specifically
with marine pollution. There is a call to control maritime and land-based
sources (Reco. 86(a)(f)). Global IGOs are to provide guidelines that
governments may take into account when developing measures to control all
significant sources of marine pollution (Reco 92(a)). States are to
cooperate regionally and, where appropriate, on a wider basis in developing
such measures (Reco. 92(b)). States are asked to contribute to inter¬
national programmes for research and monitoring (Reco. 87). UNEP has
undertaken activities to realize many of the recommendations, not single-
handedly, but in cooperation with other IGOs.
In UNEP's early years there was some doubt about its role in
1079
developing international environmental law, a doubt exacerbated by
a 1974 Governing Council decision stating that "'UNEP has no formal man-
1080
date in this connection.'" The Council did, however, add UNEP can
facilitate the development of law "'by initiating appropriate consulta-
1081
tions between experts.'" At its 1975 session the Governing Council
went further and adopted a broad environmental law programme; some of
the objectives include: contributing to the development and codification
of a new body of international law; facilitating cooperation among states
for the development of international law regarding responsibility,
liability, and compensation; contributing to the development of envi¬
ronmental law on the national and regional levels; promoting protection
of the international commons; and working towards establishment of




mental disputes. In 1975 the General Asse affirmed UNEP's role
in developing international environmental law.
2. Activities
UNEP is to address itself to all environmental problems, not
just marine pollution. Confronting all global environmental problems
is daunting. To give order to this complex endeavour, UNEP has divided
environmental problems into "priority subject areas," two of these are
1084
"oceans" and "environmnetal law. Before examining these, UNEP's
general approach to its work, a three part framework, will be presented.
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
monitoring, research, goal setting, environmental
evaluation and review, law, international consulta-
information exchange tion and agreements
SUPPORTING MEASURES




Assessment, management, and supporting measures are functional
tasks of UNEP. Assessment is a prerequisite to adequate management.
"Environmental assessment is the collection, collation, and interpretation
of data that describes and evaluates the conditions and trends of the
1085
environment, and the effects of man's activities on it." UNEP's
environmental assessment programme is called Earthwatch and its two main
components are the Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS) and the
1086
International Referral System for Sources of Environmental Information.
GEMS encourages and coordinates data collection by governments and IGOs
and the International Referral System performs the complementary function
, • 1087
of organising and distributing data.
As for UNEP's environmental management work, the essential goal
is to inject concern for environmental implications into decisionmaking
processes at all levels, national and international, and in all sectors,
1089
industrial, military, agricultural, etc.
Environmental assessment and management will not succeed without
the support of an informed public and informed governments. Thus, sup¬
porting measures are an essential part of UNEP's functions and include
environmental education and training; technical assestance; Regional
Advisory Teams serving West Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Asia and
1091
the Pacific; publications; and dissemination of information,
a. Priority Area "Oceans"
Work undertaken within the priority area of "oceans" is almost
1092
wholly accomplished within UNEP's Regional Seas Programme (RSP).
The Programme began in 1974 after the regional approach to marine
1093
pollution control was endorsed by the Governing Council.
The RSP is an action-oriented programme concerned with the
consequences and causes of environmental degradation and encompasses a
comprehensive approach to combating environmental problems through the
1094
management of marine and coastal areas. Ten regions, involving
about 130 states, now make up the RSP.
The RSP involves three phases in developing regional action plans:
1095
. .
preliminary, preparatory, and operational. The preliminary phase
begins with a decision by UNEP to approach the governments of a region
with the idea of developing a plan for the protection and development
of their natural resources, particularly with regard to resources of the
marine area. It is for the governments to deciee if they wish to pursue
the idea and to decide which countries to include in the region. After
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acceptance of the idea, the process enters the preparatory phase,
beginning with interagency consultation. UNEP brings together IGOs
to discuss a strategy for the region. At the meeting, responsibilities
for carrying out the preparatory phase are divided among the IGOs. In
the Wider Caribbean, for example, the following IGOs helped develop the
action plan: UNEP, FAO, IOC, IMO, the U.N. Department of International
Economic and Social Affairs, the Caribbean Conservation Association,
the U.N. Disaster Relief Organisation, the Economic Commission for Latin
America, the Pan American Health Organisation, UNESCO, the U.N. Indus¬
trial Development Organisation, and the International Union for the
1096
Conservation of Nature. The next step is collection of information
about the area. The information sought is varied, intended to "provide
a general assessment of the state of the environment and should serve as
the basis for environmentally sound management and development decisions.1
The background data is then presented to a group of experts nominated by
the regional states. Their opinion is sought on proposals for the action
plan. Although the experts act in their personal capacity they tend to
reflect the basic views of their governments. The experts of the Wider
Caribbean Region studied 66 project proposals, each devised by IGOs but
1098
based on recommendations made by the experts. Another part of the
preparatory phase is obtaining reactions of the states to the gradually
developing plan. The Wider Caribbean Region again provides an example.
Between the first and second meeting of the national experts, a draft
of project proposals was sent to all states and territories of the
region and to a number of IGOs with a request for comments and sug-
1099
gestions for improvement. This is an important aspect of the RSP
strategy because a plan's value depends upon ultimate cooperation of
states and thus it is important they play a role in its development.
The plan is not devised by UNEP and then thrust upon the states.
The most important event in the development of a regional
action plan follows the assessment aspect and is an intergovernmental
meeting that discusses and, with good fortune, adopts the proposed
action plan. The operational phase of the strategy can now go forward.
Much of the implementation revolves around the institution
selected at the time the plan is adopted and responsible to the states
for coordinating and supervising implementation. Sometimes UNEP has
been nominated, sometimes an IGO has been created, and in some regions
a pre-existing regional body has taken on the duties.
Implementation of an action plan depends on the states, not UNEP
1097
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and its fellow IGOs, though the organisations do assist with money, advice,
and technology. The action plan itself usually contains four parts:
... . 1100
assessment, management, legislation, and supporting measures.
Assessment has priority because it concerns vital studies of
the sources, amount, and effects of pollution, as well as development
practices that effect the marine environment. An ongoing assessment
programme assists the formation of environmentally sound management
decisions and legal instruments, and facilitates updating legislation.
For example, the Mediterannean Action Plan, the first adopted in the RSP,
contained MED POL, discussed in Chapter Six. The management element of
an action plan aims "to help managers improve their ability to make
decisions on their own and to develop integrated plans for coastal area
1101
development," such as control of coastal erosion and rational ex¬
ploitation of marine resources. As for an action plan's legislative
element, a convention on the preservation of the region's marine envi¬
ronment may be agreed to when the plan is adopted or at a later time.
It is also possible that no convention is adopted or even planned.
Treaties of the RSP are typically umbrella agreements, to be supple¬
mented with specific protocols. RSP protocols have developed legal
obligations on dumping, land-based pollution, protected areas, and
1102
cooperative action in emergencies. Throughout the operational
phase, UNEP coordinates the supporting measures offered by itself and
other IGOs. This involves financial assistance, scientific advice,
administrative help, and suggestions on technical problems. But "[o]nce
UNEP and the specialized agencies have assisted the governments of a
region to initiate their regional action plan, UNEP's responsibility
and financial support will gradually diminish, eventually leaving the
1103
programme predominantly in the hands of the governments..."
Although this strategy is common to all regions, it is flexible,
responsive to varying regional demands. For example, the Caribbean
Action Plan takes account of the area's special needs and thus addresses
tourism, a vital regional industry, and because the area is less
1104
developed educational training and technical assistance are emphasized.
Despite variations among the regional plans, there are common elements
in all, and if their implementation is closely coordinated the RSP
1105
will, it is hoped, eventually lead to a global ocean programme,
b. Priority Area "Environmental Law"
UNEP's efforts to develop environmental law take place on two
levels, nationally and internationally. Nationally, UNEP assists
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developing countries to adopt and strengthen environmental legislation
1106
and law enforcement. Developed countries may also be aided by
UNEP, for it, and other IGOs, compile information that help states
1107
conceive technical legislation.
At the international level UNEP acts similarly to IMO. It pro¬
motes the adoption of treaties it has helped formulate. It drafts prin¬
ciples and guidelines it hopes states will follow in conducting activities
with potential transfrontier environmental effects. Guidelines also
1108
seek to elaborate the Principles of the Stockholm Declaration.
Regarding marine pollution, UNEP's environmental law work is
concentrated in the RSP and it has here played the lead role in drafting
and bringing into force a number of regional conventions and protocols.
Such work is significant. Besides creating legal obligations for
dozens of states in a number of regions, the marked uniformity of
the instruments may push along the emergence of customary norms on
international environmental law of the sea. And the RSP "performs the
vitally important function of transforming the 'soft' law of the [LOSC]
1109
into 'hard,' enforceable law..." In addition, there is an Ad Hoc
Working Group of Experts on the Protection of the Marine Environment
from Land-Based Sources. Its first session was in 1983 and it seeks
1110
to develop global guidelines. It is hoped the guidelines, once
adopted, will strengthen action at the regional level and in the longer
term provide a basis for a global convention on land-based sources
that will use the experience gained in the development and implementa¬
tion of the principles regionally. * ^ UNEP has already produced
guidelines for offshore mining conducted within the limits of national
1112
jurisdiction. Of course, UNEP's efforts to develop guidelines
proceeds in areas besides marine pollution, but such work is beyond the
1113
scope of the thesis.
3. Conclusion
UNEP' s RSP has been successful. It is considered the organisa-
1114
tion's foremost achievement. The numerous legal agreements reached
under the RSP's auspices are, however, but a part of this programme.
The RSP has contributed to the development of national environmental
legislation, greater scientific understanding of the sources and effects
of marine pollution, improved scientific facilities and personnel in
a number of countries, and to a more pronounced awareness of the dangers
of marine pollution. Excluding the RSP, it is difficult to assess the
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effect UNEP, this inadequately funded IGO, is having on the develop¬
ment of international environmental law. Its principles and guidelines
probably have had, at best, only modest effect on state policies. They
have not had the clearly ascertainable influence of IMO's codes. Though
the work of these two IGOs is not readily comparable. IMO's codes are
highly technical and apply to defined processes and circumstances. UNEP
tackles broader, more difficult issues, such as land-based pollution,
and it cannot expect to have the success of IMO. UNEP's formulation
of principles and guidelines did not begin in earnest until the mid
and late 1970s and there has been less time for its work to seep into
national legislation. On the other hand, some of IMO's codes were
developed in the early 1960s. What UNEP's work on principles and guide¬
lines is probably doing is laying foundations for future advances in
international law. But even without success today or tomorrow in its
efforts to have these followed by states and accepted in treaties,
the development of international law and other beneficial advances
made in its RSP makes UNEP, globally and regionally, the foremost IGO
in the effort to preserve the marine environment.
D. The International Sea-Bed Authority
1. Mandate and Powers
The LOSC says seabed resources beyond national jurisdiction be¬
long to mankind (Art. 136). Such tracts comprise what is known as
the Area (Art. 1). To administer activities in the Area, the ISBA is
established (Arts. 156(1), 157(1)). "'[A]ctivjties in the Area' means
all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources
of the Area" (Art. 1(1) (3).
The ISBA's principle organs are the Assembly, Council, and Sec¬
retariat. A functional body, the Enterprise, is to carry out deepsea
mining on behalf of the ISBA. The Assembly is empowered to promulgate
rules relating to the exploration and exploitation of the Area (Art.
160(2)). Rules protecting the marine environment from deepsea mining
are substantive and all substantive decisions before the Assembly are
to be taken by two-thirds vote (Art. 159(8)).
A subsidiary body of the Council is the Legal and Technical
Commission (Art. 163(1)). The Commission's broad mandate embraces
numerous environmental matters. It is required to assess the environ¬
mental implications of activities in the Area, make recommendations to
the Council on the protection of the marine environment that take into
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views of recognised experts in the field, submit to the Council rules
governing activities in the Area that take into account environmental
factors, recommend necessary amendments to such rules, and recommend
to the Council establishing a monitoring programme to ensure the rules
are adequate (Art. 165(2)). Although rules come into force upon the
Council's approval, this is provisional until the Assembly gives them
final approval. The Legal and Technical Commission's environmental
duties are a means by which the ISBA may carry out its obligation to
protect the marine environment from activities in the Area, a duty
1116
clearly set forth in Articles 145 and 209.
All LOSC parties are bound by the ISBA's environmental rules.
There is not an opting out procedure nor the right to declare a reser¬
vation to a regulation; nor is a state that voted against a proposed
rule in the Council or Assembly, or both, exempt from its application.
Thus, the ISBA is the only global IGO with truly legislative powers.
It also possesses certain limited tools for ensuring implementation.
The Council may issue emergency orders for the suspension or adjustment
of an operation to prevent serious harm to the marine environment (Art.
162(2)(w). If the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, a disputes settlement body
also set up by the LOSC, finds a state has grossly and persistently
violated the deepsea mining provisions, that state may be suspended from
the ISBA (Art. 185). A suspended state loses the rights and privileges
of membership to the convention (Art. 185(1)). This includes the oppor¬
tunity to partake in deepsea mining and receive royalties from the
Enterprise. The Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber has jurisdiction over dis¬
putes involving the activities in the Area, including allegations a
state has violated environmental rules (Art. 187).
In designing the ISBA as they have, states have given an IGO
exceptional legislative power. Reasons for this include the fact that
most states are technically and financially unable to mine the deepsea
and thus accept controls on the activity. As mining has not begun,
there are no entrenched interests making economic and social arguments that
they be allowed to continue operation with only marginal oversight.
Lastly, as mining in the Area will take place far from land, states
probably see controls as less an infringement on sovereignity than other¬
wise .
2. Activities
Of course, the work of the ISBA has not begun as the LOSC is
not in force. To ensure the ISBA enters into immediate and effective
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operation upon entry into force of the LOSC, an UNCLOS III resolution
1117
established a Preparatory Commission (PREPCOM).
PREPCOM held its first session in 1983 and has since formed
1118
four Special Commissions, each to deal with particular issues.
Special Commission III is to prepare a seabed mining code with rules
1119
and procedures on deepsea mining in the Area. The code will include
environmental provisions and these will apply provisionally pending
1120
formal adoption by the ISBA once it is in operation (Art. 308(4)).
1121
Work on the code began in 1984 but environmental provisions had
1122
not been adopted by the Commission's August 1985 meeting.
3. The Reciprocating States Regime
If the LOSC never comes into force there will, of course, be no
such entity as the ISBA. But exploration for deepsea wealth will go
on and it is likely sooner or later exploitation will take place. If
a specific treaty is not concluded concerning this activity, will an
IGO step in to regulate it? UNEP would be a candidate to do so, recog¬
nising its overall environmental mandate, and it has expressed an inter-
1123
est to be involved. IMO is also well situated. Exploration and
exploitation will be conducted from vessels and IMO has long dealt with
the technical problems of pollution from ships. Since most countries
capable of mining are Western States, they may have a predilection to
accept IMO, if any IGO, as the regulating body. FAO, with its interest
in protecting marine living resources, may seek and legitimately play a
role as well.
It is possible that if the LOSC does not enter into force deep-
sea mining will be solely controlled by national law. Indeed, as some
countries able to mine, such as the United States and Britain, have no
intention of accepting the convention, it is likely that much of the
mining will be regulated only by national legislation.
These two countries, along with others, have for a number of
1124
reasons set up a Reciprocating States Regime, "a network of rules
laid down in unilateral municipal legislation co-ordinated internation-
1125
ally on a reciprocal basis. The regime is set forth in a 1982
112
agreement between France, West Germany, Britain, and the United States.
The pact's primary objective "is to facilitate the identification and
resolution of conflicts which may arise from the filing and processing
of applications of [mining] authorizations made by Pre-Enactment Ex-
1127
plorers..." (Art. 1). It also contemplates a future arrangement
whereby the parties would recognise one another's seabed mining licenses,
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and in 1984 such an agreement, containing such a term, was signed by
1128
the four states along with Belgium, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands.
The agreement also provides for regular consultation with respect to
seabed mining. Although the agreement says nothing about the environ-
1129
ment, a Memorandum on the Implementation of it does. Its environ¬
mental provision states: "Each Party will take all necessary measures
so that deep seabed operations under its control...(b) will include efforts
to protect the quality of the environment and will not result in signi¬
ficant adverse effects on the environment...(f) are monitored for their
effects on the environment" (Art. 3(1)). Apart from these requirements.
environmental provisions are included in deepsea mining legislation
1 by I
1133
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adopted France, West Germany, Britain, and the United
States,
4 . Conclusion
If the LOSC comes into force, there is no question that the
ISBA will be the lead IGO to control pollution from deepsea mining. Its
mandate is unequivocal and even if its enforcement powers are marginal
its legislative jurisdiction is significant. It has been argued that
the ISBA may be able to exercise some jurisdiction over dumping on
1134 . .
the high seas. Those taking this position focus on the dumping
of high-level nuclear wastes. It would seem, however, that because
the ISBA's mandate is limited to "activities in the Area," which refers
only to mining, that dumping, even if done above the Area and effecting
1135
the Area, is not an "activity in the Area" under the LOSC.
Several writers have given thought to the question whether the
ISBA will effectively carry out its mandate, and doubts have been ex¬
pressed. One, it has been argued that there may be a conflict of in¬
terest within the Legal and Technical Commission. The Commission is
responsible for environmental protection but also has exploitation
duties. "We have that problem in the United States, when the Department
of Interior engages in both development functions and environmental
functions, and the inevitable conflict of interest results in imprudent
..1136
environmental management. Two, when the community of states
gathers to formulate environmental regulations what often results is
1137
a low common denominator, if not the lowest. The ISBA may follow
this trend. Three, it is unclear how enforcement of environmental
rules by the ISBA "would turn out since international agencies do not
1138
usually enforce." Also, the enforcement tools can only be used
in cases of significant environmental damage. Four, the ISBA Assembly
160
and Council are unlikely to place environmental considerations over
1139
economic interests. The royalties of deepsea mining have been
sought for years and it is difficult to imagine states restricting
mining or placing costly pollution controls on it for the sake of the
vague concept of a healthy environemnt, particularly since that envi¬
ronment will be far from the territory of most states.
For these reasons it has even been suggested that, with regards
to deepsea mining, the marine environment might benefit from the failure
of the LOSC. Without it there may be less mining and that which will be
undertaken will be by states likely to adopt stronger environmental rules
1140
than they would have implemented under the ISBA. Of course, recog¬
nising how poorly states have in the past controlled polluting activities
from their ships, the argument environmental controls over deepsea mining
1141
is best left to states can be only accepted with caution. This
debate may see considerable resolution in the near future for it is
likely PREPCOM will soon promulgate its mining code and its environ¬
mental provisions may then be assessed and compared with national legis¬
lation to determine which regime, the LOSC or that of the reciprocating
states, is likely, at least on paper, to protect the oceans more.
E. The International Atomic Energy Agency
1. Mandate and Powers
IAEA's objective is to enhance the contribution of atomic
energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world and ensure
, _ 1142
the assistance it provides states is not used for military purposes.
Nowhere does its constituting Statute refer to the need for environ¬
mental protection from nuclear processes but numerous provisions mention
1143
IAEA's responsibility for safety and health in the nuclear field.
Thus, one need not resort to an expansive reading of the Statute to
find an environmental mandate for the agency.
IAEA is without even quasi-legislative authority, though it
may make recommendations to its membership (Art. IV(D)). It is also
to establish safety standards for the protection of health and the
minimization of danger to life and property and see to it these stand¬
ards are applied to its own operations as well as to national ones it
has assisted (Art. 111(A)(6)). Safety standards are not binding law,
though states generally accept them because commonly the standards in¬
trinsically demand respect and IAEA technicl assistance is conditioned
1144
upon their acceptance. And it may be argued the standards seep into
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international law through their general adherence by states, for they
"have proved to be a useful basis for international regulations and
1145
national legislation" and "many of these have gained a large
1146
measure of international and national acceptance." In this way
IAEA contributes to the development of international law.
Although its Statute does not give IAEA a role in formulating
and establishing conventions, it has been instrumental in developing
several treaties, such as the 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability
of Operators of Nuclear Ships, the 1973 Vienna Convention on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage, and the 1971 Convention Relating to
1147 .
Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material.
. . . 1148
2. Activities
IAEA has issued dozens of documents in its safety series. Most
have little direct relation to marine pollution though a number do con¬
cern protection of the environment and the oceans in particular. In
1983 IAEA issued the document "Control of Radioactive Waste Disposal
1149
into the Marine Environment," an update of a 1961 safety bulletin
1150 .
on the same subject. This sets forth the environmental considerations
a state needs to consider when disposing of low level radioactive wastes
either as effluent into coastal waters or as packaged waste into the
deep sea. Other relevant documents in the safety series include
"Safety Considerations in the Use of Ports and Approaches by Nuclear
Merchant Ships" and "Disposal of Radioactive Wastes into Rivers, Lakes
,,1151and Estuaries.
IAEA has promoted environmental protection in its Waste Man-
1152
agement Programme. The objective of which is to assist national
and international programmes "in protecting man and his environment from
all hazards arising from the management of radioactive wastes and
1153
effluents." The Agency provides information and technical and
regulatory assistance within the programme's three main components:
handling and treatment of radioactive waste, which concentrates on
high level and alpha-bearing wastes and on decommissioning nuclear
facilities; a comprehensive research programme on underground disposal
1154
of radioactive waste; and the environmental aspects of nuclear energy.
Information in the Waste Management Programme has been disseminated in
symposia and seminar proceedings (26 volumnes), the Technical Reports
Series (40 reports), the Safety Series (20 documents), as IAEA-TECHDOCS
1155
(22 reports), and as Waste Management Abstracts (14 issues).
Part of IAEA's modest research programme is the International
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Laboratory of Marine Radioactivity (ILMR). ILMR exists to study
the occurrence and behaviour of radioactive substances and other forms
of pollution in the marine environment, enhance calibration and stand¬
ardization of methodology and interlaboratory comparisons in the study
of marine environmental problems, and coordinate research and provide
1157
advice and training.
IAEA's most important role in protecting the seas is its res¬
ponsibility under the LDC to define high level radioactive wastes un¬
suitable for ocean dumping and make recommendations on dumping radio-
1158
active wastes that are not high level. The Agency adopted provi-
1159
sional recommendations and a provisional definition in 1975. A
revised definition and revised recommendations were adopted in 1978
1160
and have been operative under the LDC since 1979. The definition
and recommendations have been kept under review and will be revised
in 1985.1161
The recommendations "describe the requirements regarding site
selection, site-specific assessments and monitoring, packaging and
operational control of dumping to be followed by national authorities
1162
when granting a special permit for dumping of radioactive waste."
IAEA recommended the parties to the Barcelona Convention adopt the
1978 definition and recommendations for use in that convention's dumping
1163
, „ 1164
protocol. OECD has adopted them.
On this work, IAEA's most important involving the seas, the
first thing to note is that the LDC has been in force since 1976 and
IAEA has yet to supply a definitive definition of high level wastes
unsuitable for dumping. In addition, the definition may not prevent
the dumping of any radioactive wastes the nuclear industry wishes to
1165
dump. The 1975 provisional definition begins by setting limits on
three kinds of radioactive wastes. For example, alpha-bearing wastes
of over ten curies per ton of waste are unsuitable for dumping, but
the definition ends by stating that its "activity concentrations shall
be averaged over gross mass not exceeding 100 tons."
Thus, a permitting agency may countenance the ocean dumping of
10 tons of wastes having an activity concentration of 100 curies
per ton (i.e., ten times "hotter" than the numerical standard),
so long as it is combined with 90 tons of nonradioactive matter.
If there was doubt about this interpretation, it was later dis¬
pelled. Certain delegations to an IAEA-sponsored meeting of ex¬
perts in February 1978 agreed to lower the standard under dis¬
cussion to only one curie per ton - provided that they be per¬
mitted to average that activity concentration over a gross mass
not exceeding 1,000 tons!
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Indeed, the revised definition lowers the standard to one curie per ton
and raises to 1,000 tons the gross mass over which the waste may be
averaged.
There are, furthermore, disturbing elements in the bases of
IAEA's definition. One, the definition is based on the "'limiting
1167
capacity of the deep sea,'" but this capacity is based on an assess¬
ment of the northeast Atlantic, a model that may not be suitable for
1168
other ocean areas. Two, IAEA has quantified acceptable radiation
doses to.which a human can be exposed.1169 This anthropocentric quan¬
tification fails to account for the hazards the marine environment may
suffer frem nuclear waste dumping. Three, the definition concentrates
on the danger posed by each canister of waste to be dumped, but when
dealing with highly persistent toxic materials it would be more intelli¬
gent to look at the ocean's capacity to assimilate the aggregate amount
^ 1170of such wastes dumped. Four, the definition says it "is based on
an assumed upper limit to t.he dumping rate of 100,000 tons per year
at any one site." But this is without regard to one site's proximity
1171
to another.
In 1977 a meeting of IAEA consultants concluded there were no
1172
high level radioactive wastes intrinsically unsuitable for dumping.
At the 1978 LDC Consultative Meeting a statement of the IAEA observer
1173
implies the Agency might agree with this view.
In sum, an environmentalist might not view IAEA as the brightest
star cf IGOs concerned with marine pollution. There are even "those who
believe that the IAEA has an institutional bias in favor of ocean
dumping of radioactive wastes and does not want...[the LDC] to stand
1174
in the way of the proliferation of nuclear technology.
IAEA, unlike most of the IGOs studied in this thesis, is not
concerned with the many contaminants that pollute the seas; nor is it,
like some IGOs, concerned only with one source of marine pollution.
Only radioactive wastes are the Agency's concern, no matter how they
reach the marine environment. Because of the LDC, however, IAEA directs
much of its environmental work to the regulation of radioactive waste
dumping. Unfortunately, the manner in which it has carried out its
pivotal role has not been as effective as it might be.
F. UNESCO and its Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
1. Mandate and Powers
The purpose of UNESCO is to promote education, science, and
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culture throughout the world. Knowledge of the ocean requires promotion
because of oceanography's novelty and the explosion of complex ocean
management issues. UNESCO established a Division of Marine Sciences
(orginally the Office of Oceanography) to address the ocean aspects
of its mandate. The Division's major responsibilities are in the field
of training, education, and technical assistance with the goal of
1175
strengthening marine institutions and research in UNESCO member states.
A second ocean body, and one far more important for thesis
purposes, is the IOC. IOC's 1970 Revised Statute says the Commission
is to promote, in collaboration with other IGOs, international scien¬
tific investigations of the oceans with a view to learning more about
1176
its nature and resources. It is to define problems in oceanic re¬
search that demand international cooperative action and then develop,
recommend, and coordinate international scientific investigations and
promote the distribution of research results (Art. 2(a)(b)(e)). IOC
is also to work with other IGOs and may make recommendations to them
(Art. 2(c)(d)). The Commission does not have rule-making or legisla¬
tive powers.
IOC, capable of dealing with all aspects of marine science
research and related technical aid, has been referred to by the United
Nations General Assembly as the focal point for marine sciences in the
1177
United Nations system. It might be more effective were it autono¬
mous, something it is not, having been constituted within UNESCO. As
a semi-independent IGO it is an anomaly. Although it has its own member
states, staff, officiers, and statutues, andean generally decide its own
course of action, it is bound to follow many of UNESCO's administrative
rules. Final selection of its Secretary is by UNESCO's Director-General
(Art. 9(2)) and UNESCO essentially controls its budget (Art. 10(2)).
Because of such structural weaknesses, the future of IOC has been much
1178
discussed within and outside of the Commission. Fundamental changes,
however, are unlikely.
2. Activities
IOC has three main areas of activities. Ocean services in¬
volves organising knowledge about the seas and putting it at the public's
1179
disposal. The training, education, and mutual assistance programme
is similar to the work of UNESCO's Division of Marine Sciences and seeks
to reach the goal where all IOC members are able to adequately parti-
. . 1180 . .
cipate in IOC's activities. Ocean science is IOC's main activity and
1181
involves promotion and coordination of cooperative investigations.
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Some of the investigations IOC has initiated, organised, and imple¬
mented include the International Co-operative Investigation of the
Tropical Atlantic (1963-1964) and the Co-operative Investigation of
1182
the Caribbean and Adjacent Region (1967-1976).
For these programmes IOC specified an ocean area or phenomenon
requiring study and coordinated its investigation. These investigations
emphasized basic scientific research. However, the principle framework
for IOC's present scientific activity, the Long-Term and Expanded Pro-
1183
gramme of Oceanic Exploration and Research (LEPOR), marks a new approach.
LEPOR does not concentrate on a single area or phenomenon. Rather, it
leaves the initiative for action to individual scientists, institu¬
tions, and states, who are also responsible for needed coordination.
What IOC does is define criteria for establishing priority areas of
1184
study within LEPOR and assist implementation. IOC also helps
distribute the knowledge gained and identify areas where more
, 1185
is needed. LEPOR's purpose is to increase knowledge of the ocean
and the processes operating in or affecting the marine environment
1186
"with the goal of enhanced utilization of the ocean and its resources..."
LEPOR, which is to last several decades, is thus more directed at applied
rather than pure scientific research, representing the new influence of
developing states demanding more immediate and practical benefits from
IOC. This influence also means IOC pays considerably more attention
1187
today to technical assistance, a practice detrimentally effecting
1188
IOC's effectiveness as a research organisation. Consequently,




Marine pollution is one of LEPOR's primary areas. The
marine pollution segment is the Global Investigation of Pollution in
the Marine Environment (GIPME), a comprehensive plan to provide "an
international-framework within which national and regional programmes
on various aspects of marine pollution may be co-ordinated to contribute
1192
1191
to an understanding of global pollution problems." The ultimate
objective of GIPME, which is IOC's main marine pollution programme,
is to provide a sound scientific basis for assessing and regulating
1193
marine pollution. Its four components include "the development of
sampling and analytical methods, the construction of mass balances of
pollutants in the ocean, the assessment of pollution effects, and the
,,1194
strategy to ensure abatement or regulatory action. Results of
GIPME projects should allow IOC to regularly review the state of the
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marine environment anf forecast long-term trends.
Since IOC does not have law-making or law-promoting powers,
its role in marine pollution must be justified by its scientific work.
But its programme here, GIPME, is dependent on the willingness of
states to carry it out, yet states have done "very little" to implement
. 1196
it.
G. Food and Agricultural Organisation
1. Mandate and Powers
FAO's objective is to enhance food production, fight malnutri-
1197
tion, and improve agriculture. "Agriculture" is defined to include
fisheries and FAO aims to ensure the maximun sustainable yield of fisheries
is maintained throughout the world and fisheries everywhere are developed
1198
to optimize their food potential. Much of this work is overseen by
FAO's Committee on Fisheries (COFI), created within the organisation's
1199
Department of Fisheries. This Department also has a Fishery Re¬
source and Environment Division that is concerned with the environmental
effects of human activities and long term environmental changes on
1200
fisheries. FAO's Constitution says one of FAO's functions is
"generally to take all necessary and appropriate action to implement
the purposes of the Organisation as set forth in the Preamble," (Art.
I(3)(c)). As marine pollution can diminish fisheries, FAO may properly
address this subject, and environmental harm is something FAO recog-
1201
nised more than a decade ago as particularly relevant to its work.
FAO may make recommendations to its members (Art. IV) and its
plenary body, the Conference, may submit to its members conventions
and agreements concerning food and agriculture (Art. XIV(l)). The
Council may submit to members agreements that apply to a particular
geographical area (Art. XIV(2)(a)). The organisation lacks legislative
competence.
2. Activities
Even though FAO's activities are much broader than solely
marine, fisheries have a prominent place in its work because of the
importance of fish as a food source. Fish provides about 20% of the
world's supply of animal protein and for many people in developing
countries it is a "vital" part of the diet and its demand is expected
1202
to grow dramatically in the 1980's.
To enhance fisheries as a food source, FAO devotes consider¬
able time to management issues. As good management is dependent on
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information, FAO engages in a multitude of studies and research pro¬
jects and produces many useful reports. For example, it has studied
fishery legislation implementing the 200 mile EEZ and publishes a
Yearbook of Fishery Statistics. Good management cannot neglect the
effect of pollution on fish and fish habitats and FAO studies this sub-
1203
ject. Its Advisory Committee of Experts on Marine Resource Re¬
search (ACMRR) has established working groups on Ecological Indices,
Biological Effects of Pollutants, Pollution Research, and River Inputs
1204
to Ocean Systems. In addition, it has provided extensive informa¬
tion on the extent and effects of marine pollution on common fisheries
to COFI's six regional bodies which in turn use the information in
1205
their work developing and managing fisheries. ACMRR has also aided
IOC in planning and implementing aspects of IOC's LEPOR and GIPME pro¬
grammes .
The EEZ Programme, established in 1979, may be FAO1s most
important fisheries project. It aims to assist coastal states, parti¬
cularly developing ones, in developing and managing fisheries in their
1206
EEZs. Although protection of the marine environment is not a pri¬
mary concern in the programme, some efforts to control environmental
„ 12 07
degradation are involved.
A specific example of FAO's research role is the comprehensive
review of marine pollution in the Mediterranean Sea it produced in
1208
1972. In the pilot phase of MED POL FAO also produced baseline
studies, monitored various chemicals in marine organisms, and researched
1209
the effects of pollutants on marine communities. It also has been
actively involved in the marine pollution aspects in other regions of
1210
UNEP's RSP.
FAO's role in the organisational response to marine pollution
has largely been one of scientific research and technical assistance
on managing fisheries. Far more limited has been its role in directly
1211
developing international law to protect the marine environment.
Yet it did take the initiative that eventually led to the Barcelona
1212
Convention and does contribute to developing legal components of
1213
Action Plans in UNEP's RSP. Although FAO has engaged in standard
1214
setting, marine pollution has been of little concern in this regard.
H. World Health Organisation
I. Mandate and Powers
WHO's Constitution says the organisation's objectives "shall
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be the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of
1215
health." To achieve this goal Article 2 sets forth 22 wide-ranging
functions, including directing and coordinating international health
work, providing governments with technical services and assistance,
conducting research, and promoting the improvement of environmental
hygiene.
WHO's relevance to marine pollution is readily apparent. In
some cases man has contaminated marine areas and living resources to
1216
such a degree that his health has been harmed. Two kinds of exposure
to marine pollutants that affect man are consumption of contaminated
seafood and direct contact with pollutants through swimming.
In order to achieve its objectives, WHO is empowered to engage
in research and studies, but its Constitution also provides it with
1217
three methods by which it may seek to regulate its members. One,
its Assembly has "authority to adopt conventions or agreements with
respect to any matter within the competence of the Organisation" (Art.
19). The Article provides that a two-thirds vote is required for
adoption of conventions or agreements, which come into force for a
member upon its ratification. Members are to act on the convention
or agreement within 18 months of its adoption and those not accepting
the instrument must explain why. A state accepting the instrument
must make an annual report on implementation (Arts. 14, 20, 62).
Two, the Assembly is given quasi-legislative powers. Article 21
authorizes it to adopt regulations concerning (a) procedures to
prevent the international spread of disease; (b) nomenclatures on
diseases, causes of death, and public health practices; (c) standards
on diagnostic procedures for international use; (d) standards on the
safety, purity and potency of biological, pharmaceutical, and similar
products moving in international commerce; and (e) advertising and
labelling of biological, pharmaceutical, and similar products moving
in international commerce. These regulations bind all members that
do not reject them within a certain time (Ar.t 22). Reservations may
be made to acceptance of the regulations, furthering diluting their legal
1218
force. Areas where WHO has quasi-legislative authority have little
to do with marine pollution. Three, the Assembly may adopt recommenda¬
tions for consideration by its members and members are to annually re¬
port on any action taken on the recommendations (Arts. 23, 62). The
recommendations do not, however, have any legal force.
2. Activities
WHO's Executive Board has stated: "While health policies and
programmes alone cannot ensure a safe environment, helath aspects have
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to be given a prominent place in all considerations of the environment."
Although WHO recognises UNEP as the focal point in solving environmental
1220
problems, it believes it "has an important role to play." Indeed,
WHO has been active in the environmental field.
The bulk of WHO'S environmental activities are not directly
concerned with the marine environment. Yet because the seas receive
waters from rivers, lakes, and direct runoff, and because such land-
based sources bring most pollutants to the sea, many WHO programmes
indirectly relate to marine pollution. Some of these programmes in-
1221
elude the International Programme on Chemical Safety, assistance to
1222
states in developing national environmental legislation, an air
1223 ....
quality monitoring project, and activities to improve water sani-
1224
tation. A more direct involvement by WHO in marine pollution is
its role in UNEP's RSP, to which it provides information on human health
aspects of marine pollution and coordinates development of training
materials for a projected series of workshops on assessing the envi-
1225
ronmental impact of coastal area development. WHO has also
developed health criteria for the quality of recreational waters, with
1226
particular reference to coastal waters and beaches.
WHO is divided into six regional divisions and the European
Office, WHO/EURO, has closely collaborated in developing and imple¬
menting UNEP's Mediterranean Action Plan. Its work is illustrative of
what other regional WHO offices have done in the Action Plans in their
areas. WHO/EURO coordinated the Mediterranean Action Plan's project
1227
on coastal water quality in the pilot phase of MED POL and now
plays a significant role in MED POL Phase II. In Phase II's monitoring
component, WHO/EURO's responsibilities have included studying pollution
1228
sources and the influence of polluted coastal waters on human health.
More specifically, it has sought to develop sampling and analytical
techniques for pollution monitoring and research, reporting formats
for land-based pollution, scientific rationale for environmental qual¬
ity criteria, epidemiological studies related to water quality, and




Besides other scientific work in MED POL, and participation
1231
in the Action Plan's Blue Plan and Priority Action Programme, in
the mid-1970s a WHO survey of the national legislation of Mediterranean
1232
states laid the groundwork for the Athens Protocol on Land-Based Sources.
WHO/EURO and UNEP have published a comprehensive text that will form
170
the basis for the development of a model code of practice for the
1233
management of wastes from coastal sources. As with the parent
body, WHO/EURO has undertaken a number of activities with an indirect
1234
bearing on marine pollution.
Like FAO, WHO's marine pollution work is far more grounded in
scientific studies and technical advice than in adopting conventions,
promulgating codes, and issuing regulatory acts. This is despite
quasi-legislative tools. Article 19, which allows for the adoption of
1235
conventions, has "[i]n practice... never been applied." Its rule-
1236
making ability under Articles 21 and 22 has seldom been exercised
1237
and never used for a specific environmental issue. WHO generally
1238
prefers to set standards by nonbinding recommendation.
I. World Meterological Organisation
1. Mandate and Powers
There is, though perhaps surprisingly, a relation between
meterology and marine pollution.
Many atmospheric processes are... inextricably related to pro¬
cesses and phenomenon the study of which falls within... hydrol¬
ogy and oceanography. The WMO has therefore certain responsi¬
bilities in these fields also, and as a result its interest in
the human^^vironment is somewhat wider than its title may
suggest.
WMO's Consitution sets forth its purposes, and in two of these
may be found a mandate to address marine environmental problems. WMO
is "[t]o facilitate world-wide co-operation in the establishment of
networks of stations for making meterological observations as well as
hydrological and other geophysical observations related to meteor-
1240
ology..." It is also [t]o further the application of meterology
to...water problems, agriculture and other human activities" (Art. 2(d)).
WMO's general responsibilities are to coordinate, standardize, and im-
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prove meteorological services throughout the world.
WMO's plenary body is the Congress. The kind of decisions it
may make, and their legal effects, is complex. Congress may make
recommendations (Art. 8(b)). These are without legal effect. It may
also adopt, by two-thirds vote, technical regulations on various
meteorological practices and procedures (Art. 8(d)). Technical regu-
12 42
lations are not merely recommendatory, for Article 9 says:
(a) All members shall do their utmost to implement the deci¬
sions of Congress;
(b) If, however, any Member finds it impracticable to give
effect to some requirement in a technical resolution adopted
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by Congress, such Member shall inform the Secretary-General...
whether its inability to give effect to it is provisional or
final, and state its reasons therefor.
To clarify Article 9 and the legal effect of technical regula-
12 4 3
tions, in 1955 Congress adopted a clarifying resolution. It says
technical regulations may be either a recommendation or a standard.
The resolution says it is "desirable" for states to implement recom¬
mendations and they must, in compliance with Article 9(a), do their
"utmost" to do so. Thus, this kind of WMO recommendation has more legal
effect than typical IGO recommendations, which may usually to completely
ignored. State obligations regarding a standard are stricter. The 1955
resolution says it is "necessary" for states to implement standards and
both (a) and (b) of Article 9 apply. Thus, a state must do its "utmost"
to implement a standard and must if it is practicable to do so. A state
not implementing a standard must notify the Secretary-General of the
specific nature and extent of non-compliance and its reasons.
While decisions of WMO's Congress are not binding, the obliga¬
tions arising upon adoption of standards and certain recommendations
1244
are not inconsequential. WMO has quasi-legislative power. But it
must be noted that the areas in which this power may be exercised,
meteorological practices, is of little relevance to controlling marine
pollution.
2. Activities
WMO's environmental interest concentrates on air pollution.
It has recognised the "pressing need for resource conservation and the
protection of the atmosphere, land and oceanic environment" and asserts
1245
this need requires contributions from meteorology. "Knowledge of
the mechanics of long-range transport of pollutants in the atmosphere
is necessary for the successful prediction of environmental impacts.
1246
This is particularly pertinent in the case of acid rains... Such
knowledge is also necessary for the effective drafting and application
of international agreements controlling air pollution as a source of
ocean contamination. WMO believes it has a major contribution to make
1247
in understanding the transfer processes of air pollutants.
In the late 1970s WMO led a Working Group on the Interchange
1248
of Pollutants between the Atmosphere and the Oceans and its concern
with air pollution as a source of marine pollution is illustrated in
some of the programmes it formulated in 1983 as part of its strategy
for 1984-1993. These include the development of a comprehensive envi¬
ronmental monitoring service and activities within the International
172
1249
Global Oceanic Services System (IGOSS). IGOSS, which includes
marine pollution monitoring, is a WMO/IOC project and part of IOC's
GIPME. ^ WMO is valuable in such a project because it has a "well-
established international system for monitoring [and] predicting envi-
. . 1251
ronmental conditions at the sea-air interface... This system can
contribute visual observations of contaminants such as oil slicks,
1252
collect surface samples, and monitor air pollution over the oceans.
WMO also monitors marine pollution in its Executive Committee's Panel
1253
on Meteorological Aspects of Ocean Affairs.
As for developing international environmental law of the sea,
WMO's role is subordinate to that of most IGOs. It does, however,
contribute to the development of a scientifically sound legal regime
for the control of atmospheric sources of marine pollution.
J. Conclusion
The work of global IGOs is an important part of the world
community's response to marine pollution. They have carried out res¬
ponsibilities to develop marine pollution control conventions. They
have drafted conventions and influenced their adoption. They have
engaged in a range of law-promoting actions. Though much of such
work fails, significant successes have occurred. Most IGOs have con¬
tributed to improving scientific capabilities in less developed
countries; some to the formulation of national environmental laws.
Knowledge of the sources and effects of marine pollution has been ad¬
vanced by IGOs through their own research programmes and by encouraging
and coordinating national investigations. They have helped make known
the values of the seas and the threats confronting this resource.
The prominent function IGOs play in the response to marine
pollution is reflected by Principle 25 of the Stockholm Declaration,
calling on states to ensure IGOs "play a co-ordinated, efficient and
1254
dynamic role for the protection... of the environment." And the
LOSC contains many references to IGOs and there is widespread opinion
1255
the treaty will enhance the role of IGOs. This is particularly
true with regard to the LOSC's marine environment protection provi¬
sions, Articles 207-237, which are replete with general references
to IGOs. The provisions look to IGOs for regulatory action, pollu¬
tion monitoring, information collection and dissemination, and
development assistance. Even without the LOSC, IGOs would continue to
increasingly contribute to man's response to marine pollution including the
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development of the international law of the sea.
This chapter reveals that under the broadly written constituent
instruments of the eight organisations, all have a mandate to protect
the marine environment. No general conclusions, however, can be drawn
about their legislative powers. IOC, IAEA, and UNEP have no law-making
powers. ISBA has legislative authority and the rest have degrees of
quasi-legislative competence. But of these, only IMO is significantly
involved in directly developing law protective of the marine environment.
The quasi-legislative powers of FAO, WHO, and WMO are either not exer¬
cised or do not reach marine polluting activities.
As for law-promoting activities, UNEP with its Regional Seas
Programme, is deeply and successfully involved, as has been IMO with its
adoption of guides and standards that often attract wide respect. Those
organisations without law-making and promoting activities or powers --
IOC, WHO, FAO, WMO, IAEA -- concentrate on a range of research and informa¬
tion work.
Despite this great mix of mandates and activities regarding
marine pollution, there is not necessarily disorder among them.
A study by Messrs. Kingham and McRae sought to determine which
IGO has lead responsibility to implement those LOSC provisions that
call on the "competent" IGO to develop rules to control each source of
1257
marine pollution. The criteria Kingham and McRae used for designating
an IGO as the lead one for a specific provision and source included its
constitutional mandate, existing activities, and general ability to
1258
undertake the tasks set forth in the LOSC. It may be a surprise
the study found few areas "in which major jurisdictional conflict is
likely to occur between organisations asserting competence in respect
1259
of particular provisions of the [LOSC]."
This chapter's review of the IGOs confirms this idea. Regarding
law-making and law-promoting, IMO is clearly the lead IGO for ship
pollution. The UNCLOS III Secretariat assured IMO the Conference
12 60
recognised IMO's competence here. In addition, IMO is the appro¬
priate IGO, along with the LDC's Consultative Meeting, to deal with
1261
dumping. ISBA will be the lead IGO for pollution from deepsea mining.
If the LOSC does not come into force, IMO, because of its expertise in
pollution from ships and its work with dumping, may be the lead organisa¬
tion, though UNEP has much to contribute. For land-based pollution, air
pollution, and pollution from offshore activities, UNEP is the lead
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law-making and law-promoting IGO.
These conclusions are illustrated in the following table that
shows the IGO with lead responsibility to develop law to control each
source of marine pollution. The table also lists IGOs with supporting
roles.
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPING LAW


















In sum, when considering which IGOs have primary responsibility
for regulating the sources of marine pollution, the divisions, based on
constitutions and activities, are fairly clear. Of course, regulation
is but a small part of the organisational network's response to marine
pollution. There is also the vast research and information work, but
even here there is some order.
ISBA has the responsibility to assess environmental implications
of deepsea mining and to monitor the effectiveness of mining rules. UNEP
which has a broad mandate to assess the environment, may have something
to contribute. UNEP's primary means of carrying out research is as
coordinator of its Regional Seas Programme. The RSP relies on other
IGOs and national institutions to do the actual work. Provided the
coordination is effective, there should be little overlap in the research
and information activities of the RSP's regional action plans.
As for the research and information work of other IGOs, WMO's
environmental work concentrates on studying the transfer processes of
air pollutants from land to sea and monitoring air pollution. FAO's
environmental work concerns the effects of pollutants on living resources
As most of man's fishing is near shore, FAO will be involved with those
sources of pollution effecting coastal areas, that is, land-based pollu¬
tion and dumping and, to a degree, offshore mining incidents and ship
pollution. Though other IGOs are also concerned with each of these four
sources, FAO is the only one concentrating on their effect on fish. WHO
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directs its research and information work on how man is effected by
pollution near shore. While this work, like FAO1s, centres on land-
based pollution, WHO approaches such pollution from a different angle --
human health. IAEA is concerned with radioactive waste and it reaches
the seas by dumping and directly from land. IOC has a broad science
mandate that includes marine pollution. But IOC's role is as a
coordinator of the activities of scientists, institutions, and states.
IMO's marine pollution research and information activities seem less
involved than those of other IGOs, being concentrated on studying
means to control ship pollution.
These conclusions on research and information responsibilities
are also illustrated by a table. Here, the primary IGOs remain the same
as those in the table on responsibilities for developing law, but the
supporting bodies increase markedly because most global IGOs are more
concerned with this aspect of marine pollution work than with rule¬
making .

















UNEP, IOC, WHO, FAO




IMO, WHO, FAO, IOC
UNEP, IMO, IOC
Although eight global IGOs operate in the area of marine pollution,
their responsibilities and activities are fairly distinct. This is not,
however, to say there are never jurisdictional squabbles or overlapping
activities. And there also remains another part of the organisational
network to consider, the regional European IGOs. As there are six of




THE EUROPEAN IGOs: MARINE POLLUTION ACTIVITIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CAPABILITIES TO DEVELOP INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Introduction
The European IGOs discussed in this chapter are the EEC, the
Council of Europe, OECD, the ECE, Nordic Cooperation, and NATO's
Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS). The Oslo, Paris,
Helsinki, and Barcelona Conventions established IGOs as implementing
institutions, and though these bodies are regional, their activities
are not reviewed here because they were discussed in Chapter Six.
As with the global IGOs, two aspects of the European IGOs
are reviewed: their mandate and powers in the environmental field and
their marine pollution activities. These activities include law-making
and law-promoting and research and information. Reasons for undertaking
the review are also the same. It will determine how a selected part of
the organisational network at the regional level is responding to marine
pollution, what role these IGOs have in developing international environ¬
mental law of the sea, and gain an understanding of the coordination
issue.
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B. The European Economic Community
1. Mandate and Powers
The EEC seeks to establish a common market and harmonize its
member's economic policies, all with the purpose of promoting stability,
1263b
a better standard of living, and close relations. None of the ways
the EEC Treaty specifies how the organisation is to carry out its
functions refer to the environment (Art. 3). Yet the EEC has force¬
fully entered the field. Initially, questions were posed about the
1263c
EEC's mandate in this area. But these are seldom heard today and
there are several treaty provisions upon which the mandate is based.
The most important says that if the EEC Treaty does not provide the powers
needed to attain Community objectives, "the Council shall, acting unani¬
mously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
Assembly, take the appropriate steps" (Art. 235). Commentators and
1264
EEC practice interpret this article broadly, particularly since a
1972 summit when EEC states declared that economic expansion should in-
1265
elude giving particular attention to protecting the environment.
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Article 100 of the treaty has also been relied on and Article 84(2)
and a clause in the Preamble offer additional support for an environ-
1267
mental mandate. Each of these articles requires the Council to act
with unanimity. Furthermore, it has been the practice of the Council
1268
to use unanimity wherever vital interests of a state are at stake.
The unanimity requirement means the EEC is without quasi-legislative compe¬
tence in environmental matters.
Environmental activities are carried out by the EEC's Council,
Commission, Parliament, and, in a sense, its Court of Justice. The
Commission consists of fourteen individuals who act independent of state
loyalties (Art. 10). The Commission has the exclusive right to propose
legislation, negotiate international agreements, and has a duty to ensure
observance of Community law. When compared to the legislative competence
of the Council, however, the Commission's is limited, typically to second-
„ • • • 1269
ary matters such as administration.
The Council, the principle legislative organ, is composed of
a delegate from each member state (Art. 146(2)). It usually meets at
the Foreign Minister level, though specialized meetings are held with
the Ministers of a particular sector, such as the environment. The Council
may adopt Regulations that are binding in their entirety and directly
applicable to all member states; issue Directives that are binding as to
the result to be achieved by each state to which they are addressed;
take Decisions that are binding in their entirety upon those to whom
they are addressed; and make Recommendations and deliver Opinions that
are not binding (Art. 189). The EEC thus appears to have extensive leg¬
islative power. Furthermore, EEC legislation is enforceable in the courts
1270
of the members and prevails over conflicting national law. Imple¬
mentation and enforcement, however, are left to the members (Art. 192).
Though if a state fails to observe EEC law the Commission shall deliver
1271
an opinion and may take the matter before the Court of Justice (Art. 169).
The EEC Assembly, elected by popular vote, has no legislative
powers. While empowered to dismiss the Commission, it has never done
so. It is to be consulted on legislative proposals and may call on the
Commission to explain its actions. The Assembly has a significant role




A number of factors inhibit the EEC's environmental work. A
disadvantage lies in the slow pace by which it reaches decisions, parti-
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cularly in the Council. This is due, in part, to the different
institutional and administrative structures of member states and differ-
1274
ent philosophies in dealing with pollution. Nor is the Commission
1275
immune from a sluggish pace. The Directive on Environmental Impact
1276
Assessment went through 23 drafts in the Commission. Furthermore,
the scope of the EEC's environmental work is all out of proportion with
1277
the staff size and money allotted to carry it out. Another problem
is the unanimity requirement for almost all environmental decisions of
the Council. Obtaining unanimity is difficult and has led to most
1278
adopted measures being of the lowest common denominator. In fact,
the EEC's environmental work of the 1970s has been criticized by the
• 1279 , 1280Commission and implicitly by the Council.
Nonetheless, the EEC has adopted many environmental acts, the
full affect of which cannot be immediately determined. One environ¬
mentalist has said this legislative work "is second to none," though
1281
implementation is weak. Another environmentalists says EEC Direc¬
tives and other actions, when looked at as a whole, have provided "a
1282
greater covering of legislation than would have been the case otherwise."
1283
The EEC's first environment programme was adopted in 1975
1284
and the second in 1977. The Third Environmental Action Programme
was adopted in 1982 for the 1982-1986 period. ^84a T^e programme and
1285
Council Resolution approving it are the key reference documents
1286
for the future."
The third programme does not contain a detailed list of pro¬
jects, nor does it emphasize pollution control. It is philosophical,
setting forth a policy emphasizing that environmental protection is
1287
a key element in all Community socio-economic policies. Thus, en¬
vironmental considerations must be included in the planning of all its
work. This new stress implies a broader environmental role since the
EEC will assess environmental ramifications of all its activities
rather than viewing its pollution control work as self-contained. Even
so, work on specific projects began under the earlier environmental
programmes will continue, supplementing the new, broader environmental
1288
perspective.
Air pollution, waste management, and protection of the EEC's
1289
seas will likely be high on the EEC's agenda during the next decade.
The first two, particularly waste management, have a relation to healthy
seas and specific activities for marine pollution appear to be a major
1290
part of the EEC's work. The Council Resolution approving the third
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environmental programme says it is important Community actions be
carried out in the Mediterranean region and in combating freshwater and
1291
marine pollution. Other parts of the resolution, the programme
itself, and the Commission say the EEC will be active in protecting the
1292
Mediterranean and North Sea.
Well over a hundred legal instruments concerning the environ-
1293
ment have been adopted by the EEC, many are binding Directives. The
water Directives are most relevant for the thesis and fall into three
categories: the "Dangerous Substances Directive," those setting quality
objectives for water used for particular purposes, and those dealing
1294
with industrial processes that cause water pollution.
The "Dangerous Substances Directive" seeks to control discharge
of substances into the aquatic environment by aiming for the elimination
of pollution caused by black list substances and reduction of pollution
1295
caused by other substances. The Directive is a framework, to be
implemented by subsequent Directives and several have been adopted, in-
1296
eluding Directives on cadmium and mercury discharges.
The second category of water Directives lay down quality ob¬
jectives for water used for particular purposes, such as Surface Water,
1297
Bathing Water, and Shellfish. Five Directives have been adopted
in this category and each has been implemented or is in the final
^ , • 1-298
stages of being so.
The third category relates to certain industrial processes.
Though the application of Directives to specific industries was envisaged,
there is only one Directive of this type, on waste from the titanium
„ 1299dioxide industry.
The EEC's marine pollution activities also involve scientific
1300
work. ECC has an important international role, represented by its
participation, either as a contracting party or observer to the ODC,
ECE Air Pollution Convention, Paris Convention of Land-Based Sources,
Barcelona Convention, OILPOL Convention, MARPOL 73/78, and the 1976
1301
Bonn Convention to protect the Rhine against chemical pollution.
It has signed the Barcelona Protocol on Protected Areas, UNEP's Regional
Seas Convention for the Caribbean, and 1983 Bonn Agreement for coopera-
1302
tion in dealing with North Sea pollution by harmful substances, as
well as the LOSC. The EEC will use its influence to ensure plans
agreed at the international level, such as those of UNEP, are imple-
, 1303
mented. The third environmental programme says environmental pro¬
tection should be regarded as an integral part of the EEC's development
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policy. The organisation is also capable of influencing environ¬
mental policies of its trading partners by requiring that imports meet anti¬
pollution standards and is able to help developing states absorb costs
1305
of better environmental policies.
C. The Council of Europe
1. Mandate and Powers
The Council of Europe seeks to achieve a greater unity between its
members for the purpose of safeguarding their common ideals and facili-
1306
tating economic and social progress. To qualify for membership a
state must ensure its citizens enjoy fundamental freedoms (Art. 3).
"Human rights, individual freedoms and pluralistic democracy are the
1307
Council's raison d'etre." The Council of Europe's Statute lacks a
reference to the environment. Nonetheless, the Council has entered the
field, but because of the broadness of the Council's purposes in pro¬
moting a political philosophy, it devotes little time and few resources
to the environment.
The Committee of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly are the
Council of Europe's main organs. Governments are directly represented
in the Committee of Ministers. Its purpose is to further the organisa¬
tion's aim by concluding conventions or other agreements, adopting
common policies, and making recommendations to member states (Art. 15).
Any convention or agreement it adopts is only binding on a state rati-
1308 1309
fying it. The adoption of common policies is seldom realized.
Its recommendations are non-binding and require unanimous vote (Art.
20(a)). The Committee of Ministers is thus without legislative powers,
so too with the Parliamentary Assembly. Its membership is either
elected by or appointed from the parliaments of member states. The
Assembly, by two-thirds vote, may adopt recommendations directed to
the Committee of Ministers (Arts. 22, 23(a), 29). It may also adopt
^. . 1310non-binding resolutions.
Member governments attach "little importance" to the Assembly's
1311
work, and it may become "a well-meaning academic exercise whose fine
1312
words are written on the wind." For example, an Assembly report on
action taken by European states to prevent coastal pollution comments
that "'the many proposals and warnings addressed to governments by the
1313
Parliamentary Assembly...[have had] very limited success.'" Another
example is found in a report prepared for the Council of Europe on ship
pollution. The author made seven suggestions of how the Council might
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ensure the proper labelling of hazardous ship cargo. The first few
words of each exhibit the fraility of the Council. They are: "En¬
deavour to promote... Exhort shipping companies to ... Encourage central
governments... Campaign in favour of... Encourage further research into...
1314
Study further...Make better known..." Prior to the writing of the
report, the Council sent regional authorities a questionnaire about
1315
coastal pollution. The response was disappointing and the author
wondered: "is it lack of faith in the Council of Europe's capacity to
,.1316
do something about this situation?
Probably the best hope for effective environmental action by
the Parliamentary Assembly is through the development in Parliamentarians
of an appreciation of supranational interests that, upon return to their
home parliaments, they may interject into national debates, policies,
and law.
2. Activities
Most of the Council of Europe's work is spent on human rights and
on social, educational, cultural, health, and legal affairs. Protecting
the environment is not a paramount concern and marine pollution is of
subsidiary concern in the environemntal work.
Involved in environmental issues are these Council of Europe
bodies : the European Committee for the Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources, the European Conference of Regional and Local Authori-
1317
ties, and the European Information Centre for Nature Conservation.
None of these devotes its work primarily or even significantly to marine
pollution.
By 1981 the Council had adopted 108 treaties. None are directed
1319
specifically at marine pollution and only a few indirectly. In 1974
it was said the significance of the Council's conventions "is not very
1320
impressive." This assessment is still valid.
The Council of Europe has sponsored conferences, undertaken
1321
studies, and produced reports on marine pollution problems. But
1322
the work is not great. Furthermore, it would appear by a 1982
review of twenty years of the Council's scientific studies in the envi-
1323
ronmental field that none have addressed marine pollution.
The Council of Europe may be able to spur environmental action
by member states through its sponsorship of regular meetings of ministers
and authorities. Though the aim of the conferences is to work towards
1324
cooperation and harmonization of environment policies, they have
hardly reached the latter goal. More realistically, the conference
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enables environment ministers to discuss common problems, exchange
experiences, and, it is hoped, develop guidelines for common policies.
There have been four conferences thus far. The first three had little
1325
to do with marine pollution. The fourth, held in 1984, addressed
1326
conservation of coastal areas, river banks, and lake shores. Little
seems to have been accomplished by it, except the adoption of innocuous,
... . • 1327
non-binding recommendations.
The conference was a part of the Council's "Water's Edge" pro¬
gramme that conerns coasts, river banks, and lake shores. It is
1328
largely a public information campaign. Such work is probably well-
suited for the Council, for perhaps its role in marine pollution is in
1329
arousing public awareness.
D. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
1. Mandate and Powers
The aims of OECD, which includes the non-European countries
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States, are to
achieve high economic growth and employment, a rising standard of
1330
living, and expansion of world trade. Though the concerns of OECD
are economic, it does address environmental issues. A mandate to do
so may be found in several of the OECD aims and functions, such as the
objective to promote efficient use of resources. Furthermore, differ¬
ences in environmental laws affect trade between OECD states and may
. ^ . 1331
give rise to non-tariff barriers.
OECD functions through a Council, the decisionmaking organ
composed of representatives of each state (Arts 6-7). A fourteen member
Executive Committee, along with numerous other committees carry out
functional work (Art. 9).
The OECD Council is able to take Decisions (Art. 5(a)). They
are binding only upon ratification and adoption requires approval of
1332
all members. The Council may also adopt non-binding Recommendations
1333 1334
(Art. 5(b)). These also require unanimity. Typically, Recom¬
mendations include an obligation on states to inform OECD of their res-
1335
ponse to it. This, together with the rule that the position taken
vis-a-vis a recommendation obliges a member to take a non-contradictory
position in other IGOs, distinguishes Recommendations from mere sug-
1336
gestions. In fact. Recommendations "frequently have considerable
1337
political weight." Even so, the need for ratification and unanimity
mean OECD is without even quasi-legislative power.
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The limited law-making powers OECD has are little used. The
Organisation functions more as a forum of reflection and debate on
1338
economic policy than as a legislative body. The use of potentially
binding Decisions has been largely replaced with declarations and
1 , 1339pledges.
2. Activities
In 1970 OECD established an Environment Committee. There is also
an Environment Directorate within the Secretariat. The Environment
Committee's mandate was renewed in 1975 with these duties: examine prob¬
lems on the protection and improvement of natural and urban environments
and propose solutions to them, consult on environmental actions taken or
proposed by members and assess their results, provide guidelines to pre¬
vent or minimize potential conflicts between members in the use of shared
resources or as the result of national environmental policies, and en-
. . 1340
courage harmonization of policies. Projects of the Environment
Committee usually result in comprehensive reports containing conclusions
for governments to consider when formulating and implementing environ-
1341
mental policies. These conclusions also may lead to Decisions or,
. 1342
more likely, Recommendations by the Council.
During its first decade the Environment Committee concentrated
on programmes that helped states deal with urgent environmental problems,
1343
such as PCBs, and developed useful guidelines for environmental
1344
policy, such as the Polluter Pays Principle for liability. However,
a new approach to pollution is underway. Preventive work now receives
. . 1345
greater emphasis than reactive policies. Presently, OECD stresses
the early integration of environmental concerns into decisions likely
to have significant environmental impact.
A survey of OECD annual reports for 1981, 1982, and 1983 reveals
several things about its environmental work. One, it is highly active
in this field. OECD has published a number of useful books on a wide
range of environmental topics. Ongoing projects involve hazardous
1346
waste, environmental impacts of agriculture, and acid rain. Two,
much of the OECD's environmental work relates to economics. For ex-
ammple, it has studied the relation between environmental policies and
decline in industrial productivity and assessed the monetary benefits
1347
of environmental regulation. Three, few of the Environment Committee's
projects directly concern marine pollution. The Nuclear Energy Agency
(NEA), a subsidiary body of the OECD created to develop nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes, is, however, involved with the oceanic disposal
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of radioactive waste and the Environment Committee cooperates with NEA
1348
on this.
Important NEA work for the purposes of this thesis involves
1349
waste management. A 1977 OECD Decision established a mechanism
1350
for the consultation and surveillance of sea dumping. Although the
Decision requires NEA to establish standards for safe dumping, it does
not limit dumping radioactive waste and assumes such dumping may be
safely done. The Decision also requires NEA to assess the suitability
of dumping sites proposed by states. Dumping states are to apply NEA
standards, take into account IAEA standards, notify NEA of their inten¬
tion to dump, supply it with certain information on the waste and
dumping operation, and allow a NEA representative to observe the dumping.
In 1981 a four year scientific research and environmental sur¬
veillance programme was launched aimed at assessing the impact on the
1351
biosphere of radioactive contaminants from sea disposal. Also
under way is a technical study of the means of emplacing high-level
1352
radioactive waste under the seabed. In sum, NEA work addresses
the engineering feasibility and environmental safety of oceanic radio¬
active waste disposal, with legal considerations of less prominent
concern.
Other than radioactive waste disposal work, OECD is little in¬
volved in marine pollution, nonetheless, it has a role to play. Beyond
NEA activities, this role has two facets. OECD is capable of influencing
1353
national policies and laws that will benefit the marine environment,
as was the case with the PCBs Decision. In 1976 the Organisation adopted
principles upon which the coastal protection, management, and develop¬
ment policies of members should be based and while non-binding they




legislation relating to coastal areas." In addition, it has un r¬
taken "country analyses" of Sweden, Japan, New Zealand, and Greece.
The environmental policies of these states were examined by policy-
1356
makers of other countries. Such objective appraisals can improve
the policies and give other states the opportunity to benefit from the
experiences of the country examined. It is hoped, other work of OECD,
such as its efforts on an international code of behaviour for trans-
1357
frontier pollution and its "Equal Access Principle," will become a
part of international law and, if so, the marine environment will benefit.
These are a few examples of the potential of OECD to develop international
environmental law that will benefit the seas.
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E. The Economic Commission for Europe
1. Mandate and Powers
The ECE bears some resemblance to OECD in that its membership includes
some non-European countries, Canada and the United States, and it is
1358
primarily concerned with economic matters. While there is little
in its constituting instrument giving the ECE an environmental mandate,
it is nonetheless active in the field.
The work of ECE was given a boost by the 1975 Final Act of the
1359
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Conference
was attended by nearly all ECE members and its Final Act addresses a
host of European issues, including environmental ones, and seeks their
study and resolution by regional cooperation. The ECE asserts that the
Act "had a powerful impact on the intensity and scope of the process of
1360
co-operation in the ECE." Indeed, the Act states its signatories
intend to implement it partly within the framework of existing IGOs,
1361
such as the ECE. Some specific areas where cooperation is called
for are control of air pollution and water pollution, fresh water use,
1362
and protection of the marine environment.
As for the ECE's legislative powers, it may take "no action in
respect to any country without the agreement... of that country," and
its recommendations are non-binding (Arts. 1, 4). Furthermore, it has
1363
been the long practice of ECE to work by consensus.
Despite these limitations the ECE has been influential in develop¬
ing national and international environmental law. Some ECE sponsored
seminars on pollution have gone beyond adopting recommendations and
have developed guidelines that "are frequently used by national and
1364
other levels of government when framing new legislation or regulations."
13 65
The ECE has also formulated a number of agreements. A convention of
significance for the marine environment that the ECE saw to adoption and
has implemented is the ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution, discussed in Chapter Six. Work under this treaty is the ECE's
main activity in developing international environmental law.
2. Activities
The scope of the ECE's activities has broadened significantly
since its early years when post war political tensions limited it to
1366
technical aspects of reconstruction. Since then it has gradually
incorporated programmes on comprehensive, interdisciplinary problems.
Environmental work in the ECE began earlier than in most IGOS.
In 1957 it studied means to prevent pollution of European waterways
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1367
caused by inland vessels. This work has been continued and ex-
13 68
panded in the ECE's Committee on Water Problems, established in 1968.
There are a number of other subsidiary bodies that address environmental
issues. For example, the committees on Agricultural Problems, Chemical
Industries, Coal, Electric Power, and Gas have all examined pollution
1368
problems caused by activities within their competence.
The most important ECE body for environemntal purposes is the
Senior Advisers to ECE Governemnts on Environmental Problems that held
its first session in 1973. This group's work has experienced the same
shift in emphasis as have other European IGOs, that is, it gives in¬
creasing attention to preventing pollution rather than reacting to it.
Thus, the Senior Advisers pursue the examination of the relationship
between environmental quality and socio-economic development, procedures
for environmentally sound planning, and methodologies for environmental
1370
impact assessment.
In 1984 the Senior Advisers adopted a work programme for 1984
to 1988 with these general subject areas: (1) Policy and Management
Problems, (2) Environmental Impact Assessment, (3) Air Pollution, (4)
Low and Non-Waste Technology and Re-Utilization and Recycling of
1371
Waste, and (5) Resource Problems. While (1), (2), and (4) have an
indirect, yet important, relation to marine pollution, of more rele¬
vance to this thesis are Air Pollution and Resource Problems.
Air pollution received early attention by the ECE with its work
1372
on abatement techniques. But its shining success is the Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution Convention. Much of the Senior Advisers
work takes place under this treaty and includes projects on monitoring
and evaluating long-range transportation of air pollutants, desulphuri-
zation of fuels and combustion gases, and developing and updating guidelines
1373
for control of emissions from certain industries.
Within the programme on Resource Problems, there is a section on
1374
transboundary water pollution. Here the Senior Advisers cooperate
with the Committee on Water Problems and work in this area is potentially
of great significance for the marine environment. In 1980 ECE approved
a Declaration on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, including
1375
Transboundary Pollution. The Declaration says governments sharing
water resources should undertake cooperative actions to improve water
quality and control pollution, especially through information exchange
and early consultation in regard to activities likely to have signifi¬
cant adverse effects on water quality in other states. The Water
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1376
Committee is working on implementing this Declaration. Besides
1377
studying pollution reduction techniques for particular industries,
every three years the Committee holds a policy debate on action taken
1378
by states to implement principles of the Declaration. The Committee
also has a programme -- in which several states have expressed a
willingness to participate -- on monitoring and evaluating transboundary
1379
water pollution. The Water Committee has also studied aspects of
marine pollution, making, for example, economic assessments of damages
caused to the marine environment by land-based sources and determining
1380
which substances among these sources are harmful to the ocean.
Much of the work of the ECE involves seminars, studies, exchange
of views, and information gathering and dissemination. ECE bodies do
not make law and rarely set out to promote law. Nonetheless, the ECE
does have a potential role as the forum wherein land-based pollution
might be controlled. ECE continues to work extensively in this area.
Some of its members argue that the Declaration of Policy on Prevention
and Control of Water Pollution is the starting point in a gradual
process of international legal regulation of transfrontier water
pollution, eventually leading to a transboundary water pollution con¬
vention. Such a treaty would directly benefit the oceans because trans¬
boundary water pollution mainly refers to river pollution and rivers
are the main source of ocean pollution.
F. Nordic Cooperation
1. Mandate and Powers
Nordic cooperation "rests on a foundation of mutual affinity of
the Nordic peoples, an outgrowth of close historical, cultural and
linguistic ties. Secondly, there is a pronounced community of values
1381
in legal, social and religious matter." Only recently, however,
has the longstanding cooperation been formalized, finding expression in
1382
the Co-operation Treaty of 1962 (revised in 1971 and 1974), the
1383
1971 Cultural Treaty, and the 1976 Nordic Environmental Protection
1384
Convention. Of these, the Co-operation Treaty is the basic docu¬
ment of Nordic unionism. Parties "shall endeavour to maintain and
further develop co-operation between the countries in the juridical,
cultural, social and economic fields and in questions of transport and
communication" (Art. 1). While Articles 4 and 6 on harmonizing national
law may be used to find a mandate for environmental action, in the 1974
revision of the Co-operation Treaty provisions concerning protection
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of the environment were introduced. Article 4 of the Cultural
Treaty provides a mandate for Nordic countries to carry out cooperative
marine science work.
In order to implement and extend Nordic cooperation under the
treaties, Nordic states are to continuously consult in the Nordic Council
1386
and the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM). The Nordic Council is an
1387
organ of collaboration for Nordic Parliaments. In 1971 the Council's
1388
Revised Statute became part of the Co-operation Treaty. The Council
is to be an initiating and advisory body on questions of Nordic coopera¬
tion (Art. 39). The Council has various committees, including the
1389
Social Affairs and Environment Committee. Nordic Parliaments elect
their representatives to the Council, which meets for one week each
1390 . . . 1391
year. The Council, while unable to make binding decisions, can
initiate and follow up cooperation efforts by issuing recommendations
1392
and statements to the NCM and Nordic governments. Such pronounce¬
ments are often effective as the NCM generally responds with appropriate
1393
measures as do the governments. This positive effect is due to
political realities. Although the Council is not a legislative body,
recommendations approved by a broad majority have considerable weight
1394
in the national Parliaments and governments. The Council may sub-
1395
mit questions to the NCM and governments. It also receives reports
1396
from the NCM on actions taken in response to Council recommendations.
The NCM is the ministerial level of Nordic cooperation. NCM's
purpose is to further cooperation between Nordic governments and between
these governments and the Nordic Council, and does so by putting propo¬
sals to the Council, administering Council recommendations, reporting
to the Council on the progress of joint Nordic projects, and overseeing
1397
Nordic undertakings in various areas. Significantly, the NCM is
1398
able to make Decisions. Decisions, which require unanimous approval,




Activities of Nordic cooperation are broad and include environ¬
mental matters. Nordic states are presently in the midst of their third
programme for cooperation in environmental protection. The first covered
1972-1977 and its chief objective was to prepare and implement a Nordic
1400
treaty on environmental protection. This was attained and the treaty
is discussed below. The second programme began in 1978 and involved
a number of particular projects with the objective of having the states
introduce similar environmental measures in many areas.^^ In 1978 the
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NCM's Programme for People and Resources was adopted that says "it is
1402
essential that an active environment policy should be pursued." "In
1982 there were activities in the following areas: research of water and
of the sea, air pollution, noise, waste and recirculation, testing and
checking of products, the natural environment and outdoor activities,
1403
ecological planning and environmental data. The list of projects
1404
in the present programme is nearly the same.
Regarding marine pollution, the NCM stated in 1978 that the work
protecting marine waters of the Nordic states is carried out "within
the framework of several international conventions and bilateral agree¬
ments, if need be, the [NCM] is prepared to take the initiative for addi-
1405
tional measures." This approach is reiterated in the 1983-1987 envi-
1406
ronmental cooperation programme. The ODC, Helsinki Convention, and
Nordic Environmental Protection Convention are likely the international
treaties referred to. Bilateral agreements the NCM probably had in
mind are the 1974 Oresund Agreement between Sweden and Denmark and a
1974 agreement between Finland and Sweden of the protection of the Gulf
of Bothnia. Thus, the marine environmental protection work of Nordic
cooperation will be largely conducted within the Oslo Commission and
the Baltic Sea Marine Environment Commission, the work of which was
discussd in Chapter Six.
Along with working to improve the marine environment within the
structure of international agreements, Nordic countries also intend,
as a part of their environmental programme, to investigate the effect
1407
of polluting substances on the marine environment. Also, the NCM
is preparing a report on the global environment that will include a
1408
study of the oceans.
A survey in the early 1980s on the effect of Nordic environmental
projects concluded they "are generally used in administrative decision¬
making or as a basis for further investigations. In some cases, the
1409
project results are used directly in legislation." Consequently,
Nordic states have developed consistent legislation and administrative
1410
rules in many areas. The NCM believes Nordic environmental coopera-
1411
tion has created a uniform basis for decisionmaking and one publi¬
cist writes that harmonized law is found in almost every legal field,
1412
including maritime law and protection against marine pollution.
The development of consistent national legislation has the potential
of creating a regional international environmental law of the sea.
3. The Nordic Environmental Protection Convention
The Nordic Environmental Protection Convention is not directly
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concerned with marine pollution. Basically, it requires environ¬
mental interests of all parties be given equal status in the national
legislation of each country. Parties must give citizens in other Nordic
states the same status as their own citizens with regard to environmental
problems. In particular, when a state is considering allowing environ¬
mentally harmful activities, it must assess the harm such action may
cause a neighbouring Nordic state, and this assessment must be made
on the same terms as if the problem would affect interests in the
country of origin (Art. 2). The treaty thus attempts to restrict trans¬
frontier pollution by requiring the potential harm of an actiivity be
examined with the same criteria as if the harm were to occur in the
polluting state. After such an assessment, the examining authority
must notify countries likely to be affected (Art.5).
Individuals affected by transboundary pollution are allowed to
bring legal action in the polluting state challenging the permissibility
of the activity and can claim compensation for any harm suffered (Art.
3). Furthermore, each state is to establish a Special Authority that
acts as a kind of ombudsman with standing, on behalf of its citizenry,
before the courts of a polluting state (Art. 4).
The treaty applies only to activities carried on at a fixed
installations. Thus, ship pollution is not covered. But land-based
sources are. The convention, which places no limits on polluting dis¬
charges, is far more procedural than substantive, opening as it does
national courts to foreign claimants and requiring a review of poten¬
tially harmful activities before permitting them.
G. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and its Committee on the
Challenges of Modern Society
1. Mandate and Powers
NATO is a security organisation with the purpose of defending
1414
Western Europe and North America from armed attack. NATO's Council
implements the North Atlantic Treaty and the North Atlantic Assembly,
made up of national legislators from member states, considers and de-
1415
bates problems of the alliance. The Assembly may direct recommenda¬
tions to the Council and resolutions to member governments and parlia-
1416
ments, but these are without legal effect. The Council is empowered,
by Article 9, to establish subsidiary bodies and this, coupled with
Article 2, enabled the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
(CCMS) to be created. Article 2 states: "The parties will contribute
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toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international
relations... by promoting conditions of stability and well being...."
The idea for CCMS was President's Nixon's. In 1969 he asked
for the creation of "'a committee... to explore ways in which the experi¬
ence and resources of the Western nations could most effectively be
marshalled toward improving the quality of our peoples' and to help
20th century man to learn 'how to remain in harmony with his rapidly-
1417
changing world.'" That same year the Council established CCMS with
these objectives:
[T]o examine methods of improving exchanges of views and
environmental experiences amongst members of the alliance,
to consider specific environmental problems with the object
of stimulating action to treat them by member-governments,
to perform various tasks aimed at improving the existing
system of international environmental regulation, and to
coordinate the efforts of NATO members in this area. . .
CCMS is thus unique among European IGOs discussed in this chapter, it is
the only one solely concerned with environmental pollution.
The CCMS is not empowered to convene international conferences
or draft treaties and it has no legislative authority. It is a research
institution. Based on its research, it may adopt resolutions and recom¬
mendations for the NATO Council's consideration. CCMS resolutions ap¬
proved by the Council require NATO members to press for particular action
1419
in other international fora. CCMS recommendations approved by the
Council are not binding, yet CCMS requires that a review of national
actions to implement recommednations be conducted under its auspices, a
mechanism capable of producing pressure influencing compliance. Recom¬
mendations, however, are not far-reaching, for NATO reigidly adheres to
decision by consensus, that is, CCMS only acts if all members concur and
the Council only accepts CCMS recommendations if all members agree, and
, . , , 1420
even then recommendations are subject to approval by governments.
2. Activities
CCMS annually sponsors a meeting of environmental ministers that
allows exchange of experiences and disucssion of common problems. But
its purpose is research, though CCMS does not itself do the research.
This work is decentralized and operates on four concepts: "pilot country
leadership, stimulation of national and international action, open parti-
1421
cipation and results, and follow-up..." Project proposals are made
by a NATO state or CCMS but it is up to a single state to pilot, or
lead, the project. If the project is accepted by CCMS, countries in and
outside of NATO may participate. States may choose not to participate
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if the project is of no interest to them. Once completed, the results
are freely available, even to non-NATO states.
CCMS is not a bureaucracy devising projects that may or may not
be of interest to its membership. Members take the initiative and only
become involved in projects that interest them. Consequently, the pro-
1422
jects receive full support and are expeditiously carried out.
1423
CCMS does, however, have weaknesses. Some NATO countries
believe CCMS is the wrong forum to address environmental issues and give
it little support. It lacks a specific purpose to justify its existence.
What CCMS does can be accomplished within other IGOs or by informal
bilateral or trilateral arrangements.
It has been suggested that CCMS could play an important role were
1424
it to confine itself to projects not undertaken by other IGOs. It
is in a unique position, for example, to fully study the environmental
impact of military exercises and the oceanic disposal of munitions. It
might also coordinate the NATO naval network to monitor pollution and
conduct surveillance of shipping to ensure marine pollution control
treaties and national laws are obeyed.
As for the pilot studies undertaken so far, few relate directly
1425
to marine pollution. Peripherally relevant projects concern air
pollution and disposal of hazardous waste. Of direct relevance have been
studies of oil spills and the establishment of a "mathematical model of
1426
the North Sea." A recent project involves an effort to produce
a state-of-the-art survey of various teledetection techniques to detect
1427
marine pollution. Despite its overall lack of interest in marine
pollution, CCMS could study any aspect of it. It is well situated to
respond to neglected aspects or those requiring prompt study.
H. Conclusion
The marine pollution work of European IGOs discussed in this chap¬
ter is less considerable than that of the global IGOs. This may be
because some of their constituting instruments -- as those of ECE and
the Council of Europe -- do not give a mandate for environmental action.
OECD has only an implied mandate.
The law-making powers of European IGOs are weaker than their global
counterparts. The ECE, Council of Europe, and CCMS have no legislative
powers. Unanimity is required before EEC, OECD, and the NCM can take
binding decisions on the environment. Although OECD and the NCM seldom
use this limited power, the EEC vigorously uses it and has adopted
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many binding acts on environmental protection. The EEC is also a
party to several marine pollution control treaties and its environ¬
mental efforts also go on under these.
By a number of means the European IGOs seek to promote environ¬
mental law. Nordic states have adopted a good deal of similar national
environmental law, some ECE guidelines have been adopted into national
law, and much of OECD's environmental work seeks to promote stronger
national environmental law.
The Council of Europe and CCMS are not very active in marine pollu¬
tion research and information activities. Even OECD (at least outside
of its NEA), Nordic Cooperation, and the ECE do not direct much of this
kind of work to marine pollution. Only EEC is significantly involved.
Overall, these European IGOs are only marginally concerned with
marine pollution. Even the EEC, which does the most, only gives less
than 1% of its budget to the Commission's Environment Directorate, and
only a part of this can go to marine pollution. This does not mean
the member states of these IGOs are unconcerned about the oceans. Quite
the opposite is true. But this concern is mainly reflected in the work
of functional bodies created by the Oslo Dumping, Paris, Helsinki, and
Barcelona Conventions. Because of the work of these bodies there is
less reason and fewer benefits for the members of OECD, ECE, etc., to
become engrossed in marine pollution issues. Indeed, Nordic states
have decided their marine protection work will primarily be carried
out through the marine pollution control conventions. Also, OECD and
ECE include non-European countries that would have little interest in
participating in and funding projects to protect European seas. Perhaps
another reason why European IGOs are largely willing to leave matters
to functional bodies is that their members do not all border the same
seas. It is more logical and politically convenient to leave protection
of a sea to the functional body specifically set up to protect it,
rather than direct the work of an IGO toward a sea that does not border
all members of the IGO.
The European IGOs do, hwoever, have a role to play, but this is
more indirect. These organisations are able to study broader environ¬
mental problems than is a functional commission overseeing day to day
implementation of a treaty. OECD, for example, has studied and developed
the Polluter Pays and Equal Access Principles and is studying the legal
aspects of transfrontier pollution. The IGOs are also in a position to
promote international understanding and the usefulness of international
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cooperation. The Assemblys of EEC, Council of Europe, and NATO, and
the Nordic Council may foster a better understanding among states about
environmental problems. Members of these bodies may be motivated to,
upon return to their home states, advance national policies protective
of the environment, particularly regarding activities with transboundary
consequences. Several of the IGOs sponsor meetings of ministers of the
environment, allowing for exchange of experiences and discussion of
common problems. Some seek means by which environmental concerns can
be inserted into all facets of society. While such activities are not
specifically directed at marine pollution, they can contribute to
lessening the harmfulness of its sources.
Though it was possible to determine among global IGOs lead and
supporting responsibility for each source of marine pollution, this
cannot and need not be done with the European IGOs.
It cannot be done because, firstly, the jurisdictional arrange¬
ments among European IGOs are not as neat as with global IGOs. There are
global IGOs with specific mandates to deal with one type of marine pollu¬
tion; IMO with ship pollution, WMO with air pollution, ISBA with deepsea
pollution. European IGOs are not constituted to facilitate delineating
lead responsibility among them for each source of pollution. Second,
there are three seas around Western Europe. Each has distinct eco¬
systems and hydrographic characteristics. Each suffers from different
contaminants. Each requires different scientific study and law. It
would be a complex, expensive task for one European IGO to adequately
respond to the adminstrative, scientific, and legal needs for more than
one sea. Third, since there is no one IGO with members bordering just
one sea, decisions on how to handle problems of a marine region would
partially be made by states from another region, something that would
not be politically acceptable. Thus, one IGO could not be named the
lead IGO for a pollution source for all of Europe.
But there is no need to determine lead and supporting IGOs. Func¬
tional commissions have been given lead responsibility for all sources
in the Baltic Sea and Mediterranean Sea. The Oslo Commission and Paris
Commission have leads for North Sea pollution problems
Recognising that the European IGOs discussed in this chapter are
not, overall, greatly involved with marine pollution, and that European
states have already assigned important pollution control duties to func¬
tional commissions, the coordination picture becomes clearer. Though
since there are eight global IGOs and six regional IGOs involved, to
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varying degrees, with marine pollution, and at least five functional
bodies so involved, legitimate questions about coordination may be
raised. The next two chapters study the means by which these organisa¬
tions seek to collaborate and question the underlying ideas that more




MECHANISMS USED TO SATISFY COORDINATION DUTIES
A. Introduction
In Chapter Seven a review of the legal framework for organisational
collaboration was presented. This chapter studies the methods by which
IGOs carry out coordination duties.
Part of the coordinating machinery is institutionalized coordi¬
nation; that is, coordinating duties given a body created either speci¬
fically for coordination or for a number of purposes but including coordi¬
nation. Such bodies include the United Nations General Assembly, ECOSOC,
the Adminstrative Committee of Co-ordination (ACC), the Joint Group of
Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP), and the
Inter-Secretariat Committee on Scientific Programmes Relating to Ocean¬
ography (ICSPRO). UNEP's Regional Seas Programme (RSP) and the System
Wide Medium Term Environment Plan (SWMTEP) are also institutionalized
mechanisms designed to coordinate. An abundance of coordination, how¬
ever, is done by non-institutionalized means that comprise a host of
methods: meetings and joint sessions, joint committees and programmes,
informal consultation, harmonized reporting and procedures, exchanges,
and liaisons.
Not only has the international community's legal and organisa¬
tional response to marine pollution taken place on global and regional
levels, but, in general, its efforts to coordinate use different
methods at these levels. Global IGOs use institutionalized as well as
non-institutionalized methods. Nearly all inter-regional coordination,
on the other hand, is informal. There is yet another level upon which
coordination may be needed, that is, intra-regionally, particularly in
Europe which has many IGOs. Here the coordination is largely non-insti¬
tutionalized. In areas other than Europe there is less need for coordi¬
nation because, compared with Europe, most regions do not have the
number and varied nature of IGOS.
In the chpater's conclusion, reasons for the difference in coordi¬
nating machinery at the global and regional levels are offered. An
attempt is also made to analyze the effectiveness of the institution¬
alized and non-institutionalized approaches and, if the usefulness
differs, to answer why. These queries may also reveal differences in
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the purposes and functions of coordination at the regional and global
levels.
B. Coordinating Machinery
1. ECOSOC and the General Assembly
The United Nations Charter gives the General Assembly and ECOSOC
1428
general coordinating duties. The Charter, however, gives neither
body the authority to take binding decisions on IGO coordination. Rather,
their coordinating role is to be conducted by consultation and recom¬
mendation .
Although ECOSOC did negotiate the relationship agreements, took
the initiative to establish the ACC and has contributed to more cohesion
in administrative matters, its efforts to coordinate programmes have been
unsuccessful even though it -- as envisaged by the Charter — was to play
a key role here. This negative opinion of ECOSOC "is the quasi-unanimous
assessment which one encounters in governmental, intergovernmental and
secretariat circles of the UN system as well as in academic studies and
1429
publications." ECOSOC has not even taken charge of coordinating
1430
its regional economic commissions. In a 1970 resolution ECOSOC itself
admitted its work on coordination has not substantially improved collab-
1431
oration. At the time of the Stockholm Conference the ineffectiveness
1432
of ECOSOC as a coordinating body "was very strongly felt." This is a
reason why an Environmental Coordinating Board was established within
1433 1434
UNEP. Many reasons are given for the failure of ECOSOC to coordinate,
but the fundamental one is that it was given few substantive powers to
1435
carry out this task. Recognising ECOSOC's failure to coordinate, it
is probably of small consequence it gives only irregular attention to
1436
ocean matters.
The General Assembly has been much less concerned with coordina¬
tion than ECOSOC, being preoccupied with economic and political activi¬
ties. When it does address coordination it criticizes and recommends,
1437
but on the whole has played an insignificant role. Even if the Assembly
did seek to play a wider role there are obvious limits to the extent to
which co-ordination can be effectively achieved through the debates and
1438
recommendations of a large deliberative body; one without expertise
in understanding the relative value of the wide-ranging marine pollution
activities and deciding what new programmes ought to be undertaken.
It is, however, probably true that the nonbinding recommendations
of ECOSOC and the General Assembly calling for cooperation have kept the
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United Nations bodies and specialized agencies constantly aware of the
1439
coordination issue, and in this indirect way further greater order.
2. The Administrative Committee on Coordination
a. Introduction
To carry out coordination duties called for by the Charter, in 1946
ECOSOC requested the Secretary-General to establish a standing committee
of administrative officers consisting of himself and those of the
specialized agencies for the purpose of taking all steps to insure the
1440
most effective implementation of the relationship agreements. Con¬
sequently, the ACC began its work in 1947. It is not an organ of ECOSOC;
the ACC derives its authority from the powers of its members as chief
1441
executive officers of their IGOs.
The relationship agreements each contain an undertaking by the
agencies to cooperate with any organ ECOSOC sets up for furthering
collaboration. This provision has been understood to relate primarily
1442
to the ACC, which is also a device through which the agencies dis¬
charge their constitutional obligations to cooperate with one another.
1443
What began in 1947 as a small group with five members, has
greatly expanded. Along with the United Nations Secretary-General, the
heads of all the specialized agencies are members, as are the leaders
of the World Food Programme and the General Agreement on Tariff and
Trade and ten United Nations bodies, such as UNEP, UNIDO, and UNCTAD.
Matters are complicated even further since certain United Nations Under
Secretaries-General attend ACC meetings as do the Chairmen of the General
Assembly's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
and Joint Inspection Unit and the Executive Secretaries of the five
regional economic commissions of the United Nations. At times the heads
1444
of regional IGOs have been invited. Sometimes 50 to 60 people are
1445
present. This great mix of individuals has made the meetings less
informal and too large and heterogeneous to be an effective coordinating
v, a 1446body.
The tasks of the ACC for inter-secretariat cooperation have never
been formally stated, thus the 1946 ECOSOC resolution, referred to above,
1447
is its mandate. In its early years the ACC concentrated on organisa¬
tional and adminstrative matters, such as personnel, statistical, and
1448
financial matters. Though it also sought to establish a coordinated
1449
programme throughout the system, it was unable to agree on prior¬
ities. In 1948 it said its efforts to do so would take "'the form of a
continuous flow of relatively small decisions, all arriving at the most
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economical use of available resources and at the application of a sound
1450
financial policy.'" Acceptance of this ad hoc, incremental approach
to setting priorities -- which is yet today the ACC1s position -- means
1451
there is no general discussion of priorities in the United Nations system,
b. The ACC's Prior Consultation Procedure
Although it has abandon attempts to set priorities, the ACC tried
to develop a systematic prior consultation procedure by which, it hoped,
agencies will themselves bring order to the organisational network. Prior
consulations refer to consultations among IGOs that precede or accompany
the preparation of work programmes and budgets and aim at avoiding dupli-
1452
cation in these programmes and at harmonizing them.
In 1950 ECOSOC requested the Secretary-General and the ACC to make
arrangements to ensure programmes that concern more than one IGO be the
1453
subject of inter-agency consultations prior to their adoption. The
arrangements adopted in response did not achieve their objective and in
1969 an ECOSOC committee recommended each draft work programme should,
as soon as possible, be sent with a request for comments to all IGOs
1454
having programmes in the same or related areas. The ACC responded
with a new procedure but in 1977 said the effect of this response on
1455
programming was "very limited." The problem was that consultation,
though prior to final acceptance of the programme by the governing body,
occurred after the programme and budget had been formulated by the
secretariat. The draft being the final product on a long process of
internal examination and decision was not easily modified. The fault
with prior consultation was that it applied to the last stage of the
1456
programming process.
Nonetheless, the ACC decided to keep the procedure with the idea of
improving it and decisions made in 1981 on the procedures are those cur-
1457
rently in practice. These include an earlier circulation of pro¬
grammes. Rather than waiting until the programme is finalized and diffi¬
cult to change, there may be a less formal circulation of draft programmes
1458
to interested agencies that may comment on the draft. Informal bi-
1459
lateral consultations between programme managers is encouraged. In
some areas the need for prior consultation might be sufficiently great
to require a more formal process of consultation and it is suggested
1460
standing inter-agency bodies serve as a vehicle for such consultation.
Besides these innovations the old prior consultation procedure of cir¬
culating the final programme proposals throughout the network continues.
It remains to be seen whether the agencies will carry out the sug-
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gestions and whether they will make a difference. The approach is
sensible. The agencies are able to know what others intend to do and
can structure their programmes to complement one another. They will
also be able to settle jurisdictional feuds if they are recognised and
discussed prior to formal acceptance and implementation of activities.
c. The ACC's Subsidiary Bodies: The Sub-Committee on Marine Affairs
and the Designated Officials for Environmental Matters
. , 1461
The ACC meets three times a year for short periods. Its prepara¬
tory work and much of its substantive work is done by officials within
the United Nations Secretariat and deputies of the executive heads of
the agencies. Much of the work takes place within the ACC's Consulta¬
tive Committee on Substantive Questions (CCSQ). There are two branches
of the CCSQ, one for Operational Activities (CCSQ(OPS)) and one for Pro-
1462
gramme Matters (CCSQ(PROG)).
Subsidiary bodies of the ACC have also been specifically concerned
with oceans and the environment, and the two to be discussed here are
the Sub-Committee on Marine Affairs and the Designated Officials for
Environmental Matters (DOEM).
Formal cooperation in ocean affairs began in 1960 with the ACC1s
establishment of the Sub-Committee on Oceanography, entrusted with en-
1463
suring coordination between the agencies and the newly formed IOC.
After a name change in 1966, in 1977 the Sub-Committee's terms of
reference were broadened and its name again changed, this time to the
1464
Sub-Committee on Marine Affiars. The new terms of reference said
"marine affairs" includes all subjects the Sub-Committee identifies as
requiring coordination, such as the implications of and developments
in marine science and technology, interaction between uses of the sea
as reflected in the functions of United Nations organs, and examination
1465
of decisions of United Nations organs as they affect marine affairs.
Although this Sub-Committee was abolished in 1978 it will be useful
to look at it for doing so contributes to understanding the coordina¬
tion issue. Some of the Sub-Committee's more specific functions in¬
cluded: ensuring regular consultation and joint planning of programmes,
promoting systematic prior consultations and joint planning of pro¬
grammes, and identifing programme areas and activities where concerted
, . J. 1466
action would improve or expedite results.
Membership is the Sub-Committee was open to all agencies and regular
participants from its 1960 origin were the United Nations, FAO, UNESCO,
1467
IOC, WHO, WMO, and IMO. Its annual sessions were later attended by
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1468
IAEA, UNCTAD, UNEP and some regional economic commissions.
The 1977 terms of reference required the Sub-Committee to period¬
ically review its effectiveness, and it intended to make a preliminary
1469
evaluation in 1979 and a complete analysis in 1980. It also planned
to convene a special session in 1978 at which the agencies would examine
one another's draft programme forecasts for the 1980-1981 period to harm¬
onize activities and include needed coordination links before programmes
1470
were submitted to governing bodies. The coordination effort was to
1471
be evaluated in 1980.
These were worthwhile coordination projects and it appears the Sub-
Committee was well-placed to contribute to greater coherency among the
agencies concerned with marine pollution. All relevant ocean and envi¬
ronmental IGOs participated and its terms of reference were broad. But
the Sub-Committee was abolished in 1978 when the economic and social
1472
sectors of the United Nations were reorganised. The end came just
a year after its name was changed and its reponsibilities boradened.
During discussions on the extension of its competence, the United
Nations Secretariat referred to the Sub-Committee "as the central
1473
mechanism for interagency co-operation in the marine field." It
also accurately remarked that problems of coordination in marine affairs
1474
were becoming more complex. These comments make it all the more
curious that the ACC1s Sub-Committee on Marine Affairs was abolished
and that nothing replaced it.
During the reorganisation of the United Nations, the committee set
up by the General Assembly to advise on restructuring suggested the ACC's
1475
machinery be streamlined. The ACC had become unwieldly with too
1476 1477
many subsidiary bodies. Six sub-committees were abolished.
Various reasons are given why the Marine Affairs Sub-Committee was one
1478
of the six: it was ineffective; its work was done by other bodies
1479
making it superfluous; and because in the mid-1970s politicians did
not view marine affairs as particularly important the Sub-Committee
1480
lacked political support. The thread running through each opinion
is that the Sub-Committee was seen as dispensible, even though it was
"the central mechanism for interagency co-operation in the marine
field."1481
It is theoretically possible that questions of cooperation among
agencies concerned with oceans, and with marine pollution in particular,
might be discussed within the ACC's CCSQ(PROG), but a review of this
committee's reports of the past few years proves otherwise; nor has
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this organ concerned itself with general environmental problems.
Similarly, reports of ACC meetings for the past few years reveal a
lack of concern for coordination issues within the marine environment
1482
field. The ACC does, however, review the annual report of UNEP
but this is far from engaging in an effort to coordinate by prioriza-
1483
tion and rationalization. Since the ACC ' s actual coordinating
work in sectoral areas takes place in its subsidiary bodies, the abolish¬
ment of the Marine Affairs Sub-Committee means the ACC does not attempt
1484
to coordinate marine pollution work.
There is, however, the Designated Officials for Environmental
Matters (DOEM), an arm of the ACC and through which enhanced coordina¬
tion is possible. DOEM's predecessor was UNEP's Environmental Coordi¬
nating Board (ECB). The ECB was set up when UNEP was established and
its purpose was to coordinate environmental programmes at the secretariat
1485
level. This machinery was to link the work of specialized agencies.
When considering a coordinating organ for environmental matters the
General assembly thought it best to keep the ECB separate from the ACC
1486
so the environemntal coordination might develop its own identity.
In the mid-1970s the Governing Council of UNEP expressed its support for
1487
the ECB and viewed it as a success. Nonetheless, a few years after
1488
it was established the ECB was dissolved by the General Assembly.
Its functions were then given to the ACC. This switch by the General




the United Nations system should be merged with the ACC. In response,
the ACC set up DOEM to carry out this delegation of work.
While not all ACC members participate in DOEM, those with envi-
1491
ronmental interests do. DOEM meets about three times a year with
UNEP preparing for the meetings in consultation with members and chairing
1492
the meetings.
Through DOEM the organisations are briefed on conferences and
1493
meetings recently convened by UNEP and apprised of future ones.
DOEM's purpose is to review, programme, and coordinate environmental
matters of the entire United Nations system; prepare a report for the
ACC on its work; and designate the subjects and methods for undertaking
1494 . . .
thematic joint programming. Thematic joint programming exercises
have been held by DOEM that discuss detailed programme activities.
DOEM proper tends to concentrate more on policy matters than detail.and
this has involved it in the development of SWMTEP, discussed below, as
1495
well as in its continuing oversight.
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d. The Failure of the ACC
Deciding soon after its creation that it could not set programme
priorities, the ACC turned to the notion of prior consultation in the hop
of bringing about more order. It is unclear whether the new procedures
of prior consultation are better than the ineffective old ones. The ACC'
nearly two decade long experiment with coordinating issues in the Sub-
1496
Committee on Marine Affairs failed and today the ACC gives little
attention to marine affairs. Thus, if marine environment problems are
to be coordinated by the ACC, it is DOEM that must do it. DOEM, however,
has more to deal with than just marine pollution and whether it is accom¬
plishing its purpose is not clear. Some individual representatives to
1497
DOEM, however, believe it is, broadly speaking, a worthwhile body.
Set up to coordinate all aspects of the organisational network,
the ACC is generally regarded as a disappointment in coordinating sub¬
stantive programmes. Criticism of it ranges from the harsh, "[e]verybody
1498
knows that the ACC hasn't coordinated anything in its life..." to the
1499
mild, "[i]t has had only limited success... A strong criticism
comes from within the United Nations. ECOSOC's Committee on Programming
and Coordinating (CPC) typically views the ACC as unable to achieve
"genuine results...in terms of co-operation, that the procedure was com¬
plex and mysterious and that ACC papered over differences and concealed
1500
overlapping, parallelism and duplication."
There are a number of reasons for such assessments, including the
ACC's heterogeneity and unwieldly size. Representing as it does the frag
mented and decentralized system of agencies and United Nations bodies,
the ACC necessarily suffers the same strains that system places on coord¬
ination. The inherent limitations of the ACC have been summarized:
Because of its composition, it cannot easily take a
position detrimental to the interests of any agency
or in opposition to the wishes of its executive head;
it can be used as an instrument for economizing staff
and other resources but not as an instrument of budgetary
stabilization; it has no authority to decide on the dis¬
tribution of international resources as between different
purposes, or to settle jurisdictional disputes (though
it has usually been able to find practical solutions in
cases of overlapping competences). It cannot establish,
though it may influence, the policy decisions which are
fashioned through the inter-governmental organs of the
United Nations, the specialized agencies and the IAEA.
On the other hand, at least the "ACC provides a point of contact for
Secretariats at the Senior executive level. This in itself promotes
,.1502coordination.
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There also seems to be resistance among states to make the ACC
more effective. In 1969 the ACC in its report to ECOSOC said:
The main task of the ACC is to identify, for the benefit
of [ECOSOC] and the governing bodies of the organsations...the
major problems that confront the United Nations system of organi¬
sations, and collectively to tender advice on the manner in which
its resources should be used to resolve such problems in a con-
1503
structive manner.
This statement suggested a stronger coordinating role for the ACC but
"produced a lively reaction" in ECOSOC1s CPC, which saw the ACC attempting
1504
to exceed its bounds. The following summer ECOSOC "somewhat stiffly
reaffirmed that the policy-making role in the United Nations system is
the perogative of Member States in the competent organs of the system,
and instructed CPC to review the sphere of activities and competences
of ACC. That review led to a lengthy Council resolution...[that had as
1505
its] clear intention to relegate ACC to a more subordinate position."
ECOSOC is of course composed of representatives of states and a
study in the Netherlands International Law Review made interesting ob¬
servations about what various groupings of states think about the ACC
taking strong coordinating initiatives. Developing states are "very
volatile in their approach to intersecretariat co-ordination problems,"
with the majority not very interested in encroaching on the perrogatives
of IGOs; East European countries advocate a passive ACC, if only because
international civil servants should not play a political role; France
has more or less followed this approach; and a number of developed
countries have traditionally supported a strengthened, policy-formulating
1506 . ...
ACC. The reason for this latter position is because such states
bankroll IGOs they are more concerned with eliminating duplication.
Some developed countries, however, particularly the United States, are
1507
today less interested in a strong United Nations. "An effective
1508
ACC might, therefore, be no longer in thier interest;" better that
decisions concerning priorities and activities be made within each
agency than to give one body direction over the entire system.
In 1977 a United States Senate committee studied United States
participation in IGOs. The quote below is taken from the report's
discussion of the politicization of IGOs, but contains insights on the
rejection of the idea that all coordination is good.
[I]f the U.N. General Assembly or one of the organs associated
with it, such as ECOSOC, were made too effective a coordinating
organ, it might only make it easier for the politics that now
dominate the U.N. General Assembly to dominate the international
organisations as well....Any efforts at coordination might lead
to changes in the status or nature of certain international or-
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ganisations which the United States would consider against
its interests...
Several questions are thus presented by any proposals
to revitalize the coordinative role of the U.N and rationalize
its organisation. Where would greater rationalization of the
system be consistent with U.S. interests, and where would it be
1509
inconsistent?
Such state policies as these provide some substantiation to this
statement: "The record shows conclusively that, while the Agencies may
genuinely want to work together (and in so doing help be bring the
[system] under control), they have been frequently prevented from doing
so by forces outside their control."^'''''
In sum, the inherent nature of the ACC, the lack of authority to
make decisions, the fragmentary system it is a microcosm of, and the lack
of interest in states in inter-secretariat coordination all contribute to
1511
the "arid process" that is the ACC.
3. The Inter-Secretariat Committee on Scientific Programmes Relating
to Oceanography
ICSPRO was created in 1969 and arose out of a general dissatisfaction
with the ACC Sub-Committee on Marine Affairs and the belief a more
, 1512
specialized coordinating mechanism in marine science was needed.
ICSPRO's objective is to contribute to cooperation between organs of
the United Nations system concerned with oceanic programmes and thus
to avoid duplication and overlapping in the planning and implementation
1513
of marine science programmes. The committee consists of the United
Nations, FAO, WMO, and IMO, each of which are required by the Committee's
Terms of Reference to contribute to the Secretariat of the IOC, sustain
the work of the IOC through its programmes, and use the IOC as appro-
1514
priate for advice on matters of marine science. Although the ostensble
purpose of ICSPRO is to coordinate marine science activities, it does
seem more of a maintainence group for the IOC. "The members of ICSPRO
provide support to IOC's activities in the form of cooperation in
technical work, the provision of staff to...IOC, conference services,
1515
publication facilities, and other means as needed." A past IOC Secre-
1516
tary has referred to such duties by the members as "membership fees."
An ICSPRO document says: "The establishment of this Committee is a step
1517
forward in broadening the base of the IOC..."
Though concerned with a limited aspect of marine pollution, ICSPRO
has not developed into an effective coordinating mechanism and has not
met the expectation of an early IOC Secretary, Dr. Holt, who in 1970, a
year after ICSPRO was constituted, said ICSPRO would review the marine
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science programmes of the members and, if fully exercised, will provide
1518
a means for synthesis of all such programmes.
In 1980 some ICSPRO members said there was a need to improve its
1519
effectiveness. At the 1981 session the issue was again raised and
ICSPRO itself "felt a need to make itself more effective and define
better its relation to the IOC and to IOC programmes, as well as joint
1520
programmes amongst its members." The Committee1s Secretary made
1521
several insignificant suggestions for improving ICSPRO and all
ICSPRO did was express its desire "that it meet at least once a year
1522
so as to improve its effectiveness..." It was also decided each
ICSPRO member would evaluate the Committee's usefulness and propose
. 1523
ways of improving it. But in the reports of the two meetings
following the 1981 session no mention is made that these studies were
completed. The 1981 session also decided that the next meeting would
1524
include a review of the functions and work of ICSPRO. Ironically,
ICSPRO did not meet the following year because of "various scheduling
problems and the heavy pressure of work in the Secretariats of the...
1526
members of ICSPRO..." In other words, the members do not cosnider
ICSPRO important enough to make time and staff available to it when
other work is pressing.
When ICSPRO did meet again, that is, in 1983, it does not appear
1527
to have discussed its utility. Nor was the issue addressed at the
1528
1985 session. Thus, whatever brought about questions of ICSPRO's
usefulness in 1980 have not been remedied, at least nothing in the
reports of the Committee's meetings indicate changes have been made.
Indeed, matters seem to have worsened. IMO did not send a represen-
1529 1530
tative to the 1983 and 1985 sessions. At the 1985 meeting
the Secretary said IMO had withdrawn the staff member it had loaned
1531
IOC. IMO's rationale was that its increased workload required the
1532
transfer.
The points raised thus far indicate serious questions exist about
the success of ICSPRO as a coordinating body, a view supported by at
1533
least two commentators. Its usefulness is intrinsically hampered
by its limited mandate and membership. It does not seek to coordinate
the overall work of IGOs, just marine science and one must wonder how
scientific work can be easily extracted from the programme activities
such work is to complement. ICSPRO's underlying purpose of support for
IOC cannot help but make it a somewhat dubious institution in the eyes
of most IGOs. In fact, FAO and UNEP think "it is inconsistent with IOC's
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status as a 'joint specialized mechanism' under the ICSPRO agreement to
have its budget and programme subject to the overall authority of
1534
UNESCO..." FAO has also said that if ICSPRO remains part of UNESCO
1535
then UNESCO should provide it with the basic support. Furthermore,
ICSPRO is not empowered to delimit the mandates of its members or
direct their activiteis in any way. Its membership is limited because
WHO and IAEA, and more importantly, UNEP, are not members. The diffi¬
culties between UNEP and IOC have been of long duration. While it is
unclear from the IOC reports why UNEP is reluctant to join ICSPRO and
give the IOC more support, the reports do offer possible reasons.
In 1982 Poland's delegate to the IOC Assembly said that UNEP was
1536
more concerned with pollution on land and in coastal waters. As
IOC's interests in marine science are broader, perhaps there is a
fundamental distinction between the work and priorities of the two
IGOs that inhibits close collaboration. Dr. Keckes, the head of UNEP's
RSP, appeared before the IOC Executive Council in 1984 to discuss the
problem and said UNEP has problems understanding what role IOC's GIPME
1537
has in the RSP. He also said efforts at cooperation would be faced
with problems arising frcm the different geographic coverage of the IOC
regional subsidiary bodies and the UNEP regional seas structures, as
1538
well as from their mandates. Dr. Keckes also said the legal and
budgetary structure of the RSP made it relatively easy to cooperate on
1539
specific, well-defined projects. The implication is that IOC's
activities tend to be broad and less suited for the RSP. An observer
of and sometimes participant in the affairs of IGOs believes the problem
between the IOC and UNEP rests largely upon the clash of two forceful
personalities, Dr. Keckes and Mario Ruivo, head of the IOC. Whatever
the reason, UNEP does not intend to become part of ICSPRO and, as Dr.
Keckes told the IOC Executive Council, for the present UNEP considers
GESAMP as the most appropriate interagency body for matters relating to
1540
the scientific aspects of marine pollution.
ICSPRO is a weak coordinating body, designed more to buttress IOC
than to coordinate. A review of the reports of the past six ICSPRO
sessions give the impression it is somewhat sterile. Without IAEA and
WHO, ICSPRO lacks optimum membership and without UNEP, the IGO in the
vanguard of developing the international environmental law of the sea,
the Committee is incapable of achieveing much. For whatever reasons,
IMO seems to be in the process of cuttings its ties with ICSPRO. To
conclude, ICSPRO, although it has been in existence nearly two decades.
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seems to be searching for a role. It may also be a body coming to its
end.
4. The Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution
In 1968 FAO, IMO, WMO, and UNESCO established a joint working party
to advise on scientific questions concerning marine pollution. The next
154 1
year the group was institutionalized as GESAMP. Since then, WHO,
1542
IAEA, the United Nations, and UNEP have joined. The most important
components of GESAMP, however, are not IGOs but experts. Each IGO nomi¬
nates several internationally respected experts to GESAMP. These indi¬
viduals, representing many marine science disciplines, act in their
individual capacity and serve GESAMP, not their nominating IGO. Thus,
annual sessions of the Group are attended by the experts and the member
IGOs .
Scientific issues are discussed, and if possible, resolved at the
annual session. If there is a need for intersessional work on an issue,
as is usually the case, working groups are established, made up typically
of three or four experts. The terms of reference for the working groups are
agreed upon by the experts and the IGOs. One of the IGOs sponsoring the
intersessional work will be the "lead agency" and provides administrative
and technical support for the experts. The lead agency will usually
be the IGO with interests and internal programmes most closely related
to the working group's terms of reference. Because marine pollution
problems are intersectoral, IGOs besides the lead agency are inevitably
concerned with the activities of the intersessional working groups.
Such IGOs may contribute to the lead agency's support and are known as
"cooperating agencies."
Before submission to GESAMP, a working group's work product is
often circulated for criticism to scientists who are not GESAMP members,
further ensuring an intellectually sound result. Also contributing to
this goal is the fact the experts receive no compensation for their work.
The working group's final report will be presented to an annual session
of GESAMP where it will be scrutinized by the entire body, which may
request changes. Once adopted by consensus, the report becomes an
official GESAMP document and one all the expert members are willing to
1543
stand by and member IGOs accept. The decision whether to adopt the
1544
work of a working group is seldom influenced by politics.
This method of work has been largely dependent on UNEP, for
prior to UNEP's entry into GESAMP, the work was not done intersession-
ally because of insufficient funds. Rather, the experts sought to give
208
advice during the week of GESAMP's annual meetings. Today UNEP is
commonly a co-sponsoring agency of the working groups and its contri¬
butions sustain intersessional work.
1545
GESAMP's 1983-1984 Intersessional Working Groups
1. Review of Potentially Harmful Substances
Lead Agency: WHO
Cooperating Agencies: FAO, UNEP




3. Biological Effects of Thermal Discharges in the Marine
Environment
Lead Agency: FAO
Cooperating Agencies: UNESCO, UNEP
4. Interchange of Pollutants between the Atmosphere and the
Oceans
Lead Agency: WMO
Cooperating Agencies: UNEP, IAEA
5. Land-Sea Boundary Flux of Pollutants
Lead Agency: UNESCO
Cooperating Agencies: UNEP, IAEA
6. Methodology and Guidelines for the Assessment of the Impact
of Pollutants on the Marine Environment
Lead Agencies: FAO, WHO
Cooperating Agencies: IMO, UNESCO, IAEA, and UNEP
Some of GESAMP's work has been significant. GESAMP played a funda¬
mental role in developing the generally accepted definition of marine
pollution. Its "Review of the Health of the Oceans" published in 1982,
1546
provides a valuable tool in understanding marine pollution. A
GESAMP working group provides IMO with environmental hazard profiles of
substances that IMO uses to update and revise the lists of substances
1547
in Annexes I and II of MARPOL 73/78. Furthermore, GESAMP studies
receive wide respect from IGOs and the international scientific community.
For example, one GESAMP study was used by IAEA in carrying out its work
1549
on behalf of the LDC.
GESAMP is not empowered to regulate the marine scientific activi-
209
ties of its members. It can neither set priorities nor settle juris¬
dictional disputes. Like other coordinating bodies, GESAMP can only
coordinate by persuasion. It is not within the power of the experts to
unilaterally undertake studies to, for example, close a gap they believe
1550
exists. GESAMP does, however, have value as a coordinator. This
lies within the discussions it holds after a study proposal is submitted.
All member IGOs may debate the proposal's wisdom and the experts may add
valuable, independent opinion about the project's necessity and the
method by which it ought to be carried out, or whether it can feasibly
1551
be carried out at all. Once the work is agreed to be worthwhile
and a working group set up, GESAMP can helpfully advise the group on
1552
methods to bring the project to a successful conclusion. At the
1983 session, UNEP proposed that guidelines on certain matters be estab-
1553
lished. In the discussion of this proposal, IOC pointed out that
1554
aspects of it had been covered elsewhere. Views were also expressed
on the concepts underlying the proposal and a concern for the magnitude
, 1555
of the task was expressed. Though a working group was set up, its
1556
terms of reference were narrower than UNEP's original idea. The
following year UNEP tabled another proposal that also received critical
1557
examination before a working group was established. In fact,
questions were raised about the potential overlap of the proposal with
ongoing work in other IGOs.
Without GESAMP it is possible, regarding UNEP's 1983 proposal,
that UNEP would have gone ahead and set up a programme based on its
original proposal, perhaps inadvisably in light of other work in the
network and without full awareness of all the project entailed. Though
it is true that a proposal for an activity has never been rejected by
GESAMP, it is not unusual for GESAMP to restructure or more clearly
, . . 1558define a proposed activity.
GESAMP provides a forum where the United Nations and specialized
agencies concerned with marine pollution meet and discuss matters of
mutual interest. It is probably true that the IGOs use GESAMP to discuss
informally matters beyond marine science. The exchange of views and
information allows each organisation to understand the work in others
and this may reduce overlap and enhance cooperation. GESAMP's use
of independent experts and its method of work has produced solid sci¬
entific work for use by the IGOs and the wider international community.
Remarkably, the experts give their time to GESAMP without compensation.
This may be an indication of the prestige of GESAMP. There is, however.
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a drawback with GESAMP in that it operates slowly. It takes usually
two to three years after the creation of a working group for its
report to be officially adopted. Nonetheless, by its critical dis¬
cussion of agency proposals for scientific work and the not uncommon
changes made to them, GESAMP furthers positive coordination. As a
scientific advisory body set up to assist eight IGOs, GESAMP supplys
a useful link in inter-organisational affairs.
5. UNEP's Regional Seas Programme
In Chapter Eight UNEP's RSP was discussed. That discussion in¬
cluded an account of how the RSP sets up a regional action plan.
This method will not be recounted. It will, however, be recalled that
the development of these plans involve not just UNEP but a number of
IGOs, global and regional. For example, MED POL Phase I was organised
by ECE, UNIDO, FAO, UNEP, IOC, WHO, WMO, IMO, and IAEA, though all
under UNEP's guidance. After an action plan is adopted the IGOs continue,
still under a coordinated format, to conduct regional activities, and
often in collaboration with one another.
It is the consensus that the RSP has been a success as it has ini¬
tiated environmental action in ten areas throughout the world involving
about 130 states. Some of the regions have adopted framework treaties
and some additional protocols on specific sources of pollution. The
power of the RSP as a coordinating mechanism is proved by the tangible
results achieved under its auspices. These results, however, could only
have been attained with the entire system's help.
6. The System-Wide Medium-Term Environment Programme
The SWMTEP is an idea and undertaking of UNEP's and is to help
UNEP carry out its coordinative and catalytic functions, set environ¬
mental objectives for UNEP and its partners in the United Nations sys¬




The SWMTEP was finalized in 1982. It is organised into fifteen
programmes that are to be revised every two years by UNEP's Governing
1561 1562
Council. One of the programmes is "Oceans." Most of the fifteen
1563
programmes contain two or more subprogrammes. One of the sections
in the subprogrammes sets forth "the system-wide strategy and focuses on
the major activities that the system will be addressing in the period
1984-1989... and those activities which UNEP, with its partners, will
1564
concentrate on over the same period.
To be effective the SWMTEP required, during its formulation.
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intensive cooperation of all the global IGOs with environmental pro-
1565
grammes. There is some doubt whether this was achieved:
It is unfortunate, if not surprising, that [Dr. Tolba,
Executive Director of UNEP] is at no stage prepared to openly say
that the failure of the SWMTEP processes is due to the failure of
the UN agencies to cooperate in the preparation of these plans.
In those cases where meetings have been called for that purpose,
most of the agencies have not bothered to attend and those who
have done so did not wish to commit themselves.^66
Perhaps the agencies view the SWMTEP as another coordination effort
that will require a significant amount of time and money and bear too
little fruit. Perhaps they are skeptical of it because with it UNEP
might develop a directive role, stepping beyond its coordinative func¬
tions. At the 1980 meeting of UNEP's Governing Council the representative
of UNESCO, reportedly speaking on behalf of the IGOs involved with the
SWMTEP, said coordination difficulties are not due primarily to the ab-
1567
sence of a system-wide plan. If UNEP views a system-wide plan as
a means to bring the United Nations system closer together and if
other IGOs do not share this view, the SWMTEP will have limited effective¬
ness. Carrying out the SWMTEP will cost considerable money and govern-
„ „ 1568
ments may not supply the necessary funds.
Although the programme has high objectives, an imposing title, and
is contained in a 184 page document, its contents do not seem to amount
to much. The "Oceans" programme, for example, is divided into three
subprogrammes: protection of global marine environment, regional activi¬
ties for the protection of the marine environment, and living marine
1569
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resources. An examination of the subprogramme on regional activities
will suffice to give an idea of what the other two involve.
The "general objective" of this subprogramme "is to improve regional
co-operation aiming at the protection of the marine environment and to
promote the development of specific regions through the design and imple¬
mentation of environmentally sound strategies for the rational development
1570
of coastal and land-based resources and activities..." "Specific
objectives" are to improve assessment of the causes, amount and effect
of environmental problems in regions; adopt legal, institutional, finan¬
cial, and technical arrangements for regional cooperation; and improve
1571
regional cooperation in development planning. To meet its ob3ectives
the subprogramme outlines the 1984-1989 strategy: establish regional
action plans, formulate and promote the adoption of legal instruments
for the environmental management of regional seas, develop agreements




The objectives and strategy of the "Oceans" subprogramme on
regional activities are sensible but hardly novel. Implementation is
1573
to be carried out through fifteen "main activities." It is here
that one would hope to find new ideas for controlling marine pollution
and enhancing coordination. But the implementing activities are not new
and are simply described in one or two lines. Along with the activity,
an IGO is named with responsibility for it. To illustrate, some of the
activities are: regional programmes for marine science - UNESCO/IOC;
training programmes on marine pollution and pollution control - WHO/
UNIDO/FAO/UNESCO; monitoring the transfer of pollutants between the air
and oceans - WMO; and organising regional and subregional arrangements
1574
to deal with oil pollution incidents - IMO.
The IGOs named as responsible for each activity are already
doing such work and will continue to do so with or without the SWMTEP.
1575
IGOs are not legally obligated to adhere to the SWMTEP. Rather
than being a system-wide plan to unify the global IGO programmes, the
SWMTEP seems far more a document merely stating what IGOs are already
doing, without suggestions on how the work might be more effectively
accomplished through better coordination. Although the Programme will
1576
be periodically evaluated to determine if its objectives are being met,
it is so broadly written that an analysis of its implementation and
1577
affect may be impossible.
This does not mean that the SWMTEP is completely without value
for better coordination. Its value, however, does not lie in its pur¬
pose of setting environmental objectives and unifying environmental
programmes, which it is unlikely to accomplish. It may, on the other
hand, succeed in contributing to better implementation of UNEP's coordi¬
nation and catalytic functions by its very formulation, which probably
aided UNEP to better understand what is being done by what IGO and what
is not being done. This information should help UNEP determine areas
where coordination is most needed and where it might usefully take
catalytic initiatives. For other IGOs, formulation of the SWMTEP
probably contributed to more awareness of what the participating IGOs
are doing, and enhanced coordination in marine pollution affairs may
flow from this.
7. Non-Institutionalized Coordinating Machinery
a. Introduction
A good deal of the formal coordinating apparatus described above
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has failed to bring significant coordination to the network of IGOs
concerned with marine pollution. But beyond this machinery lies a wide
range of coordination tools. These may be referred to as non-institution¬
alized. This machinery is extensively used by global and regional IGOs
and has probably resulted in considerable cooperation and more
success than institutionalized mechanisms. Categorizing the non-
institutionalized tools is possible if broad areas of delineation are
used. What follows is such a categorization, each containing a short
description of the category and examples of its use.
b. Meetings and Joint Sessions
Meetings between secretariats frequently occur, as do meetings
between legal and scientific advisory groups. The subject matter of the
joint meetings of technical bodies is closely defined, whereas
inter-secretariat meetings may have a particular item for discussion or
be wide ranging. Examples of meetings are common.
The Paris Commission has met with the EEC Commission to examine
1578
their relationship and discuss measures to deal with overlap. In
1983 an inter-agency meeting on radioactive waste disposal into the sea
1579
was attended by experts nominated by six IGOs. In 1981 representa¬
tives of the LDC Secretariat, UNEP, and the Oslo, Paris, and Helsinki
Commissions met to discuss the role and future direction of regional
and global dumping conventions and the effectiveness of past coordi-
1580 . J.
nation. Experts from regions in the RSP gather to discuss parti-
1581
. J.cular issues. UNEP sponsors periodic Inter-Agency Meetings on
the Regional Seas to provide a forum for a general exchange of views
and to which secretariats of all global and regional marine environ-
1582
ment treaties are invited. The ECE and UNEP hold periodic inter-
1583
secretariat meetings on environmental problems in the ECE region.
The ECE annually holds a meeting -- to which about twenty secretariats
come -- on water pollution and related water questions to develop
1584
better relationships and avoid duplication. Since the Stockholm
Conference the Executive Directors of the United Nations regional
economic commissions commonly convene meetings prior to global confer-
1585
ences to formulate concordant proposals on pertinent issues.
Despite the prevalence of these meetings, it may be asked what
good they do. This is difficult to answer. Some may be entirely
sterile affiars. Yet it may be that ostensibly inconsequential meetings
have benefits that are not readily detectable. Meetings surely enhance
knowledge of another IGOs programmes and philosophies and knowledge is
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the first step to coordination. The meetings may contribute to
developing personal understanding and respect among secretariats.
The large number of meetings may at least represent the awareness of
international civil servants of the possibility of overlap and an attmept
to satisfy coordination duties.
The use of joint sessions as a coordinating mechanism is not widely
used. It is limited to bodies established by marine pollution treaties.
Holding joint annual meetings are the Paris and Oslo Commissions and the
contracting parties to the Barcelona Convention and its Protocols.
Joint sessions of the Oslo and Paris Commissions discuss the Joint Moni¬
toring Programme, administrative matters, and issues of mutual interest.
Such a mechanism, along with the joint secretariat of the two Commission's,
probably provides the best means of ensuring cooperation between two
independent entities. As for the Barcelona Convention and its Protocols,
each calls for biannual meetings of their members, but the sessions are
all held together, facilitating coordination under all the instruments,
c. Joint Committees and Programmes
A common coordinating tool is combining the resources of two or
more organs to plan and carry out specific work. Joint working groups
might be established because one IGO is unable to do a satisfactory job
alone or because both IGOs have a similar objective and the most eco¬
nomical way to reach it is through cooperation.
1586
An example is the Joint Working Group on Incineration, convened
by the LDC Consultative Meeting and Oslo Commission to prepare provisions
for the control of incineration at sea. The Paris Commission is con¬
sidering whether to assess the effectiveness of present agreements on
radioactive waste disposal, but recognising the experience of other bodies,
1587
has discussed with the NEA the possibility of a joint working group.
One might also recall the extensive cooperation that goes on within the
RSP, which involves a number of particular projects being jointly carried
out by numerous IGOs. All of GESAMP's intersessional work is sponsored
by at least two IGOs. Other examples of joint activities include several
1588
IOC/UNEP undertakings, including the river inputs to ocean systems
1589
project; IAEA's International Nuclear Information System in which
1590
thirteen IGOs participate; a manual on air pollutants prepared under
1591
the auspices of WHO/EURO and the ECE; the IAEA/IMO issued guide on
"Safety Considerations in the Use of Ports and Approaches by Nuclear
1592
Merchant Ships;" and the ECE/UNEP/WMO Programme on Long-Range Trans-
1593
mission of Air Pollutants in Europe. Lastly, mention may be made of
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the Ecosystem Conservation Group, composed of UNEP, FAO, UNESCO, and
IUCN, that meets once or twice a year to coordinate the conservation
... „ . 1594
activities of its members.
d. Informal Consultation
Informal consultation might include a request for information on
a specific matter and involve a simple exchange of letters. More in-depth
requests for assistance also occur. For example, the Oslo Commission
is considering what to do with the danger posed by anti-fouling paints
1595
on pleasure boats and has asked WHO and FAO for help and these agencies
1596
have agreed to assist. The Paris Commission has turned to the Inter¬
national Council for the Exploration of the Sea for advice on certain
1597
technical matters. Because the Oslo Commission has considerable
experience with reports ODC parties must submit on dumping practices
and monitoring, UNEP has sought for use in its RSP the advice of the Oslo
1598
Commission on reporting procedures. UNEP has also gone to the LDC
1599
Secretariat for the same purpose. In developing the Baltic states'
ability to combat pollution caused by maritime incidents, the Helsinki
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Commission has studied other regional arrangements.
e. Harmonized Reporting and Procedures
A number of marine pollution control treaties require their parties
to submit reports on their polluting practices, efforts to control them,
and monitoring programmes. Some treaties require certain steps be taken
under certain circumstances and, if the procedures are harmonized through¬
out the network, ease of compliance by states party to several conven¬
tions will result. For example, at an ICC Consultative Meeting, secre¬
tariats of the ODC and Barcelona Convention proposed that the ODC's
Prior Consultation Procedure -- to be used by states intending to dump
certain hazardous wastes -- be acceptable to satisfy the LDC prior con-
1601
sultation requirements. This was essentially agreeable to the LDC
1602
Consultative Meeting. The LDC and ODC have not only harmonized
1603
certain notification requirements, but also their general reporting
1604
duties on dumping practices. Furthermore, a state party to both a
regional dumping treaty and the LDC need only submit its general
dumping reports to the regional secretariat, which will in turn forward
1605
them to the LDC Secretariat.
f. Exchanges
Exchanges may involve personnel, documentation, reciprocal repre¬
sentation at one another's meetings, and direct reports by one IGO to
another of the former's activities. Exchange of documentation is a
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widespread practice. Whether the voluminous documentation gets read
by the proper individual and in time to make a difference, is another
matter. Reciprocal representation at meetings is also a standard
1606
practice. Sixteen IGOs, for example, attended the ECE's 1983
1607
annual meeting. Of course, with the e>panding number of IGOs and
growing programmes it is "important to concentrate such observation
missions in those areas where there is a real possibility of mutually
1608
beneficial adjustments of work..." This method of coordination can
have direct benefits. For example, the Secretary of the Paris Commission
attended a meeting of OECD that discussed annual reports on mercury
pollution. OECD proposed that states submit such reports every three
years, but when the Paris Commission Secretary explained that under the
Paris Convention states must submit similar reports every four years
1609
the OECD decided to require the reports every four years as well.
The extent of attendance by one IGO at another's meetingstis illustrated by
figures in WHO/EURO's recent annual reports. In 1982 WHO/EURO received
233 invitations to meetings (81 from IGOs in the United Nations sys-
1610
tern, 75 from other IGOs, and 77 from NGOs) of which 187 were accepted.
1611
In 1981, 248 invitations were received of which 149 were accepted.
Exchange of reports allows state representatives to an IGO to
quickly gain an overview of the work going on in other IGOs. This
coordinating mechanism is illustrated by the Oslo Commission's habit
of submitting a report on its recent activities to the LDC Consultative
Meetings. UNEP sometimes does the same.
Exchanges of personnel is illustrated by UNEP's having assigned
1612
personnel to the ECE to support ECE environemtnal work. ICSPRO
1613
members second staff to IOC.
g. Liaisons
The use of liaisons is the placement of an individual of one IGO at
the headquarters of another to ensure that the sending IGO is aware of
what goes on in the receiving organisation and to provide a representa¬
tive of its views. All specialized agencies maintain a permanent liaison
officer at the United Nations Secretariat. IAEA and WHO have an
arrangement for the mutual appointment of liaison officers to ensure
1614
that plans in related fields are coordinated. The IAEA also has a
1615
liaison officer at WMO. The practice also occurs at the regional
1616
level. The Council of Europe has a liaison office at the EEC and




An IGO may unilaterally conduct its work in a manner that promotes
coordination. When WHO and UNEP began developing guidelines for a
Mediterranean protocol on land-based sources, they realized their
joint knowledge of the nature and sources of land-based pollution was
incomplete and consequently the ECE, UNIDO, IAEA, FAO, and UNESCO be-
1618
came involved in the preparatory work. The Paris Commission set
up a Working Group on air pollutants with terms of reference that in¬
cluded the duty to "examine which other national and international
bodies deal with atmospheric inputs to Paris Convention waters, and
1619
in which manner..." After the LDC Consultative Meeting changed
the LDC definition of "significant amount" for certain wastes, the
1620
Oslo commission changed its definition to conform with the LDC.
On the other hand, the LDC Consultative Meeting, in considering
adoption of guidelines and definitions, has relied on work done by the
1621
Oslo Commission. The Helsinki Commission has relied on the work
1622
of IMO to develop the Helsinki Convention. Each year the Council
1623
of Europe takes it upon itself to debate OECD's annual report.
The Mediterranean states, in implementing the Mediterranean Action
1624
Plan, have often sought the assistance of work done elsewhere.
Some of the examples provided above under "Informal Consultation"
are also instances of an IGO taking unilateral steps to ensure collab¬
oration .
1625
Some other means of ad hoc coordination are exchange of letters,
162 6
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aide-memoires, memorandum of understanding, and formal coopera-
1628
tion agreements. These might set forth a general agreement that
the signatories are committed to close cooperation and will seek closer
coordination, or may be more detailed and address coordination in
particular subject areas.
A typical practice in most global IGOs is to maintain a division
1629 . _ . .
on coordination matters. A senior member of such a unit in FAO
has said that a major part of his job was to "'comb all ECOSOC resolu-
1630
tions for their FAO implications.'" An individual in IMO is respon¬
sible for studying all resolutions, decisions, and recommendations of
1631
specialized agencies. Those that affect IMO are circulated to the
relevant division of IMO for review.
C. Conclusion
*
A number of bodies exist to coordinate the marine pollution work
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of IGOs at the global level. The General Assembly and ECOSOC have not
proved effective and the ACC has not fulfilled the hopes that brought
it into existence. After seventeen years of attempting to coordinate
ocean matters, the PCC's Sub-Committee on Marine Affairs was abolished.
DOEM, however, may be able to contribute. ICSPRO suffers a serious
credibility problem, and, while GESAMP produces sound scientific work,
it plays only a limited coordinating role in a limited sphere of
marine pollution, and its role in developing international environ¬
mental law of the sea is peripheral. The SWMTEP seems only capable
of contributing indirectly to coordination. UNEP's RSP, however, is an
effective coordinator and has contributed substantially to the develop¬
ment of international law. There are several reasons why the RSP has
had the success escaping other coordinating institutions.
One, UNEP and the RSP have a clear mandate to coordinate. The
General Assembly has many political concerns and ECOSOC has duties be¬
yond coordination and itself implements programmes. ICSPRO is a support
mechanism for IOC. GESAMP is a technical advisory body. The ACC, like
the RSP, has been set up only to coordinate, but it differs from the RSP
in that it is to coordinate everything. The RSP, on the other hand,
has a clear coordination mandate directed only at marine pollution. Two,
because the RSP's personnel are qualified in marine pollution and the
law of the sea, its suggestions are probably sounder than other bodies.
Also, the RSP is not a coordinating body abstractly making suggestions,
for it too functions in the world arena; it too has pollution control
programmes it is attempting to implement. It knows the frustrations of
other IGOs in trying to operate with limited funds in a world of
strained state relations. The RSP, subject to the same difficulties as
are other IGOs, is not a theoretical institution, making coordinating
suggestions to IGOs without the benefit of understanding their day to
day toils. Thus, it may be that the RSP makes pragmatic suggestions.
Three, and most importantly, the RSP has money. This makes it different
from other coordinating bodies, each of which may offer advice; the RSP
offers money with its advice. Able to fund the cooperative efforts con¬
ducted under its direction, the RSP has a powerful inducement for gaining
acceptance of its ideas.
Have non-institutionalized coordinating mechanisms been more
effective than institutionalized coordination? This is difficult to
answer. With coordinating bodies one has the tool of annual reports
and other documentation. Because of the casual nature of most non-
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institutionalized cooperation, it is not only difficult to locate its
occurrence but even more problematic to accurately assess its usefulness.
The mere fact that executive heads meet, documentation is exchanged, and
reciprocal representation takes place is, by itself, meaningless. It
would seem, however, that if two IGOs voluntarily initiated cooperation
that these efforts will have some effect. Indeed, Professor McRae, in
his study of the coordination problems that will flow from implementation
of the LOSC, states: "The problems identified here will continue in one
1632
form or another, managed more or less successfully on an ad hoc basis."
The flaw of non-institutionalized coordination is that it is wholly
dependent on the will of IGOs. Without the impetus of a coordinating
body this kind of coordination becomes haphazard. Yet the history of
institutional coordination has not been one of continued achievement.
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Why do coordinating bodies exist only at the global level?
There is little reason for permanent inter-regional coordinating bodies,
primarily because the regional IGOs deal with different ocean areas. As
one of the aspects of coordination is priorization, it is obvious one
region will not allow the states of another to determine what programmes
to undertake and how to carry them out. Nor is there much room for
rationalization, that is, avoidance of duplication. Scientific studies
must be done in all regions and each needs its own regulations.
Only in a few subject areas can marine regions expect to benefit
from collaboration. One region, for example, may be able to adapt another's
regulations to its own circumstances. Advantages may be gained in sharing
information on scientific methodolgies and cooperating on intercalibration
exercises. But, overall, the potential benefits of inter-regional
coordination are too limited to warrant a permanent coordinating insti¬
tution. Worthwhile cooperation can well be handled with non-institution¬
alized coordination. There may, however, be better reasons for an over¬
arching body encompassing the various functional and comprehensive IGOs
in a single region, such as Europe, where a number of such IGOs exist.
But even here the usefulness of a coordinating body may be questioned,
a point discussed in the following chapter.
As global IGOs differ from regional IGOs, there is more of a need
for institutionalized coordination. Unlike regional IGOs, global IGOs
conduct activities worldwide and their subject matter, the world oceans,
is the same. As the area of operation is identical, coordination would
likely bring benefits. The membership of global IGOs is generally the
same whereas it might be completely different from one regional IGO to
220
the next. Thus, global IGOs all have the same clientele. In these
circumstances, setting priorities makes some sense (even if difficult
to attain), whereas inter-regionally priorization makes little sense.
Furthermore, the need to avoid duplication is much more apparent for
global IGOs than for regional IGOs, for there may be good reasons for
two regional bodies concerned with different ocean areas to conduct the
same activities, but few reasons for global IGOs not to rationalize
their work. Another difference is that circumstances at the global
level are far more complex than regionally. Lastly, the legal duties
to coordinate are more clearly stated in the constituent instruments of
the global IGOs than they are at the regional level.
The above discussion sheds some light on the different functions
of coordination at the two levels. Regional IGOs tend to cooperate on
specific issues and defined problems. Thus, ad hoc measures are preferred.
Global coordination, on the other hand, while also using ad hoc measures
for particular issues, recognises a need to coordinate at the policy¬
making level. Policy-making is an ongoing process. Thus, a permanent
coordinating body is seen as appropriate. There can also occur instances
of cooperation on a particular project that is complex and of consider¬
able duration, such as the initiative by UNEP in marine regions. Hence,






It is the thesis of this chapter that the coordination issue,
as it concerns IGOs addressing marine pollution, has received un¬
deserved attention. More coordination goes on than is generally recog¬
nised. There is no need for more coordinating bodies among global
IGOs, nor is there a compelling need for them within any particular
region or between regional IGOs, nor between regional and global IGOs.
It may even be questioned whether poor coordination is necessarily an
evil and whether a fully coordinated network will bring a better result
than can an ad hoc response.
B. The Prevalence of Coordination
In Chapter Two a range of opinion from outside of and within IGOs
was presented that coordination is a problem. Such a view, though
widespread, is not unanimous. "In general, international environmental
1634
bodies are more cooperative than 'feuding.'" "[I]t is generally
recognized in the UN system that coordination in the field of marine
science has in fact been better than in almost any other field of inter-
1635
agency interaction." It has also been said that coordination
"seems to have worked much better with regard to the ocean than in
,,1636
virtually any other field I have encountered.
A United Nations Secretariat study of the marine affairs activities
of the United Nations and specialized agencies during the 1982-1983 bi-
1637
ennium provides insight into the amount of coordination that occurs.
Though the study's failure to clearly define its subject -- "marine
affairs" and "programme activities" -- renders some of its conclusions
unclear, it is nonetheless apparent that considerable coordination
takes place. The study began by examining programme mandates, usually
governing body resolutions, to determine what sort of action they called
for. This information is on pages 223-224 and reveals coordination is
the most commonly called for action in the field of marine pollution and
conservation.
The most prevalent means IGOs use to actually carry out activities
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action with other IGOs figured in 41% of the ways by which IGOs carry
1639
out their mandates. In the area of "control of pollution" coordi-
1640
nation is the most common method used to carry out activities.
The study also considered how the United Nations and the agencies
coordinate with IGOs and NGOs outside of this network. This inter¬
action is "characterized by a high degree of co-operation...Of pro¬
gramme activities identified, 26 per cent are reported to involve
co-operation with...[NGOs] and 28 per cent with non-United Nations
[IGOs]."1641
As a general conclusion to its analysis, the United Nations Sec¬
retariat said:
It might be expected that duplication and overlap
would occur in the areas of marine affairs because of the
natural interrelationships among the issues dealt with by
the various organisations of the system. In practice, the
analysis shows that procedures exist to agree on divisions
of responsibility and to concert action. To a degree that
is greater than in most of the areas in which cross-organi¬
zational analyses have been undertaken, marine affairs shows
a practical tendency for joint action through bilateral and
multilateral agreements among agencies.4®4^
This study, the quotes at the outset of this section, and many ex¬
amples of non-institutionalized coordination provided in the previous
chapter give a significantly different perspective on coordination
than the opinions presented in Chapter Two. As it is submitted that
coordination of marine pollution programmes may well be adequate at
present, the question arises why there is such a divergence of opinion.
One, the formal coordinating bodies — ECOSOC, the General Assembly,
the ACC, ICSPRO -- that on the whole have failed, have a high profile
and thus receive considerable attention. Yet much constructive coopera¬
tion is ad hoc and necessarily less well known. Two, complementary
activities may be mistaken as overlapping or duplicative. IGOs sharing
common fields of interest do not, per se, have overlapping work pro¬
grammes."^4^ Many programmes have similar titles but whether they actually
overlap requires scrutiny of programme details and the manner in which
they are carried out. Such analysis may reveal slight differences in
methodology and objective that make each project distinct, legitimate,
and not in need of rationalization. In 1974 Dr. Brown referred to the
bewildering number of IGOs working on air pollution, but then said




there is a fruitful interaction between them. Professors Kiss nd
Chayes have made similar comments on seemingly similar activities.
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C. Coordination: A Misguided Goal?
For all the calls for enhanced coordination, there is insufficient
reflection on the disadvantages this might cause. A need to "fill the
gaps" is often posited as a rationale for greater coherence among IGOs.
What these gaps might be is seldom enumerated. A United Nations Ad Hoc
Working Group on Coordination said that a part of coordination is the
allocation of resources to "'areas in which the needs and opportunities
1646
for international action are greatest.'" Where are the needs
greatest in the law controlling marine pollution? And for any such
gaps that might exist, which present opportunities for international
regulation?
Exploitation of the deep seabed has not yet begun, but when mining
starts under the LOSC the ISBA, which has competence over this activity,
will probably have adopted environmental regulations. Dumping at sea,
including incineration, is regulated by the LDC, and ship pollution is
well covered by MARPOL 73/78. Although offshore mineral recovery is
not covered by a global convention, MARPOL 73/78 has provisions re¬
garding it as does the ODC and Paris Convention. Nor is this gap in
the legal regime overly distressing because this activity contributes
only marginally to marine pollution and is conducted by only a few
states, at least some of which have environmental regulations that are
probably as strong as those to which any international conference
might agree. Furthermore, these activities are often conducted some
distance from valuable coastal waters. The topic of interest today,
radioactive waste disposal, is being addressed by several IGOs. Air
pollution is regulated by the ECE Convention, to which states that pro¬
duce most air pollution are parties. Land-based pollution is the re¬
maining source and is not controlled by a global treaty and thus a gap
exists. Yet, as the United Nations Working Group, quoted above, accu¬
rately said, resources should be directed not only where the needs are
greatest but also where opportunities for action are greatest. The
exceptional difficulties in controlling land-based pollution have been
discussed and one must wonder whether a reordering of priorities
directing the resources of IGOs to the land-based pollution problem
would be able to do much with it. And, as far as Europe is concerned,
there are a few agreements regarding this source; the Paris Convention,
the Helsinki Convention and the Athens Protocol. In many other parts
of the world, land-based pollution is not a pressing international
problem. Also, the RSP includes over 130 states and each Action Plan
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has as its aim the regulation of all sources. As the Plans develop,
1647
existing gaps may be filled.
Therefore, there are few gaps in the legal regime. Granted, it
is hardly satisfactory, but it does provide a reasonably sound frame¬
work and it may be all that is politically possible today. For land-
based pollution, the problem is too intractable to consider a univer¬
sal treaty controlling it and any new coordinating body, any reordering
of priorities, and any change in the direction of programmes cannot
change the hard economic and social facts of land-based pollution.
Even if this position is erroneous and gaps do exist that may
feasibly be filled, would not a redirection of organisational resources
to fill the gap open a gap elsewhere? Doing all the work that needs to
be done seems to have as its premise that there exists the wherewithal
to accomplish it all. But the human and financial resources of the
organisational network are distinctly limited. States give IGOs only
limited funds, but a part of which can be directed to marine pollution.
Only if priorization is accompanied with additional funding will it
likely lead to an improved marine environment. For example, the Paris
Convention will likely be amended to include air pollution. This can
be properly viewed as the wise closing of a space in the legal regime.
Yet, as the move is unlikely to be accompanied with more money, it will
divert attention and funds from the Paris Commission's primary purpose,
the control of land-based pollution.
Just as plugging gaps may not be beneficial as would initially
appear, perhaps duplication and overlap are not as bad as thought. Is
it necessarily harmful that two IGOs work on the same marine pollution
problem at the same time? Perhaps the inevitable competition will bring
1648
projects to a quicker conclusion and produce a sounder product.
Perhaps the different perspective and talent each IGO brings to the
1649
same problem will lead to a better result. Dr. Brown, in discussing
components of conventional environmental law, states: "The fora of
these acts varies from the merely recommendatory resolutions... of the
Council of Europe to the Directives of the EEC which bind states as
to the end to be achieved...[T]he interaction between these various, and
at first sight overlapping efforts can be productive of more effective
,,1650results.
Whereas some inefficiency may not weaken the network, centrali¬
zation may. The assumption that central direction is always better
1651
than a more diffuse decision-making structure may be doubted. Dr.
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Sharp has said that some agencies have exercised "imaginative experi¬
mentation" and adds that this might not have happened had they been
1652
subject to control by ECOSOC or the General Assembly. Furthermore,
constitutionally centralized systems, such as the United States, do not
1653
ensure complete functional orderliness. There has been considerable
discussion about placing the numerous marine pollution agreements
covering the North Sea within a comprehensive treaty or forum. While
the current Netherlands government believes an umbrella agreement has
some merit, it also recognises that "this could lead to highly complex
negotiations that served only to slow down the progress of such con-
,.1654sulfations.
If IGOs are deprived of some of their environmental activities
or pushed into reordering such work, perhaps they would take less
interest in it. It seems natural that any institution would pay less
attention to the work it does not have full control over. For the
preservation of the marine environment, it may be better that most IGOs
eagerly entered the environmental field, but detrimental if control of
their environmental work is taken from them.
The advocates of better coordination proceed on the premise
that more coordination will result in cleaner seas, yet this assumption
is not necessarily valid. For example, UNEP, the LDC Consultative
Meeting, and IAEA are all considering aspects of the seabed emplacement
of high level radioactive wastes. This diffusion could be tidied by
designating the IAEA as the sole body to consider this problem. But
if the opinion is true that IAEA is insufficiently environmetnal, what
has been gained in coordination may be an environemntal loss. Were
UNEP given full competence in this matter would it alone have suffi¬
cient funds to do the work and keep all of its other programmes going?
And would industrialized states contemplating seabed emplacement
folow UNEP's lead in this area? Perhaps mixing the problem in these
three IGOs will produce the best result.
Part of the rationale of the call for coordination is that
lack of cooperation saps the system of resources. But lack of coordi¬
nation may not be as wasteful as is thought and it must be asked what
coordination itself costs. Time and money invested in the pursuit of
coordination deprives substantive work of valuable resources. The
16 55
1985 budget of the Oslo and Paris Commissions is 264,000 pounds,
a paltry amount considering these bodies are to regulate dumping and
land-based pollution in the Northeast Atlantic. If more than a bit
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of this money is spent on coordination the Commission's substantive
work would have to be curtailed. The Council of Europe receives less
than 25 million pounds a year, a budget about half the size of the city
1655
where its headquarters are located, Strasbourg. The LDC Secretariat
comprises one man at IMO giving less than 40% of his time to LDC
matters. He can hardly be expected to attend all the relevant meetings
and read all the documentation. In 1979 IAEA's preliminary budget for
nuclear waste disposal was $1,372,000 while United States spending for
1656
the same year was projected at 445 million. Had the IAEA not coordi¬
nated its waste disposal programme with UNEP, LDC, and NEA, few resources
would have been lost. Had it extensively coordinated with these bodies
it may not, in the end, have had much of a project. How much did it
cost, in money and time, for WHO/EURO to prepare for and attend 187
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meetings in 1982? IMO's Marine Environemnt Division complains
that it receives so many questionnaires about its work from other inter¬
national bodies that it does not have time to respond to them all.
The points here are two. One, because the resources states give
IGOs to carry on marine pollution work are small, any failure to coop¬
erate closely with other IGOs probably causes little depletion of re¬
sources. Two, because of limited resources, pursuit of coordination
must, at some point, become an evil. That point is reached when coordi¬
nation produces too little to justify the loss of time and resources
1658
taken from substantive work. One commentator says: "I seriously
1659
question which costs more: duplication or coordination."
Some IGOs seem aware of this problem. The Helsinki Commission,
for example, requested its Secretariat to study the possible forms
of cooperation with other IGOs, but added that the study should consider
1660
the economic consequences of such cooperation. In reviewing its
position on cooperative activities related to the protection of marine
living resources, UNEP said "the co-ordinating mechanisms, and the
1661
concomitant expenditures, will be kept to a minimum..." The
Mediterranean states, in their implementation of the Mediterranean
1662
Action Plan, have often called for economical coordination mechanisms
1663
and noted that coordination can be costly. Even an organ of the
ACC has expressed "its concern regarding the proliferation both of
decisions of intergovernmetnal bodies calling for inter-agency consulta¬
tions or meetings and of the number of requests of bodies outside the
1664
United Nation system for meetings with... organisations of the system..."
"[T]he energy which has been devoted to... coordination has reached
excessive proportions to the point where it is imposing serious stresses
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on programme execution which suffers from too great a diversion of
1665
effort on the part of policy-makers and the managers of the system."
A final point to be made is that coordinating bodies and machinery
are themselves a kind of organisation and their presence further
clutters an already full arena of IGOs. Coordinating bodies may them¬
selves develop vested interests and fail to keep their raison d'etre
in view and, indeed, this sometimes happens.
Observations have been made that "there may be a manifest need
1666
to coordinate the coordinators," and "[sjometimes it seems that it
may be more difficult to coordinate the coordinating bodies than to
1667
coordinate the Agencies themselves." These are not facetious
statements; examples of their truth are prevalent.
ECOSOC and the General Assembly are two central coordinating
organs, yet there exists duplication and an unclear division of auth-
1668
ority between them. The relations between ECOSOC and the ACC have
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not always been amicable. It was some time before the ACC and
ECOSOC1s primary coordinating body, the CPC, agreed to hold joint
1670
meetings to provide for a collective dialogue and exchange of views.
However, "ACC shares the concern expressed by CPC that the Joint
1671
Meetings have not fulfilled their potential." There has been some
question of overlapping activities between committees of the ACC and
1672
other coordinating bodies. There is even the possibility that the
ACC's two main committees do not adequately coordinate between them-
1673
selves.
The ACC Sub-Committee on Marine Affairs had to spend time coordi-
1674
natmg its work with other coordinating bodies. It was not, however,
always successful in doing so. There was, for example, some overlap
1675
between its work and ICSPRO's. It is also revealing that the Sub-
Committee's Terms of Reference required it to "[m]aintain close
collaboration as appropriate with other relevant co-ordinating bodies...
UNEP has set up regional offices to represent it and cooperate
1677
with regional representatives of IGOs. Within the United Nations
regional economic commissions there are Environmental Coordinating
1678
Units (ECUs), established with UNEP1s support. Functions of the
ECUs include maintaining a liaison between the economic commission they
1679
serve and UNEP regional offices. In 1982 UNEP reassessed this com¬
plex coordinating set up and "owing to the costliness of the present
arrangements, coupled with a perceived overlap of substantive functions
betwen the UNEP regional office and the [ECUs] in the commissions, an
.1676
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over-all restructuring of UNEP's regional mechanisms should take
1680
place -- a perception shared by most of the regional commissions."
This situation is evidence that some coordination is done for the sake
of coordination with the consequence that money is wasted and the coord¬
inating design itself becomes incoherent. The episode provides an
illustration of Santayana's statement: "Fanaticism consists in re-
1681
doubling your efforts when you have forgotten your aim."
At a UNEP Inter-Agency Meeting on Regional Seas "[c]oncern was
expressed at the multiplicity of co-ordinating and supervising mechanisms
built into the Action Plan, in the form of UNEP regional co-ordinating
units, permanent secretariats of regional conventions, monitoring/
steering committees set up by the parties to regional conventions,
1682
expert technical working groups, etc."
As long ago as 1960, a study of the United Nations stated:
[I]t should be clearly understood that intensified co-ordination
must not be at the expense of efficiency, by requiring that the
heavy apparatus of interagency co-ordination be put into opera¬
tion every time something needs to be done. As a matter of fact,
some of the existing co-ordination procedures and practices
might well be simplified.
If anything, coordination mechanims have become more complex
along with the growing complexity of the entire system.
D. Governmental Disregard for Coordination and the Inappropriateness
of Further Coordinating Bodies
It is submitted that the overlapping of environmental activities
that does take place does not occur unwittingly. Rather, this possi¬
bility is often recognised and a decision nonetheless taken causing
overlap, or even duplication.
The Oslo Commission recently decided to study the transfrontier
movement of industrial wastes even though it recognised that the EEC,
1684
OECD, UNEP, and LDC Consultative Meeting were doing so as well.
At a 1981 UNEP meeting on regional seas, some IGOs asked UNEP to re¬
duce the number of meetings designed to develop and coordinate regional
seas action plans. UNEP responded that it is sympathetic with the
strain such meetings can put on IGO resources and time, but explained
most meetings were called by governments and UNEP was bound by such
1685
decisons. UNEP recently decided to continue studies on the envi-
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ronmental impact of sea disposal of radioactive waste, and it cannot
be denied UNEP was unaware of the work of the LDC Consultative Meeting
and NEA in this field. In 1960 and about 1970, FAO suggested IOC be made a
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joint body between it and UNESCO, but the desire of states for "sim-
1687
plicity" contributed to rejection of this idea. Because of a
foreseen overlap between the International Commission for the Scienti¬
fic Exploration of the Mediterranean (ICSEM) and FAO's General Fisheries
Council for the Mediterranean, ECOSOC in 1950 recommended ICSEM be abol-
1688
ished. But ICSEM's member states voted overwhelmingly to continue it.
The Mediterranean Action Plan contains several components and
each has an administering body. Unfortunately, these are not central¬
ized. The Regional Oil Combating Centre is in Malta, The Blue Plan
Activity Centre is in France, the Priority Action Plan Activity Centre
is in Yugoslavia, the Regional Activity Centre for Specially Protected
Areas is in Tunisia, an information centre is planned for Italy, and
the overall Coordinating Unit is in Greece. Ideally for coordination
the components should be in one place, but politics prevent centrali¬
zation. Governments desire the prestige of the presence of an inter¬
national body and the centres were established in the state most inter¬
ested in the activities of the particular centre. The best arrangement
for coordination was secondary to satisfying these considerations.
In conjunction with this discussion of the phenomenon of states'
willing acceptance of uncoordinated activities, one might reflect on
the provacative statement that "an increasing number of states are not
really interested in inter-secretariat co-ordination. Another in¬
creasing group of nations even seems to object to a policy-formulating
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task for secretariats..." This statement is given some validity
by the above examples of states, collectively acting as decision-making
bodies, knowingly and readily rejecting greater order and coherence.
Lack of coordination, therefore, is not always something secretariats
stumble into or a reflection of a jealous protection of their interests,
but often something into which their member states lead them.
These factors are a notable element in the coordination debate
and contribute to the conlcusion that the creation of new coordinating
bodies is ill-advised, but there are more fundamental reasons for this.
One, since history proves they have not been of much help, it is not
reasonable to establish more. Two, plenty of bodies exist. The General
Assembly and ECOSOC are capable of initiating and carrying out new
ideas for improving coordination. For inter-secretariat coordination at the global
level, the ACC exists to give overall direction to the United Nations
and specialized agencies, and ACC subsidiary bodies, standing and ad
hoc, are available for detailed work. Although one is tempted to propose
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resurrection of an ACC subcommittee solely concerned with marine
affairs, past failures require that the suggestion not be made. Be¬
sides, UNEP exists to identify gaps and otherwise coordinate environ¬
mental work. UNEP' s RSP is effective in the marine environment field
and DOEM provides another apparatus for consistent development of envi¬
ronmental programmes. ICSPRO and GESAMP are available to coordinate
marine science work. In addition, the array of non-institutionalized
coordination at the global level provide useful means of cooperation.
Thus, the coordination "problem" is not one of mechanisms but one of desire.
Of course, coordination at the global level is but a part of the
issue. Three other aspects are coordination between regional and global
IGOs; coordination amongst regional IGOs, that is, inter-regional
coordination; and coordination between the IGOs of a single region,
that is, intra-regional coordination.
As for the relations between regional and global IGOs, there is
a role for coordination allowing for timely exchange of information,
particularly when a global institution does a significant amount of
work within a regional IGOfe field, and vice versa, such as the Con¬
sultative Meetings of the LDC and the Oslo Commission. The exchange
of information will, for example, allow IGOs at both levels to keep
track of one another's scientific work so that duplication can be
avoided and knowledge supplemented, and of one another's standards and
rules so that they can learn what is an effective regulatory system
and perhaps encourage harmonization of regulations. Such harmoniza¬
tion is valuable to ensure states belonging to a global and a regional
IGO dealing with the same or similar subject are not bound by different
requirements and to encourage the development of more widespread prac¬
tices that in turn may lead to the creation of a global regulatory system.
But coordination between regional and global IGOs ought not go
much beyond such information exchange. In deciding what policies to
implement, what studies to undertake, and what regulations to adopt,
there is little purpose in coordinating the decisons of IGOs at the
two levels. Regional bodies, having been set up to escape global IGOs
and do work they proved incapable of doing, will not allow global IGOs
to return under the guise of coordination. Regional IGOs will operate
more efficiently without the influence of global IGOs in setting their
priorities and programmes. Functional regional bodies will be more
effective since the member states are far more likely to accept decisions
made solely by themselves. Thus, no formal coordinating mechanisms
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between the regional and global IGOs is advisable. Necessary coordina¬
tion can be carried out by the consistent use of various non-institu-
, . J 1690tionalized means.
There may be more reason, however, for inter-regional coordination.
Two regions, for example, may each have a dumping convention, making ex¬
changes of information on procedures, research, and methods of imple¬
mentation useful. There is also a use for cooperation between regions
to develop compatible methods of scientific research; to avoid unneces¬
sary duplication in areas of research, such as the development of tech¬
nologies to reduce the discharge of pollutants; and to exchange experi¬
ences in environmental management methods including legislation and
1691
ecologically sound development planning. As UNEP coordinates much
of the regional marine work, its RSP is well-suited to provide the
mechanism through which advisable inter-regional collaboration might
flow. Some regions, such as the Mediterranean and Kuwait Action Plans,
1692
have engaged in direct exchange of experiences and methods.
Yet it is to be kept in mind that because of differences in envi¬
ronmental philosophies and in memberships, and because of an overall
lack of homogeneity between two regions, it will be difficult to develop
relationships. The differences in the physical characteristics of
regional seas, and in the kinds and amounts of contaminants entering
them, make close inter-regional collaboration less worthwhile. And,
of course, when coordination is understood as priorization, then there
can be little room for one region having a voice in the decisions that
concern another. Periodic inter-secretariat meetings may be all the
formal cooperation needed inter-regionally, supplemented with forms of
non-institutionalized means of cooperation.
If such coordination has been insufficient in the past, it may be
fair to submit that it will improve. States have been occupied in the
past decade with setting up the legal and organisational framework for
marine pollution control. Now that most of the apparatus is in place the
states will turn to refining it. In doing so, they may increasingly
look to the benefits to be gained from inter-regional cooperation.
Intra-regionally the coordination issue becomes more complex,
particularly within the Northeast Atlantic where a number of comprehen¬
sive and functional IGOs are involved with marine pollution. In other
regions the issue is not as pointed. In the Baltic area the Helsinki
Commission provides a central body for the orderly development of sci¬
entific research and a regulatory system. Likewise with the Athens
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Coordinating Unit for the Mediterranean area.
With regards to the Northeast Atlantic, considerable thought has
been given to the need for an over-arching body to link the various
legal regimes and IGOs, and numerous suggestions have been made how the
, 1693
network might be better organised. Insofar as marine pollution is
concerned, however, reorganising the structure for the Northeast Atlantic
may not warrant lengthy discussion. The two most important treaties for
the region are the ODC and the Paris Convention and the link between
them is solid. There is the Joint Monitoring Programme to coordinate
scientific work, joint annual meetings to set general policies, and a
common secretariat to keep the Commissions fully aware of the work done
under each treaty. This secretariat also adminsters the Bonn Agreement,
placing a third agreement under one roof. As the dumping and land-based
pollution arrangements cover 80 to 90% of all marine pollution, a good
deal of the work is being well coordinated. Furthermore, the ODC and
Paris Conventions each have provisions dealing with aspects of offshore
exploitation and if the Paris Convention is amended to include air
pollution, as is likely, another marine pollution source would be brought
within this effective cooperation set up. The membership of the EEC in
the Paris Convention gives the Paris Commission another advantage of
having the most important European IGO as a part of it. Consequently,
much of the work of preserving the marine environment of the Northeast
Atlantic is conveniently located within the Oslo and Paris Secretariat.
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There are many sources of marine pollution, from the easily
identifiable and relatively inconsequential activities of offshore
exploitation to the often indiscernable sources and harmful consequences
of land-based pollution. Contaminants of the oceans come from a myriad
of man's affairs. Some wastes maintain their chemical composition for
decades; others are degraded to harmless substances within hours. The
kinds of contaminants are diverse. Vital economic and, therefore,
internal political factors affect any endeavour to control marine pollu¬
tion. Marine science is immature and many ocean processes and their
effect on wastes remain unclear. Any attempt to deal globally with
marine pollution is confronted with international political issues and
jealously protected state sovereignity. Consequently, marine pollution
and its solution are complex problems.
The response to marine pollution by the international community
has been equally complex. Recognising the limitations of international
judicial oversight, states have approached the problem through agree¬
ments. The global and comprehensive LOSC is the most recent attempt
and follows global conventions on dumping and ship pollution and a
number of regional treaties. Most of the marine pollution control
treaties rely on a commission, a type of IGO, to administer, implement,
and develop the treaty. But the response does not end here, for a
number of global and regional IGOs address marine pollution. These
organisations are often concerned with similar aspects of the problem
but often have distinct programmes and perspectives. This complex organi¬
sational response has led to a concern for effective coordination.
B. The Legal Response to Marine Pollution
1. International Claims
National environmental problems are often handled by litigation
by which a number of doctrines, such as nuisance, negligence, and public
trust have been formulated and elaborated in a wealth of case law.
National litigation may also be founded on detailed statutes and admin-
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istrative regulations. But recourse to third party settlement in
inter-state relations is a limited means by which to respond to marine
pollution. This is due not only to the nature of the international
legal system but also to the nature of marine pollution.
Ocean areas beyond state sovereignity are unprotected in the
sense that if they are damaged by pollution and no state suffers a loss,
the polluting state cannot be brought before an international tribunal.
Actio popularis is not recognised. A further barrier to international
claims is the problem of attributing to a state the acts of its nationals.
If attribution does not exist, a state suffering harm has no recourse to
an international tribunal against the individual. Individuals can neither
use an international tribunal nor be brought before one. If a state did
bring an alleged polluting state before the ICJ, it would be confronted
with a number of legal problems. Serious questions regarding the degree
1694
of harm, foreseeability, and standards of proof would exist.
The basis upon which a case would likely be founded are general
standards, such as the High Seas Convention's Article 2 reference to
"reasonableness" in the use of high seas freedoms, or such a doctrine
as abuse of rights. But proving fault under standards expressed in
such general terms is difficult. There is even the more fundamental
problem of getting a polluting state before a judicial body. States are
only subject to third party dispute settlement if they accept it and it
is uncommon for them to do so. Recognising such problems, at UNCLOS III,
Finland introduced a resolution calling for a conference to conclude a
convention "on criteria and procedure for the determination of liability,
the assessment of damage, the payment of compensation, and the settlement
1695
of related disputes." There seems to be general agreement that these
1696
areas require development.
Besides legal barriers, the nature of marine pollution signifi¬
cantly restricts the usefulness of using international claims to pre¬
serve the marine environment. A damaging marine pollutant is often
invisible and its sources too numerous or too widely scattered to permit
. . . 1697
the attribution of the injury to a single state.
Taking a marine pollution problem before an international tribunal
is the remedial legal response to marine pollution, but for the reasons
presented here, "it is quite obvious that this is a problem that does
1698
not lend itself to adequate treatment through international claims..."
What is needed is a preventive approach. This may be carried out through
the work of IGOs and by the adoption of treaties.
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2. Conventions
The marine pollution control treaties that have been concluded
make up an impressive group. Concern for the marine environment only
arose a short time ago, in the late 1960s. During the 1970s two global
conventions, the LDC and MARPOL 73/78 were adopted along with five
European treaties: the ODC, Paris Convention, ECE Convention, and the
framework Helsinki and Barcelona Conventions. All were adopted within
ten years of the environmental awakening and nearly all came into force
reasonably quickly. Considering this time period, the economic and
political ramifications of ratification, and the doubts about the conse¬
quences of marine pollution, the international community is to be commended
for its prompt response to marine pollution.
One way to assess the response is to ask if states have taken the
fundamental step of accepting that there is a problem. They have. They
have also, by adopting these conventions, taken the second step of recog¬
nising the need for some international treatment. These beneficial
trends, that have been confirmed by the LOSC, enhance the chance for
successful international resolution of the problem.
The thesis' examination of the treaties themselves, however,
typically found weaknesses in each, and some are substantial. Drawbacks
appear in treaty provisions. LOSC duties are usually vaguely expressed.
Some conventions include double standards. Numerous exceptions to obli¬
gations appear. Other drawbacks involve the manner in which the treaties
have been developed. The LDC's Consultative Meeting tends to avoid
decisions not only on difficult political issues, such as radioactive
waste, but even on fundamental decisions crucial to an effective conven¬
tion, such as allocation criteria for the annexes. Little has been done
to develop the Helsinki Convention beyond ship pollution.
An important question for evaluating these conventions is the manner
in which they have been enacted into national law and enforced by national
authorities. While the thesis has gone beyond analyzing merely the pro¬
visions of the treaties, to the way they have been developed, it has not
studied national adoption and enforcement after ratification. And en-
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forcement is "'the crucible of law, the test of its reality.'" A
study of how the parties to the conventions have implemented them is
needed to complete any evaluation of conventional law. Doubts may be
rightly held on whether implementation is adequate. Dr. Brownlie says:
"Probably the biggest single obstacle to treaty enforcement is the in¬
ability of national adminstrations in many countries to cope with even
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a minimal burden."
Despite these problems, the conventions, apart from proving the
international community's recognition of the marine pollution problem and
the need for some international treatment, exhibit a number of bright spots.
MARPOL 73/78 and its predecessor, the 1954 OILPOL Convention, have
contributed to a marked reduction in operational ship discharges. The LDC
has limted some dumping that would have occurred without it and has
surely prompted states dumping radioactive waste to proceed more cautiously.
The ODC has also prevented some dumping and is, like other conventions, a
diplomatic tool useful in stopping egregious waste disposal practices.
This treaty has also been developed to control incineration at sea as
has the LDC. Parties to the Paris Convention have adopted a few regula¬
tions limiting land-based pollution. The ECE Convention has brought about
a commitment by two dozen countries to significantly reduce sulfur dioxide
emissions and has spurred the adoption of an EEC sulfur dioxide Directive
and a Canadian-United States acid rain agreement. The Helsinki Convention
contributes to controlling ship pollution in the Baltic Sea and perhaps
the greatest benefit of the Barcelona Convention is instilling the need
for ecological perspectives in the management activities affecting
coastal areas and developing the scientific capabilities of less developed
Mediterranean states.
If the LOSC comes into force it will give states the opportunity
to exercise port state enforcement, a jurisdictional tool capable of
considerably reducing ship pollution. The LOSC also gives coastal
states some new jurisdictional power over polluting activities in their
EEZ. The convention's mandatory dispute settlement procedures may not
only contribute to elucidating the many vague terms in the convention,
but may, on a broader scale, foster the general developemnt of the inter¬
national environmental law of the sea. Perhaps most importantly, the
unique reference to "international rules," which creates a new source
of international law, may result in states being bound by such conven¬
tions as the LDC even though they are not party to it.
Thus, the LOSC will contribute to the environmental law of the sea,
but it is a mistake to view it as pivotal. Entry into force will not
ensure ocean health just as its failure will not doom the marine envi¬
ronment. The convention should be viewed as but one element in the
legal response to marine pollution, one that complements other approaches
but is not needed to ensure their efficacy. The LOSC's marine environment
protection provisions are not revolutionary. The opinion that such pro-
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visions "simply reflect the development of customary and treaty law
in recent years rather than place new obligations 6n States or develop
1701
new framework for control," is essentially correct.
In addition, if the LOSC does not enter into force, new developments
in marine protection will occur. Some of the treaty's provisions will
1702
still have an influence, acting as a model for state control, and
some may become part of customary law by state practice, such as the
articles on port state control. Other provisions may be included in
future marine pollution control agreements.
3. Considerations in Evaluating the Legal Response
a. A Complex Problem
In evaluating marine pollution control conventions, one should
keep in mind the difficult economic, political, technological, and sci¬
entific pressures and problems involved. Many of the failings in the
treaties reflect these factors.
Laws...do not grow up in isolation, but mould and are
moulded by the politics, economics and geography of the "real
world" to which they apply....The actual content of the law of
the sea at any given time will, therefore, be a reflection of
the underlying pattern of interests in the uses of the sea at
that time.
The thesis said little about the varied national interests that
shape a convention. This follows the approach of most studies. "'The
scholarly emphasis remains on the outcome...aspect of the whole process
of law development and law changes. The input aspect and the actual
process aspect of bargaining and decision-making are generally neg-
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lected.'" International environmental rules must be examined not
only in relation to the problem, but also as a product of many policies
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and influences. It would be unfair to criticize a treaty for not
covering points or for weakly covering others, without taking into
1706
account the circumstances under which it was adopted. Even among
countries with similar values and in a similar stage of development,
large environmental problems are difficult to solve. For example, despite
the long history of cooperation between the United States and Canada in
many areas, including the environment, acid rain still presents an
impasse and joint protection of the Great Lakes has been difficult to
agree upon. Professor Bilder writes:
The roots of such problems often lie in social forces and
attitudes which defy control -- exploitative attitudes to¬
wards the environment, economic expansion, population in¬
crease, and technological change. Our knowledge of the specific
causes and effects of environmental deterioration, scientific,
technical, economic, sociological and other; of the multitude
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of factors and complex interactions involved; of the optimal
and technical and institutional means for remedy; and of the
time scales such remedies may require, remains limited, im¬
precise and uncertain. The costs of effectively coping with
environmental deterioration may be substantial. Finally,
alternative patterns of solution may alter existing social
and economic patterns in different ways, and various groups
may consequently have high stakes in the approach chosen.
Where environmental issues engage such strongly competing
interests, they may transcend science and technology and be-
17 0ft
come deeply involved in the political process,
b. Not Necessarily a Global Problem
Although there are considerable weaknesses with the international
law for the marine environment, it is helpful to recognise that marine
pollution may not be the quintessentially global problem as it is often
viewed. The open oceans are clean and while some regional seas are not,
they are more resilient than was thought in the late sixties and early
seventies. Using the oceans as a disposal resource has detrimentally
effected only coastal areas and much of the harm is caused by river
pollution. For the most part, the marine interests being damaged are
those of the state allowing wastes to be put into rivers and carried
1709
to its coastal areas. The consequence is that governments them¬
selves, if they wish, are in a position to resolve many marine pollution
problems they suffer. The need for international solutions is not over¬
whelming. National environmental laws and policies are more important
than international ones.
Although this thesis neglects national law and its role in pro¬
tecting the oceans, there is a good deal of it and at least some of it
is effective. National pollution control systems, for example, "have
greatly reduced the land-based pollution that would have otherwise
reached the seas. . . In 1973 sulfur emissions in the United States
1711
were nearly 29 million metric tons. By 1979, the year the ECE
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution was adopted, the
United States had, on its own initiative, reduced sulfur emissions to
1712
about 24.5 million metric tons.
4. Conclusion
Though national law has an important role to play in protecting
the oceans, there are numerous factors hindering its use and effective-
1713
ness. Indeed, states have placed considerable hope in international
law. What fruits this confidence -- and the action based on it -- will
bear cannot now be determined. Despite the weaknesses of marine pollution
control conventions, they possess the potential to provide considerable
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protection for the marine environment from the sources of pollution they
address. Dumping, ship pollution, air pollution, and offshore and deep-
sea exploration and exploitation are fairly well covered. The gap in
this structrue is an inadequate response to land-based pollution. But
this is an extraordinarily complex problem and one that only recently
arose. Yet, even here, the Paris Convention and the Athens Protocol have
broken ground upon which the LOSC may promote the building of a more
solid structure. Indeed, the Paris and Athens agreements provide an
example that will promote similar agreements on land-based sources in
UNEP's Regional Seas Programme. Though beyond the scope of this thesis,
there also are a number of international agreements with terms protecting
1714
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the quality of rivers and lakes. These treaties, typically with just
a handful of parties, contribute to the law protecting the oceans from
land-based pollution.
C. The Organisational Response to Marine Pollution
1. Introduction
IGOs had, at best, modest environmental activities in the 1950s.
By the late sixties and early seventies the spirit and pace of their
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activities changed dramatically. In 1969 the CCMS was established
by NATO. The following year OECD set up an Environment Directorate and
UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Programme was initiated. In the early
1970s IMO began a dramatic redirection of its work that culminated in
giving it the preeminent role in ship pollution. The numerous conventions
of the 1970s created institutions for their administration.
IGOs have become increasingly important elements in the inter¬
national response to marine pollution, a development that moves along
with the advancement of the legal response. In fact, IGOs, stimulate
such advancement and are stimulated by it. The establishment of com¬
missions exemplifies the meshing of legal and organisational responses.
The functions of the IGOs are varied and may be divided into seven
1716
categories. By discussing these, the role and usefulness of IGOs in
protecting the seas may be clearer.
2. The Functions of IGOs
a. Research
Research programmes by IGOs include monitoring and information
collection. Monitoring is the study of ocean conditions to determine
1717
the attributes and changes in levels of selected variables. IGOs
also contribute to the next step which is evaluating and drawing conclu-
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sions from such studies. Scientific research is badly needed because
of man's ignorance of ocean processes and their relation to contami¬
nants. Information collection involves a much broader but less scheduled
collection effort. It goes beyond physical phenomena and includes
gathering information on such matters as national environmental law and
1718
policy.
b. Exchange of Information
Not only must research results by IGOs be disseminated to govern¬
ments and private institutions, but the results of national programmes
must also be distributed. Dissemination of information is one of the
1719
most important aspects of cooperation in IGOs. UNEP has an impor¬
tant responsibility here, one it attempts to carry out through its
1720
Information Referral System of Environmental Information. Other
efforts to exchange information include the ECE's Intergovernemtnal Centre
for Documentation on Housing and the Environment, FAO's legislative
library that compiles national marine-related legislation, and the IUCN's
Environmetnal Law Information System.
c. Regulation
"This includes the drafting of treaties, agreements, protocols,
regulations and recommended practices and procedures to be adopted within.
1721
the organisation or recommended to states for . ..ratification."
Regulatory functions also involve amending legal instruments, as is
commonly done by IMO under MARPOL 73/78. Of course, the legal status
of IGO actions vary, from recommendatory to quasi-legislative to legis¬
lative. While only a few IGOs draft treaties, many adopt recommendations
and principles. Although the latter are not binding they can have "sub-
1722
stantial effect on national policies" and contribute to the develop-
1723
ment of international environmental law. IGOs also play a vital role
in administering marine pollution control treaties. IMO oversees MARPOL
73/78 and the LDC, ECE the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Con¬
vention, and the ISBA deepsea mining under the LOSC. UNEP guides the
development of regional agreements.
d. Monitoring Compliance
The international community lacks collective monitoring and enforce
ment capacity. Enforcement rests with states, although some inroads have
been made regarding ship pollution and with port and coastal state juris¬
diction. Beyond this, the best that can be done is to give IGOs authority
to establish procedures that help inform them of state compliance with
1724
legal obligations. The most common mechanism is reporting by states
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on their activities. As seen with the dumping conventions, states
are not diligent in complying with their reporting obligations. With¬
out coercive powers, the best tool IGOs have to promote compliance is
1726
persuasion.
e. Promotion of Environmentally Sound Thinking and Practice
"This involves the formulation and propagation of demands and the
1727
mobilization of support for environmentally sound thinking and practices."
UNEP has an important role here but this function is "rather inadequately
1728
performed on the international level." Here lies a role for NGOs,
certain influential states, as well as individuals. One success in this
area that IGOs can take some credit for is the general opinion that the
1729
environment is no longer a confrontational word opposed to development.
f. Development Assistance and Technology Transfer
Most global IGOs are involved in helping less developed countries
improve their environmental laws, management practices, scientific, and
technological abilities. This function is important for ending or ameli¬
orating present problems and ensuring poorer countries are able to imple¬
ment future environmental standards.
g. Providing a Forum for Discussion and Understanding
The ongoing forum IGOs provide states to discuss national envi¬
ronmental policies and possible solutions to marine pollution may en¬
gender more understanding and respect among them. This, it is hoped,
1730
may facilitate more international cooperation to protect the seas.
Nearly all IGOs studied in this thesis engage in each of these
functions, although the degree of involvement with each varies consider¬
ably. Regarding research and information exchange, FAO, WHO, WMO, OECD,
and ECE have important programmes. The IOC and Oslo, Paris, and Helsinki
Commissions, as well as the Mediterranean Coordinating Unit, organise
cooperative scientific investigations and share the results with the
world. IMO and the EEC carry out regulatory functions. The Oslo Com¬
mission and LDC Consultative Meeting monitor compliance of dumping con¬
ventions. Promoting environmentally sound thinking and practices is one
of the purposes of UNEP, although other organisations, such as OECD, ECE,
and the Mediterranean Coordinating Unit are significantly involved.
Development assistance and technology transfer work is largely confined
to global IGOs and all IGOs provide a forum where opinions can be aired,
personal relationships fostered, and the ideal of international goodwill
promoted.
The organisational response, therefore, goes on at various levels
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involving varied functions. The response is interdependent and com¬
plex. It is also important, and it is difficult to imagine the world
without the presence of these bodies. If they did not exist today,
most would be established tomorrow.
The LOSC promotes the role of IGOs in protecting the marine envi¬
ronment. Numerous provisions in the marine environment section refer
to the "competent international organisation" wherein states are to
develop international environmental law. But as with the conclusion
made above of the LOSC1s affect on international law, the role and use¬
fulness of IGOs does not depend on the LOSC coming into force. Without
the convention, they will likely be used as the LOSC envisions. With
it there are "few significant opportunities for marine-related IGOs to
1731
devlop major new programmes and responsibilities. What the con-
1732
vention does is contribute to the trend of reliance on IGOs. If
the LOSC comes into force it will neither revolutionalize the use and
efficacy of IGOs in marine pollution control, nor will its failure
necessarily diminish their influence.
3 . Conclusion
Like international law, the IGOs active in marine pollution have
many failings. But it would be unfair to concentrate on the failings
of one organisation or the weaknesses of one commission without recog¬
nising they make up a system that, working together or independently,
contributes to marine pollution control. It would also be unfair to
concentrate an evaluation of IGOs solely on their contribution to in¬
ternational law. Although this thesis necessarily emphasized regulatory
functions, international law is only a part of what is needed to protect
the seas. Assisting less wealthy states is crucial, promoting the envi¬
ronmental perspective is an essential first step to solid environmental
law, as is facilitating a cooperative spirit. Data and knowledge are
required and must be widely disseminated.
As the programmes of IGOs are generally oriented to understanding
1733
pollution problems, it will take time to produce results. It is also
difficult to assess other IGO activities, such as dissemination of infor¬
mation, recommended principles and policies, and suggested technical
solutions. One ascertainable accomplishment of the IGOs is their contri¬
bution in giving the pollution issue lasting political and scientific
1734
credibility. Until states are willing to sacrifice their sovereignity
1735
to environmental purity, IGOs will provide a fruitful halfway house.
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Building the organisational structure for marine pollution control
began less than two decades ago. Ever since, it has been expanding and
developing and the community of states has succeeded in establishing the
necessary institutional mechanisms for marine pollution control. For
this framework to carry out its functions satisfactorily requires many
things. Financial support of IGOs is fundamental and granting them
additional powers would be helpful. International civil servants must
be committed and executive heads need to efficiently operate their
organisations. Inter-organisational coordination is also something
often posed as necessary for effective IGOs.
D. The Coordination Issue
1. Another View of Coordination
The concern for adequate coordination of IGO activities has
numerous tenets, many of which are questioned in this thesis. The prop¬
osition was presented that there may be more cooperation among IGOs than
is thought. The failure of highly visible coordinating bodies, such as
the ACC, may have led to the opinion of poor coordination, but much
coordination takes place outside these bodies by informal methods that
are necessarily less visible. Also, the myriad of coordinating efforts,
institutional and otherwise, bolster one another. Though one coordinating
body appears largely ineffective and another's methods inconsequential,
when taken together the efforts reinforce one another and have a
positive effect.
It has been stated that better coordination will close gaps in
international law protecting the seas, but a global legal and organisa¬
tional network has been established for control of dumping, ship pollution,
and deepsea mining. Offshore mining, land-based and atmospheric sources
of pollution are fairly well covered in Europe. For other areas, UNEP1s
Regional Seas Programme is developing legal obligations and setting up
institutions to cover all sources. If gaps do indeed exist, it is
highly unlikely that redirecting activities of IGOs will be accompanied
with additional funds or personnel. For example, when the ECE was assigned
to administer the Convention on Transboundary Air Pollution, it was
allocated no new resources. Consequently, reordering programmes will
stretch IGO resources more thinly and, if not open as many gaps as are
closed, will lead to superficial action in some areas.
Overlapping activities is not necessarily bad and may even be
beneficial, for each IGO may have different expertise and perspectives,
the accumulation of which may bring the best result. The interest in
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coordination does not appear to be shared by states who sometimes
choose uncoordinated and more organisationally complex approaches. The
merits of centralization were questioned and there are numerous instances
where coordinating bodies have exacerbated the cooperation problem rather
than relieve it.
All these points contribute to the position that establishing new
coordinating mechanisms is inadvisable, a conclusion further supported
by the fact that a range of coordinating bodies already exist.
While there is no question that the network of IGOs dealing with
marine pollution is complex, and some lack of coordination is inevitable,
"some of the demands for coordination reflect a desire for order and
symmetry in organisational affairs that is simply at odds with the real
1736
world." This is a valid point and why some of the reasons for
coordination difficulties were discussed. Decentralized functionalism
in the United Nations system is the result of a fully conscious policy.
A decentralized system has been systematically and deliberately built
over the years on global and regional levels. "It is idle to criticize
the complexities impatiently; they are the reflections of the political
1737
realities..." Lateral spread of environmental activities through¬
out the network is natural, considering the uniqueness of pollution.
Although one may find it exasperating that so many organisations:on
both levels are involved, this is a positive sign. By directing IGOs
to address marine pollution and setting up new bodies to administer
pollution control agreements, states are responding to the environmental
problems and seeking their discussion and resolution in international
fora.
2. Suggestions for Improved Coordination
While a skeptical position is taken on the coordination issue,
there is, as with anything, room for improvement. It is also admitted
that inter-organisational cooperation is something that states and
international civil servants should at least keep in mind. Many sug¬
gestions for improvement might be offered, but one must retain a real¬
istic perspective, particularly in light of the current financial prob¬
lems IGOs face. Three ideas follow. None propose new coordinating
bodies or novel approaches. Each seeks the better use of existing
machinery.
A way coordination among specialized agencies might be improved
is by greater use of the United Nations Charter and the relationship
agreements between the United Nations and the agencies. ECOSOC, by
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Article 63(2) of the Charter, "may co-ordinate the activities of the
specialized agencies through consultations with and recommendations to
such agencies..." Article 58 says ECOSOC as well as the General Assembly
"shall make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies and
activities of the specialized agencies." Related provisions appear in
the relationship agreements. Those in the agreement between IMO and
the United Nations are representative. Article IV of the agreement
says that IMO, having regard to the objectives of Articles 58 and 63
of the Charter, agrees to submit to its Assembly or Council, as
appropriate, all formal recommendations the United Nations may make
to it. By this article IMO also agrees to consult on such recommenda¬
tions with the United Nations upon request and to report to the United
Nations on the action it, or its members take, to give effect to such
1738
recommendations, or on other results of their consideration.
Neither the General Assembly nor, and more importantly, ECOSOC,
which has primary responsibility for coordination, have made much use
of such provisions and Articles 58 and 63. Thus, if, for example, ECOSOC
found agencies with overlapping activities or areas where no agency is
adquately involved it could bring this to the attention of the relevant
agency and suggest improvements. Although ECOSOC has issued recommenda¬
tions to agencies, these typically have been mildly worded. ECOSOC might,
therefore, start to deliver more recommendations on coordination more
forcefully worded. If the response is inadequate, ECOSOC should actively
pursue formal consultation under the relationship agreements. Such a
method would emphasize ECOSOC's seriousness and, here and there, spur
better cooperation. To be effective as possible, this approach re¬
quires commitment by state representatives to ECOSOC. If, upon adoption
of a recommendation for coordination, such a representative contacted
his national colleague who is the state's delegate to the agency to which
the recommendation is directed, and impressed on him the importance of
the issue, the recommendation might receive fuller consideration and
more respect in the agency. If just a handful of states coordinated
their response to ECOSOC recommendations this way, positive action on
the recommendations might result.
A second way to improve coordination also relies on fuller
use of existing machinery. Of all the coordinating mechanisms, UNEP's
Regional Seas Programme is one of, if not the most successful. It
has succeeded in bringing together specialized agencies and regional
IGOs to jointly develop and carry out environmentally protective pro-
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grammes in a number of regional seas. The basis for UNEP's success
seems to be largely based on its Environmental Fund. This Fund is
supported by voluntary contributions from states and UNEP uses it to
promote its projects. As UNEP is not an operational organisation it
designs projects that, it is hoped, other IGOs will find meritorious
and help implement. To promote cooperation, UNEP funds all or part of
the cooperating IGO's costs in implementing the project.. Few IGOs are
inclined to turn down suggestions for work that will funded by another
IGO. Therefore, UNEP, though without de jure coordinating authority,
has de facto authority. But the money in the Environmental Fund has
been limited since its establishment and only a part of UNEP's re¬
sources can be directed to the marine environment. UNEP's effectiveness
as a coordinator is proportionate to the amount of its funding. Thus,
were states to reach deeper into their treasuries and provide UNEP
with more money, a better coordinated system would likely result.
The third suggestion for better coordination does not depend on
existing mechanisms and it can only be implemented in the future.
Regionalization of the sea is firmly entrenched and will continue.
During this process regional conventions will continue to be adopted.
To ensure coordination of activities among the new administering com¬
missions and with commissions already at work, the drafters of future
agreements should keep in mind the coordination idea. The manner in
which they frame the treaty will have consequences for future coordina¬
tion. Unless regional environmental conditions and political interests
require otherwise, new conventions should be drafted with formats
similar to those now in existence, which themselves exhibit a similar
style. If possible, institutional arrangements under new conventions
should also be structured like those of existing arrangements. It
would also be helpful if institutions are explicitly required to develop
and maintain some kind of relationship with other bodies that deal
with similar matters. Again, if feasible, the substantive provisions
of future marine pollution control agreements ought to resemble terms
of extant conventions.
While regional chauvanism may prevent implementation of this
suggestion, and while different regions have unique environmental prob¬
lems and political pressures, by keeping the idea of future coordina¬
tion in mind during the formulation of regional conventions, and global
ones for that matter, it is likely that the opportunities for and ad¬
vantages of coordination will increase.
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3. Conclusion
The coordination problem: is there, in fact, a coordination
problem? The goal of the network is protection of the marine environ¬
ment. Critics of IGOs present no evidence of a causal relationship
between lack of coordination and a lack of protection of the seas. It
is submitted that states, by the conclusion of numerous treaties directing
IGOs to deal with marine pollution, have responded to the environmental
threat quickly, even commendably. Reasonably solid legal and institu¬
tional structures have been laid in a short time for the protection of
the marine environment. This circumstance leads to one of two conclu¬
sions about coordination. If there has been poor coordination, then
the good response proves coordination is not crucial for developing a
protective regime. On the other hand, if the premise is true that
coordination is necessary for such a development, then the work accom¬
plished proves there has been sufficient coordination.
E. Preparing for the 1990s and Beyond
The international community has approached marine pollution on
a fragmentary basis. There is not a comprehensive convention nor one
organisation dealing with all aspects of all sources of marine pollu¬
tion. Nor is there a supreme body to direct the overall response. Why
has there been such fragmentation?
One reason is that when a problem is initially recognised it is
difficult immediately to know how to solve it. Ignorance leads to
trying a number of limited approaches, a process to which few would
object. But once a limited approach takes hold, it is difficult to dis¬
lodge when a problem matures, can be seen in its entirety, and calls for
comprehension arise. The piecemeal approach also results from the hesi¬
tancy of governments to take action in areas where they are without experi-
1739
ence. Governments prefer to test solutions gradually rather than
quickly do something without knowledge of its consequences. Thus, today
ship pollution is the most comprehensively controlled source of marine
pollution. States have had over thirty years experience with such inter¬
national control. By the time the LOSC was adopted there had been ex¬
periences with controlling most sources but hardly enough to include de¬
tailed provisions on each. Yet the problems had matured enough for
states to accept general provisions on the control of all sources, some¬
thing they may not have been willing to do a decade earlier.
Some of these same reasons have led to a fragmented organisational
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response. Although the nature of the problem -- interdisciplinary --
and the nature of IGO mandates -- broad -- also led to many IGOs
addressing marine pollution.
The fragmented approach, though perhaps theoretically inferior
to a comprehensive approach, often serves better the needs of govern¬
ments in conducting international relations. Organisational and legal
comprehensiveness may never occur, for states may never be willing to
go that far.
One may even question the theory that comprehensiveness would
lead to cleaner seas. The problem is immensely complex and, as Charles
Lindblom argues, the complexity of a problem means that neither "drastic
policy change, nor even carefully planned big steps are ordinarily
1740
possible." What is ordinarily possible is "no more than small or
1741
incremental steps..." Lindblom uses the environment to discuss
his theory. He says that "one big integrated implemented solution to
environmental decay" is for most people a "happy vision" that remains,
1742
except in rare circumstances, impossible. "Too many vetoes are cast
against them. Too many conflicting interests pull them apart. An
operative, integrated solution to a problem is a vast collection of
specific commitments all of which are implemented. The odds of agree-
1743
ment...on these vast collections are extremely slim."
But one need not despair that the problem will worsen or never be
alleviated. There is promise in incrementalism. An agreement here, a
cooperative scientific investigation there, a Untied Nations resolution
here, may seem meaningless. But such incrementalism is a means of
1744
,
smuggling changes into the system. Important changes in policy
and in the political system often come about quite indirectly and as a
surprise to many participants in the system...Incremental changes add up,
1745
often more happens than meets the eye." It is doubtful, for example,
that most diplomats at UNCLOS III realized the potential significance
of requiring states to adopt environmental standards based on inter¬
national rules, a requirement that seems to make nonparties to a marine
pollution control treaty nonetheless bound by it.
That incremental changes in international environmental law have
added up is clear. On the whole, much has been accomplished since the
1972 Stockholm Conference on the Environment. Granted, much of what
the 1970s began and the 1980s seek to develop has weaknesses, and much
of what has not been done is cause for some concern. Nonetheless, the
Lilliputian efforts, taken together, have laid a foundation. The inter-
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national community's legal response to marine pollution, though frag¬
mented and uncoordinated by a detailed, comprehensive convention, con¬
stitutes a sound framework awaiting acceptance and full implementation
by all states. The organisational response, though also piecemeal and
undirected by an authoritative coordinating body, has established the
necessary institutional mechanisms to protect man's marine resources.
If the international community has the motivation, it has established
the basic legal and organisational structure to translate that will into
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